Donald Davidson Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality

by Lepore, Ernest; Ludwig, Kirk

• ISBN13: 9780199251346
• ISBN10: 0199251347
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2005-05-05
• Publisher: Clarendon Press

Summary

Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig present the definitive critical exposition of the philosophical system of Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Davidson's ideas had a deep and broad influence in the central areas of philosophy; he presented them in brilliant essays over four decades, but never set out explicitly the overarching scheme in which they all have their place. Lepore's and Ludwig's book will therefore be the key work, besides Davidson's own, for understanding one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

Table of Contents

Note on In-Text Citations	xviii
Introduction	1	(18)
Synoptic Overview of Davidson's Philosophy	1	(4)
Goals	5	(1)
Keynotes	6	(7)
Methodology	13	(1)
Overview	13	(6)
Part I Historical Introduction to Truth-Theoretic Semantics	19	(128)
Introduction	19	(6)
Learnable Languages and the Compositionality Requirement	25	(13)
The Compositionality Requirement	25	(3)
The Learnability Argument	28	(1)
Other Considerations in Favor of Compositionality	29	(2)
Relation to Knowledge of a Language	31	(2)
Objections to the Compositionality Requirement	33	(3)
The Influence of the Compositionality Requirement	36	(2)
The Form of a Meaning Theory and Difficulties for Traditional Approaches	38	(25)
The Form of a Theory of Meaning	40	(4)
The Third Man Argument and Morals Drawn from an Example	44	(4)
A Fregean Proposal	48	(1)
The Slingshot Argument	49	(6)
The Inutility of Meanings	55	(2)
Fallback Positions	57	(6)
The Introduction of a Truth Theory as the Vehicle of a Meaning Theory	63	(15)
The Proposal	64	(2)
A Truth Theory for Simple English0	66	(5)
A Solution to the Problem of Providing a Compositional Meaning Theory without Quantifying over Meanings	71	(3)
The Extended Project	74	(4)
Appendix: A Closed Form Recursive Definition of `true0'	76	(2)
Truth and Context Sensitivity	78	(14)
Adapting the Truth Predicate	78	(5)
Revising Convention T	83	(1)
Adapting the Axioms of the Truth Theory	84	(8)
Appendix: Formulating a Truth Theory for Natural Languages which Predicates Truth of Utterances of Sentences	88	(4)
Davidson's Extensionalist Proposal	92	(9)
The Extensionality and Determination Problems	101	(12)
The Extensionality Problem	102	(3)
Counter Moves, Problems, and Solution	105	(4)
The Determination Problem and Canonical Proofs	109	(4)
Foster's Objection	113	(6)
Relation to an Explicit Meaning Theory and to Semantic Competence	119	(6)
Relation to an Explicit Meaning Theory	119	(2)
Relation to Semantic Competence	121	(4)
The Problem of Semantic Defects in Natural Languages	125	(22)
Ambiguity	126	(3)
The Lack of a Precise Syntax for Natural Languages	129	(1)
Semantic Paradoxes	130	(8)
Vagueness	138	(9)
Summary of Part I	143	(4)
Part II Radical Interpretation	147	(154)
Introduction	147	(4)
Clarifying the Project	151	(23)
Initial Questions and Answers	152	(14)
A Modest Project and an Ambitious Project	166	(8)
The Procedure of the Radical Interpreter	174	(24)
From Behavior to Holding True	175	(3)
The Analogy with Empirical Decision Theory	178	(4)
The Introduction of the Principle of Charity	182	(3)
Three Interpretations	185	(7)
Is Charity Sufficient?	192	(2)
The Assumption of Grace	194	(2)
Stages of Interpretation	196	(2)
The Justification of the Principle of Charity	198	(11)
The Argument from the (Partial) Holism of Attitude Content	200	(2)
The Argument to the Best Explanation	202	(2)
The Argument from the Necessity of Radical Interpretability	204	(3)
Taking Stock	207	(2)
The Theory of Agency and Additional Constraints	209	(12)
The A Priori Theory of Rational Agency	210	(1)
Holism about Attitude Content	211	(2)
Constraints on Logical Form in the Object Language	213	(3)
Conformity in a Linguistic Community	216	(2)
The Role of Empirical Constraints	218	(3)
Indeterminacy	221	(27)
Underdetermination and Indeterminacy	223	(2)
Indeterminacy of Interpretation	225	(3)
Two Challenges	228	(3)
Non-Equivalent Sets of L-Sentences	231	(3)
Responses and Replies	234	(2)
Is This Just More Indeterminacy?	236	(7)
Does the Analogy with Measurement Theory Save the Position?	243	(5)
Development of a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action	248	(15)
Interpretation and Attitudes	249	(1)
The Problem of Assigning Desirabilities and Degrees of Belief	250	(2)
The Solution	252	(5)
Summary of the Revised Procedure and Discussion	257	(6)
Appendix: An Alternative Method of Identifying Logical Connectives	260	(3)
The Reality of Language	263	(38)
The Target	264	(5)
The Argument	269	(15)
Reactions	284	(11)
Conclusion	295	(6)
Summary of Part II	298	(3)
Part III Metaphysics and Epistemology	301	(124)
Introduction	301	(4)
The Impossibility of Alternative Conceptual Schemes	305	(17)
Conceptual Schemes	306	(1)
Scheme and Content	307	(3)
Attacking the Metaphors of Conceptual Relativism	310	(2)
Evaluating the Argument for the Impossibility of Radically Different Conceptual Schemes	312	(8)
Conclusion	320	(2)
Externalism and the Impossibility of Massive Error	322	(21)
The Omniscient Interpreter Argument	323	(3)
Evaluating the Omniscient Interpreter Argument	326	(3)
The Argument from Interpretation	329	(4)
Evaluating the Argument from Interpretation	333	(2)
Comparison with Other Sorts of Externalism about Thought Content	335	(5)
Conclusion	340	(3)
First Person Authority	343	(30)
The Explanandum	344	(5)
Two Explanations	349	(7)
Evaluating the Account of First Person Authority	356	(13)
Does Externalism Make Thoughts Self-Verifying?	369	(2)
Conclusion	371	(2)
Inscrutability of Reference	373	(14)
The Argument for the Inscrutability of Reference	374	(2)
The First Premise of the Argument for the Inscrutability of Reference	376	(2)
The Second Premise of the Argument for the Inscrutability of Reference	378	(5)
Responses	383	(3)
Conclusion	386	(1)
Language, Thought, and World	387	(38)
The Main Arguments for the Necessity of Language for Thought	392	(2)
The Argument for the Claim that Having Beliefs Requires Having the Concept of Belief	394	(3)
The Argument for the Claim that to Have the Concept of Belief One Must Have a Language	397	(2)
The Argument to the Primacy of the Third Person Point of View	399	(1)
Evaluating Argument (D)	400	(4)
The Argument from Triangulation	404	(3)
Evaluation of the Argument from Triangulation	407	(6)
The Problem of Other Minds	413	(5)
Conclusion	418	(7)
Summary of Part III	420	(5)
Bibliography	425	(10)
Index	435