Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

by Edited by Darren G. Hawkins , David A. Lake , Daniel L. Nielson , Michael J. Tierney

• ISBN13: 9780521862097
• ISBN10: 0521862094
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2006-10-30
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Table of Contents

List of figures	vii
List of tables	viii
Notes on contributors	x
Preface	xv
Part I: Introduction	1	(38)
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory	3	(36)
Darren G. Hawkins
David A. Lake
Daniel L. Nielson
Michael J. Tierney
Part II: Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits	39	(158)
Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid	41	(36)
Mona M. Lyne
Daniel L. Nielson
Michael J. Tierney
US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy	77	(30)
J. Lawrence Broz
Michael Brewster Hawes
Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems	107	(33)
Helen V. Milner
Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality	140	(25)
Lisa L. Martin
Delegation and discretion in the European Union	165	(32)
Mark A. Pollack
Part III: Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability	197	(142)
How agents matter	199	(30)
Darren G. Hawkins
Wade Jacoby
Screening power: international organizations as informative agents	229	(26)
Alexander Thompson
Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO	255	(26)
Andrew P. Cortell
Susan Peterson
Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity	281	(31)
Erica R. Gould
Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power	312	(27)
Karen J. Alter
Part IV: Directions for future research	339	(30)
The logic of delegation to international organizations	341	(28)
David A. Lake
Mathew D. Mccubbins
References	369	(25)
Index	394