Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective

by van Frederikslust; Ruud AI

• ISBN13: 9780415405317
• ISBN10: 0415405319
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2007-12-22
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Ruud. A. I. van Frederikslust, Associate Professor of Finance, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam James S. Ang, Bank of America Eminent Scholar, Professor of Finance, College of Business, The Florida State University Sudi Sudarsanam, Professor of Finance & Corporate Control, School of Management, Cranfield University Ruud. A. I. van Frederikslust, Associate Professor of Finance, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam. He joined Rotterdam School of Management as Associate Professor of Finance 1984 from the Inter-University Graduate School of Management, The Netherlands, where he was Associate Professor of Finance. He is author of the work Predictability of Corporate Failure (Kluwer Academic Publishers). And editor in chief of the volume of collection: Mergers & Acquisitions (in Dutch) and of the volume Corporate Restructuring and Recovery (in Dutch) (Reed Elsevier LexisNexis). He has participated in the organizations of leading conferences in Europe and the USA and presented there also numerous research papers at the conferences. He has published in leading journals like the Multinational Finance Journal and the Journal of Financial Transformation. He was a member of the Board of the European Finance Association. James S. Ang, Bank of America Eminent Scholar, Professor of Finance, College of Business, Florida State University. He joined the College of Business, of Florida State University as a Professor of Finance in 1998 from Barnett Bank Chair Professor of Finance, Florida State University. His main areas of research interest are amongst others, in corporate restructuring, corporate governance and control. He has published extensively in leading academic journals like Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Finance, The Bell Journal of Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, and The Review of Economics and Statistics. And he is a member (current and past) of the Editorial Board of several of these Journals. He is amongst others a member of the Board of Trustees of the Financial Management Association and formerly he was a member of the Board of Directors of the European Financial Management Association. Sudi Sudarsanam, Professor of Finance & Corporate Control, School of Management, Cranfield University. He joined Cranfield as Professor of Finance and Corporate Control on the 1 January 2000 from City University Business School where he was Professor of Finance and Accounting. His original commercial background was in banking and international trade finance. Sudi's main areas of research interest are in corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions and corporate strategy, adopting a multidisciplinary approach. He is one of the leading authorities on mergers and acquisitions in Europe and author of The Essence of Mergers and Acquisitions (Prentice Hall), translated into five European and Asian languages. His recent book, Creating value from mergers and acquisitions: the challenges, an international and integrated perspective (FT Prentice Hall, 2003, pp613) has been widely acclaimed by both academics and practitioners and is considered a standard work on M & A. He has been a visiting professor at US and European business schools. He has been an expert commentator on mergers and acquisitions on radio and television and in the print media. Sudi has also published articles in top US and European journals on corporate restructuring, corporate governance and valuation of intellectual assets.

Table of Contents

List of tables	p. ix
List of figures	p. xv
About the editors	p. xvi
Preface	p. xviii
Acknowledgements	p. xx
General Introduction	p. 1
Alternative perspectives on corporate governance systems	p. 7
The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems	p. 11
A survey of corporate governance	p. 52
Investor protection and corporate governance	p. 91
Agency costs and ownership structure	p. 111
Equity ownership structure and control	p. 133
Security design, insider monitoring, and financial market equilibrium	p. 135
Blockholdings in europe: an international comparison	p. 157
The ultimate ownership of western european corporations	p. 163
Why are the levels of controls (so) different in german and uk companies? Evidence from initial public offerings	p. 191
Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes?	p. 221
Corporate governance, underperformance and management turnover	p. 255
Governance with poor investor protection: Evidence from top executive turnover in italy	p. 257
Ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the brussels stock exchange	p. 285
Who disciplines management in poorly performing companies?	p. 313
The cadbury committee, corporate performance and management turnover	p. 347
Directors' remuneration	p. 367
The prince and the pauper? Ceo pay in the united states and united kingdom	p. 371
The sensitivity of ceo wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magnitude and determinants	p. 398
Executive stock option repricing, internal governance mechanisms, and management turnover	p. 419
Executive compensation and agency costs in germany	p. 450
Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership	p. 467
Governance, performance and financial strategy	p. 487
Does the governed corporation perform better? Governance structures and corporate performance in germany	p. 491
Corporate governance and equity prices	p. 523
Shareholders wealth effects of joint venture strategies	p. 557
Corporate restructuring in response to performance decline: Impact of ownership, governance and lenders	p. 568
Dividend policy, corporate governance and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis: An empirical analysis	p. 599
Earnings management and investor protection: An international comparison	p. 623
On takeover as disciplinary mechanism	p. 645
Takeover defenses, ownership structure and stock returns in the netherlands: An empirical analysis	p. 647
The role of hostile stakes in german corporate governance	p. 662
The market for corporate control in a bank-based economy: A governance device?	p. 708
Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure	p. 734
Name Index	p. 749
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