Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers

by David Epstein , Sharyn O'Halloran

• ISBN13: 9780521660204
• ISBN10: 0521660203
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1999-11-13
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and O’Halloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers.

Author Biography

David Epstein is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. He has also taught at Harvard and Stanford Universities. Sharyn O'Halloran is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Columbia University and has also taught at Harvard and Stanford Universities.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables	xii
Preface	xvii
1 PATHS OF POLICY MAKING
The Politics of Military Base Closings	1	(3)
Delegating Powers: The Puzzle	4	(3)
A Transaction Cost Politics Approach	7	(2)
Delegation and Broad Themes in American Politics	9	(3)
Outline of the Book	12	(2)
2 CHOOSING HOW TO DECIDE
Legislative Organization	14	(4)
Delegation and Oversight	18	(11)
Why Delegate?	29	(6)
3 TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
Lessons from the Theory of the Firm	35	(8)
A Theory of Transaction Cost Politics	43	(4)
The Political Hold-up Problem	47	(6)
4 THE DECISION TO DELEGATE
The Elements of Policy Making	53	(6)
Equilibrium Actions and Outcomes	59	(16)
Testable Predictions	75	(11)
5 DATA AND POSTWAR TRENDS
Data Sample	86	(4)
Delegation Ratio	90	(9)
Constraints	99	(7)
Total Discretion	106	(6)
Postwar Trends in Executive Discretion	112	(10)
6 DELEGATION AND CONGRESSIONAL--EXECUTIVE RELATIONS
Divided Government: The Debate	122	(7)
Discretion and Divided Government	129	(10)
Roll Calls over Delegation	139	(11)
Vetoes and Delegation	150	(1)
The Structure of Delegation: To Whom Do You Delegate?	151	(3)
Testing for Strategic Delegation	154	(7)
Implications of Divided Government for Public Policy	161	(3)
7 DELEGATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
Perspectives on Legislative Organization	164	(4)
Committee Outliers in a System of Separate Powers	168	(14)
Committees, Parties, and Delegation	182	(5)
Legislative Procedures and Executive Discretion	187	(7)
Summary	194	(2)
8 DELEGATION AND ISSUE AREAS
Introduction	196	(1)
Issues, Delegation, and Public Laws	197	(9)
Issue Areas and Information	206	(10)
Delegation and Distributive Politics	216	(14)
Summary	230	(2)
9 CONCLUSION
Summary of Results	232
The Grand Regression: Integrating Theories of American Political Institutions Separation of Powers in the United States
AN AFTER WORD ON COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONS
Presidential Systems
Parliamentary Systems
Comparative Policy-Making Structures
APPENDICES
A. Proofs from Formal Model in Chapter 4
B. Sample of Public Laws
C. Sample Coding Sheet
D. Coding Rules for Discretion
E. Gridlock Interval and Other Measures of Interbranch Conflict, 1947--1992
F. Coding Rules for Roll-Call Votes
G. Committee Hearings Data
References
Index