Efficient Rent-Seeking

by Lockard, Alan A.; Tullock, Gordon

• ISBN13: 9780792372424
• ISBN10: 0792372425
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2000-12-01
• Publisher: Kluwer Academic Pub

Summary

Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk 'Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economy could not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrong even if the referee couldn't put his finger on it. There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, in which various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to the paradox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions. In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like the referee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly, at least very well. Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted. It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did show exactly that paradox. Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matter and the discussion sort of wound down, although it could not be said that it was either solved or even abated. It also began to appear that it had a much larger scope than just competitive rent seeking. Any contest for wealth, privilege, or prestige in which the chances of winning were affected by the investment of the contestants would appear to be subject to the same problem. The sum of the investments in equilibrium might be much less than the prize or much more. It depended on the structure of the contest, but the range of structures seemed to include almost all economic competition. Clearly, from the standpoint of economics, this was a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the whole vast structure of economic analysis rested on faulty foundations. Speaking frankly, neither of the editors thinks the situation is that desperate. We feel that there is a logical solution, even if we do not know what it is. The purpose of this volume is to attempt to get economists to turn to the problem and, hopefully, solve the paradox. We present here a substantial portion of the literature on the matter. We hope that the readers will be stimulated to think about the problem and, even more, we hope they will be able to solve it.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	ix
Introduction	1	(2)
Gordon Tullock
Efficient Rent Seeking	3	(14)
Gordon Tullock
Long Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking	17	(6)
William J. Corcoran
Long Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking: A Comment	23	(4)
Gordon Tullock
Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Long Run	27	(20)
William J. Corcoran
Gordon V. Karels
Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking	47	(12)
Richard S. Higgins
William F Shughart II
Robert D. Tollison
Back to the Bog	59	(6)
Gordon Tullock
The Design of Rent-Seeking Competitions	65	(12)
Robert Michaels
Rent-Seeking with Non-Identical Players	77	(12)
Richard J. Allard
Equilibrium Conditions for Efficient Rent Seeking: The Nash-Cournot Solution	89	(8)
David L. Cleeton
Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference Models of Success	97	(12)
Jack Hirshleifer
Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals	109	(10)
Wing Suen
Efficient Rent-Seeking Under Varying Cost Structures	119	(12)
Chris Paul
Al Wilhite
Investments in Rent-Seeking	131	(6)
R. Kenneth Godwin
Rent-seeking for Pure Public Goods	137	(12)
Eliakim Katz
Shmuel Nitzan
Jacob Rosenberg
Rent-Seeking, Rent-Defending, and Rent Dissipation	149	(10)
Chris Paul
Al Wilhite
Collective Rent Dissipation	159	(12)
Shmuel Nitzan
A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games	171	(16)
J. David Perez-Castrillo
Thierry Verdier
More Efficient Rent-Seeking - A Munchhausen Solution	187	(20)
Wolfgang Leininger
Still Somewhat Muddy: A Comment	207	(6)
Gordon Tullock
Cooperation by Credible Threats: On the Social Costs of Transfer Contests Under Uncertainty	213	(20)
Chung-Lei Yang
Effort Levels in Contests: The Public Good Prize Case	233	(6)
Kyung Hwan Baik
More on More Efficient Rent Seeking and Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment	239	(2)
Shmuel Nitzan
Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests	241	(16)
Shmuel Nitzan
Cooperative Rent-Seeking	257	(12)
Bruce G. Linster
Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games	269	(22)
Wolfgang Leininger
Chun-Lei Yang
The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates	291	(18)
Michael R. Baye
Dan Kovenock
Casper G. de Vries
The Reluctant Gamesperson - A Comment on Baye, Kovenock and de Vries	309	(4)
Gordon Tullock
The Specification of the Probability Functions in Tullock's Rent-Seeking Contest	313	(4)
Peter Kooreman
Lambert Schoonbeck
Tullock's Rent-Seeking Contest with a Minimum Expenditure Requirement	317	(10)
Lambert Schoonbeck
Peter Kooreman
Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations	327	(16)
Kofi O. Nti
The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests	343	(14)
Michael R. Baye
Dan Kovenock
Casper G. de Vries
The Reformer's Dilemma	357	(4)
William F. Shughart II
Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests	361	(10)
Mark Gradstein
Kai A. Konrad
Gordon Tullock: Master of the Muck and Mire	371	(4)
Alan Lockard
The Costs of Rent-Seeking: A Metaphysical Problem	375	(10)
Gordon Tullock
Bibliography	385	(14)
Index	399