Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

by Edited by Darren G. Hawkins , David A. Lake , Daniel L. Nielson , Michael J. Tierney

• ISBN13: 9780521680462
• ISBN10: 0521680468
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2006-10-30
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Table of Contents

1. States, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson and Michael J. Tierney

Part I. Variation In Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits: 2. A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson and Michael J. Tierney

3. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes

4. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems Helen V. Milner

5. Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality Lisa L. Martin

6. Delegation and discretion in the european union Mark A. Pollack

Part II. Variation In Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7. How agents matter Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby

8. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson

9. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson

10. Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity Erica R. Gould

11. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Alter

Part III. Directions For Future Research: 12. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins.