Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions Models of Political Rationality

by Drury, A. Cooper

• ISBN13: 9781403967251
• ISBN10: 1403967253
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2005-11-05
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

Summary

"This important contribution to the debate over the efficacy of economic sanctions skillfully integrates domestic and international factors into an explanation of why sanctions are chosen by political leaders. A. Cooper Drury develops a rational theory of why leaders choose sanctions, rather than another foreign policy tool, and to explain what type of sanctions are used, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them." "Assessing presidential decision-making and coercion short of military force, the book shows that presidents use sanctions primarily for foreign policy purposes but make the decision in a domestic context while facing cognitive constraints. This increases our understanding of why presidents use sanctions even when they so often fail." "Breaking new ground with its innovative argument, thorough testing, and variety of data bases, Drury here advances the understanding of decision making and foreign policy."--BOOK JACKET.

Author Biography

A. Cooper Drury is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	viii
Preface	ix
1 Introduction	1	(7)
2 Economic Coercion in Theory and Practice	8	(24)
3 Evaluating Sanction Effectiveness	32	(27)
4 Why Does the President Sanction? Beyond the Conventional Wisdom	59	(31)
5 When Does the President Sanction? An Empirical Analysis	90	(42)
6 Is There a Target Selection Bias?	132	(11)
7 The Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy	143	(16)
8 What Kinds of Sanctions Does the President Use? Domestic Constraints and Incentives	159	(16)
9 Conclusions and Implications	175	(15)
Appendix	190	(5)
Notes	195	(14)
Bibliography	209	(12)
Index	221