Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

by Daron Acemoglu , James A. Robinson

• ISBN13: 9780521855266
• ISBN10: 0521855268
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2005-12-19
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.

Table of Contents

Preface	xi
PART ONE. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Paths of Political Development	1	(14)
Britain	2	(3)
Argentina	5	(3)
Singapore	8	(2)
South Africa	10	(4)
The Agenda	14	(1)
Our Argument	15	(33)
Democracy versus Nondemocracy	16	(3)
Building Blocks of Our Approach	19	(3)
Toward Our Basic Story	22	(1)
Our Theory of Democratization	23	(7)
Democratic Consolidation	30	(1)
Determinants of Democracy	31	(11)
Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict	42	(1)
Democracy in a Picture	43	(3)
Overview of the Book	46	(2)
What Do We Know about Democracy?	48	(41)
Measuring Democracy	48	(3)
Patterns of Democracy	51	(7)
Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution	58	(7)
Crises and Democracy	65	(1)
Social Unrest and Democratization	65	(10)
The Literature	75	(5)
Our Contribution	80	(9)
PART TWO. MODELING POLITICS
Democratic Politics	89	(29)
Introduction	89	(2)
Aggregating Individual Preferences	91	(1)
Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem	92	(7)
Our Workhorse Models	99	(14)
Democracy and Political Equality	113	(4)
Conclusion	117	(1)
Nondemocratic Politics	118	(55)
Introduction	118	(2)
Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics	120	(8)
Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies	128	(5)
Commitment Problems	133	(11)
A Simple Game of Promises	144	(7)
A Dynamic Model	151	(10)
Incentive-Compatible Promises	161	(10)
Conclusion	171	(2)
PART THREE. THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Democratization	173	(48)
Introduction	173	(1)
The Role of Political Institutions	173	(3)
Preferences over Political Institutions	176	(1)
Political Power and Institutions	177	(4)
A Static Model of Democratization	181	(5)
Democratization or Repression?	186	(7)
A Dynamic Model of Democratization	193	(8)
Subgame Perfect Equilibria	201	(2)
Alternative Political Identities	203	(4)
Targeted Transfers	207	(1)
Power of the Elites in Democracy	207	(4)
Ideological Preferences over Regimes	211	(3)
Democratization in a Picture	214	(1)
Equilibrium Revolutions	215	(3)
Conclusion	218	(3)
Coups and Consolidation	221	(34)
Introduction	221	(3)
Incentives for Coups	224	(1)
A Static Model of Coups	225	(6)
A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy	231	(15)
Alternative Political Identities	246	(1)
Targeted Transfers	246	(1)
Power in Democracy and Coups	247	(2)
Consolidation in a Picture	249	(2)
Defensive Coups	251	(2)
Conclusion	253	(2)
PART FOUR. PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK
The Role of the Middle Class	255	(32)
Introduction	255	(4)
The Three-Class Model	259	(3)
Emergence of Partial Democracy	262	(5)
From Partial to Full Democracy	267	(6)
Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer	273	(5)
Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners	278	(5)
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy	283	(2)
Conclusion	285	(2)
Economic Structure and Democracy	287	(34)
Introduction	287	(3)
Economic Structure and Income Distribution	290	(2)
Political Conflict	292	(1)
Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy	293	(3)
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land	296	(4)
Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy	300	(7)
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists	307	(5)
Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice	312	(1)
Economic Institutions	313	(3)
Human Capital	316	(1)
Conjectures about Political Development	317	(2)
Conclusion	319	(2)
Globalization and Democracy	321	(28)
Introduction	321	(4)
A Model of an Open Economy	325	(6)
Political Conflict -- Democratic Consolidation	331	(3)
Political Conflict -- Transition to Democracy	334	(4)
Financial Integration	338	(5)
Increased Political Integration	343	(1)
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade	344	(3)
Conclusion	347	(2)
PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy	349	(12)
Paths of Political Development Revisited	349	(6)
Extensions and Areas for Future Research	355	(3)
The Future of Democracy	358	(3)
PART SIX. APPENDIX
Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy	361	(20)
Introduction	361	(1)
Probabilistic Voting Models	361	(6)
Lobbying	367	(6)
Partisan Politics and Political Capture	373	(8)
Bibliography	381	(20)
Index	401