Every Thing Must Go Metaphysics Naturalized

by Ladyman, James; Ross, Don; Spurrett, Don; Collier, John

• ISBN13: 9780199573097
• ISBN10: 0199573093
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2009-11-09
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

Every Thing Must Go argues that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing howrecent metaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, they demonstrate how to build a metaphysics compatible with current fundamental physics ('ontic structural realism'), which, when combined with their metaphysicsof the special sciences ('rainforest realism'), can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics itself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, Ladyman and Ross argue, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed ofself-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects. Everything Must Go also assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information.The consequences of the author's metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism vs. empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtualobjects, and the objective reality of natural kinds.

Author Biography

James Ladyman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. Don Ross is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Economics at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, and Professor of Economics at the University of Cape Town.

Table of Contents

In Defence of Scientism	p. 1
Naturalistic metaphysics	p. 1
Neo-scholastic metaphysics	p. 7
The principle of naturalistic closure	p. 27
The primacy of physics	p. 38
Unity of science and reductionism	p. 45
Fundamental and other levels	p. 53
Stances, norms, and doctrines	p. 57
Scientific Realism, Constructive Empiricism, and Structuralism	p. 66
Scientific realism	p. 68
Theory change	p. 83
Structuralism	p. 93
What is structural realism?	p. 122
Conclusion	p. 129
Ontic Structural Realism and the Philosophy of Physics	p. 130
Identity and individuality in quantum mechanics	p. 132
Individuality and spacetime physics	p. 141
Objectivity and invariance	p. 145
The metaphysics of relations	p. 148
Objections to ontic structuralism	p. 154
Mathematical structure and physical structure	p. 159
Further reflections on physics	p. 161
Conclusion	p. 189
Rainforest Realism and the Unity of Science	p. 190
Special sciences and disunity hypotheses	p. 190
Dennett on real patterns	p. 196
Concepts of information in physics and metaphysics	p. 210
Rainforest realism	p. 220
Fundamental physics and special science	p. 238
Causation in a Structural World	p. 258
Russell's naturalistic rejection of causation	p. 258
Philosophers and folk on causation	p. 266
Causes in science	p. 269
Letting science hold trumps	p. 274
Laws in fundamental physics and the special sciences	p. 281
Real patterns, types, and natural kinds	p. 290
Conclusion-Philosophy Enough	p. 298
Why isn't this Dennett? Why isn't it Kant?	p. 298
A reductio	p. 300
Neo-positivism	p. 303
References	p. 311
Index	p. 339
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.