Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives

by Edited by Jagdeep S. Bhandari , Lawrence A. Weiss , Foreword by Richard A. Posner

• ISBN13: 9780521451079
• ISBN10: 0521451078
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1996-03-29
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

This collection is the first comprehensive selection of readings focusing on corporate bankruptcy. Its main purpose is to explore the nature and efficiency of corporate reorganization using interdisciplinary approaches drawn from law, economics, business, and finance. Substantive areas covered include the role of credit, creditors' implicit bargains, nonbargaining features of bankruptcy, workouts of agreements, alternatives to bankruptcy, and proceedings in countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and Japan. The Honorable Richard A. Posner, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, offers a foreword to the collection.

Table of Contents

Foreword the Honorable Richard A. Posner

Part I. The Role of Credit: Editor's introduction

1.1 Leverage, Nobel prize lecture (1990) Merton H. Miller

1.2 Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers Michael C. Jensen

1.3 A theory of loan priorities Alan Schwartz

Part II. Bankruptcy as a Reflection of the Creditors' Implicit Bargain: Editors' introduction

2.1 A world without bankruptcy Douglas G. Baird

2.2 Bankruptcy, non-bankruptcy entitlements, and the creditors' bargain Thomas H. Jackson

2.3 Translating assets and liabilities to the bankruptcy forum Thomas H. Jackson

2.4 Bankruptcy policy Elizabeth Warren

2.5 Loss distribution, forum shopping, and bankruptcy Douglas G. Baird

Part III. Beyond the Basic Creditors' Bargain: Editors' introduction

3.1 Bargaining after the fall and the contours of the absolute priority rule Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson

3.2 On the nature of bankruptcy Thomas Jackson and Robert E. Scott

3.3 A simple noncooperative bargaining model of corporate reorganizations Douglas Baird and Randal C. Picker

3.4 On the nature of bankruptcy Mark J. Roe

3.5 Bankruptcy and risk allocation Barry E. Adler

3.6 The corporate bankruptcy decision Michelle J. White

3.7 Bargaining over equity's share in the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford

3.8 Bankruptcy resolution Lawrence A. Weiss

3.9 The costs of conflict resolution and financial distress David Cutler and Lawrence Summers

3.10 Survey of evidence on business bankruptcy Michelle J. White

Part IV. Workouts or Bargaining in the Shadow of Bankruptcy: Editors' introduction

4.1 Managing default Stuart C. Gibson

4.2 The economics of pre-packaged bankruptcy John McConnell and Henri Servaes

Part V. Alternatives to Bankruptcy and the Creditors' Bargain: Editors' introduction

5.1 Corporate control and the politics of finance Michael C. Jensen

5.2 The uneasy case for corporate reorganizations Douglas G. Baird

5.3 Bankruptcy and debt Mark J. Roe

5.4 A new approach to corporate reorganizations Lucian A. Bebchuk

5.5 Debtor's choice Robert K. Rasmussen

5.6 Is corporate bankruptcy efficient? Frank H. Easterbrook

5.7 The voting prohibition in bond workouts Mark J. Roe

5.8 Financial and political theories of American corporate bankruptcy Barry E. Adler

Part VI. Experience of Other Countries: Editors' introduction

6.1 Lessons from comparison of US and UK insolvency codes Julian R. Franks and Walter N. Torous

6.2 The costs of corporate bankruptcy Michelle J. White

6.3 Should we abolish Chapter 11? Theodore Eisenberg and Shoichi Tagashira

6.4 The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, and David Sharfstein.