Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958

by Ramakrishna,Kumar

• ISBN13: 9780700715107
• ISBN10: 070071510X
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2001-12-14
• Publisher: RoutledgeCurzon

Summary

Despite the existence of numerous analyses of the eventual British success in the Malayan Emergency, the contribution of propaganda to the defeat of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) has never been exhaustively scrutinized. This book fills the gap in the literature and sheds new light on the hitherto neglected years of the Emergency - 1955 to 1958 - demonstrating how British propaganda decisively ended the shooting war in December 1958. Essentially, the study breaks new ground by arguing for a concept of 'propaganda' that embraces not merely 'words' in the form of film, radio and leaflets but also 'deeds' such as the behavior of Government representatives and certain official policies. It argues that for propaganda to be effective, the message transmitted by the propagandist's words must be congruent with that suggested by his actual deeds. Accordingly, the study shows that the MCP lost the support of the strategic rural Chinese community precisely because the Party's penchant for indiscriminateterror, especially in the early years, did not square with its rhetoric. In contrast, it was the British, from 1952 onwards, who recognized that their deeds had to confirm what their leaflets and films were saying to the rural Chinese. Subsequently, they were able to gradually secure the confidence of the community, and ultimately, as the successful Merdeka Amnesty of 1957/58 showed, even of the terrorists, whose mass surrenders in 1958 all but ended the war. Scholars and students of war studies and of imperial history will find the work of considerable interest.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	ix
List of Abbreviations	xi
Map	xiv
Propaganda in the Malayan Emergency: The Missing Dimension	1	(25)
The Malayan Emergency: History and Historiography	4	(7)
Defining `Hearts and Minds'	11	(1)
Understanding `Propaganda'	12	(5)
The Antecedents of British Propaganda in the Malayan Emergency I: Propaganda of Words	17	(4)
The Antecedents of British Propaganda in the Malayan Emergency II: Propaganda of the Deed	21	(4)
Approach	25	(1)
The Malayan Communist Party and its Impact on Terrorist and Rural Chinese Confidence	26	(28)
The Malayan Communist Party, the Rural Chinese and the `Rank and File'	27	(4)
Central's Intellectual and Doctrinal Problems	31	(5)
The MCP, the Terrorists and the Tension between Education and Coercion	36	(4)
The MCP, the Terrorists and the Tension between Education and Terror	40	(7)
Admission of Doctrinal Mistakes: The October 1951 Directives and the Aftermath	47	(5)
Conclusion	52	(2)
Propaganda in Disarray: The Mistakes of the Gurney Years, June 1948-May 1950	54	(33)
Introduction	54	(1)
Gurney, MacDonald and the Rural Chinese	55	(3)
The Consequences of the Loss of the Chinese Protectorate	58	(3)
The Propaganda Implications of Government and Security Force Behaviour	61	(3)
Detention, Deportation and Rehabilitation	64	(4)
Government `Deeds' and Terrorist Confidence	68	(4)
The Disorganisation of Government Word-Propaganda	72	(6)
Problems with Government Propaganda to the Rural Chinese Public	78	(2)
Government Propaganda and the Terrorists	80	(4)
Conclusion	84	(3)
Propaganda on the Mend: The Impact of Briggs and Greene, May 1950-February 1952	87	(33)
Introduction	87	(1)
Briggs, His Plan and the Rural Chinese	88	(1)
The Limitations of Briggs as Leader-Propagandist and the Consequences	89	(3)
The Propaganda Impact of Flawed Resettlement	92	(5)
Detention, Deportation and Collective Punishment	97	(3)
The Propaganda Consequences of Security Force Behaviour	100	(2)
Government Measures and Terrorist Confidence	102	(2)
Briggs, Greene and Government Propaganda of Words	104	(9)
Government Psychological Warfare and the Terrorists	113	(5)
Conclusion	118	(2)
Propaganda Turning Point: Templer, February 1952-May 1954	120	(40)
Introduction	120	(1)
The Man, the Plan, and the Rural Chinese	120	(6)
The Propaganda Impact of the New Villages	126	(4)
Operation Service and the Agents of Government	130	(6)
From Collective Detention to White Areas	136	(4)
The Improving Attack on Terrorist Confidence	140	(4)
A.D.C. Peterson and the Birth of `Information Services'	144	(9)
Government Psychological Warfare and Terrorist Confidence	153	(6)
Conclusion	159	(1)
Propaganda Most Optimal: Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Collapse of the Communist Terrorist Organisation, June 1954-December 1958	160	(44)
Introduction	160	(1)
Tunku Abdul Rahman: The Last Man for the Plan	161	(6)
The New Villages under Tunku	167	(4)
The Security Forces and Chinese Confidence	171	(3)
Government's Increasingly `Propaganda-Minded' Policies	174	(3)
Government Deeds and the Steady Erosion of Terrorist Confidence	177	(3)
Government Propaganda of Words in the Final Phase	180	(7)
The Return of C.C. Too and the State of Government Psychological Warfare	187	(3)
Propaganda Endgame: January 1955-December 1958	190	(11)
Conclusion	201	(3)
Conclusion	204	(12)
Notes	216	(67)
Bibliography	283	(13)
Index	296