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9780521814904

The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780521814904

  • ISBN10:

    0521814901

  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2002-11-18
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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Summary

A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this book provides an overview of the past and recent developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.

Table of Contents

List of figures
viii
List of tables
ix
List of contributors
x
Acknowledgments xvi
Part I Introduction
The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics
3(42)
Eric Brousseau
Jean-Michel Glachant
Appendix: Canonical models of theories of contract
31(14)
M'Hand Fares
Part II Contracts, organizations, and institutions
The New Institutional Economics
45(4)
Ronald Coase
Contract and economic organization
49(10)
Oliver E. Williamson
The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships
59(13)
Benjamin Klein
Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts
72(27)
Eirik G. Furubotn
Part III Law and economics
The contract as economic trade
99(17)
Jacques Ghestin
Contract theory and theories of contract regulation
116(10)
Alan Schwartz
Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law: sale of an asset of uncertain value
126(14)
Victor P. Goldberg
A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights
140(19)
Gary D. Libecap
Part IV Theoretical developments: where do we stand?
Transaction costs and incentive theory
159(21)
Eric Malin
David Martimort
Norms and the theory of the firm
180(13)
Oliver Hart
Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints
193(20)
Philippe Aghion
Patrick Rey
Complexity and contract
213(28)
W. Bentley Macleod
Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts
241(10)
Oliver Favereau
Bernard Walliser
Positive agency theory: place and contributions
251(22)
Gerard Charreaux
Part V Testing contract theories
Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting
273(20)
Scott E. Masten
Stephane Saussier
Experiments on moral hazard and incentives: reciprocity and surplus-sharing
293(22)
Claudia Keser
Marc Willinger
Part VI Applied issues: contributions to industrial organization
Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements?
315(22)
Francine Lafontaine
Emmanuel Raynaud
The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers
337(21)
Benito Arrunada
Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights
358(15)
Godefroy Dang-Nguyen
Thierry Penard
Licensing in the chemical industry
373(22)
Ashish Arora
Andrea Fosfuri
Part VII Policy issues: anti-trust and regulation of public utilities
Inter-company agreements and EC competition law
395(21)
Michel Glais
Incentive contracts in utility regulation
416(24)
Matthew Bennett
Catherine Waddams Price
Contractual choice and performance: the case of water supply in France
440(23)
Claude Menard
Stephane Saussier
Institutional or structural: lessons from international electricity sector reforms
463(40)
Guy L.F. Holburn
Pablo T. Spiller
Electricity sector restructuring and competition: a transactions-cost perspective
503(28)
Paul L. Joskow
Bibliography 531(39)
Index of names 570(9)
Subject index 579

Supplemental Materials

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