Evidentialism and its Discontents

by Dougherty, Trent

• ISBN13: 9780199563500
• ISBN10: 0199563500
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2011-09-15
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, the twin pillars of contemporary evidentialism--Earl Conee and Richard Feldman--respond to each essay. This engaging debate covers a vast number of issues, and will illuminate and inform.

Author Biography

Trent Dougherty graduated from the University of Rochester, where he wrote a dissertation arguing against the notion that whether one knows depends on one's practical interests. He is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, where he regularly teaches graduate seminars in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. When not writing philosophy, he is usually riding a bike, often with his wife or one of his children.

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors	p. x
Introduction	p. 1
Evidentialism and Disagreement	p. 15
Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms	p. 17
The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent	p. 34
Evidentialism and the Paradox of Parity	p. 55
Virtue Critiques: Evidence and Inquiry	p. 69
From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism	p. 71
Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue	p. 88
Evidentialism and Skepticism	p. 103
Evidentialist Anti-skepticism	p. 105
Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection	p. 123
'Knowledge First'	p. 135
Questioning Evidentialism	p. 137
Improbable Knowing	p. 147
Concerns about the Internalist Component	p. 165
Evidentialism about Knowledge	p. 167
Evidentialism and Truth	p. 179
Evidence	p. 193
Evidence	p. 195
Making it Evident: Evidence and Evidentness, Justification, and Belief	p. 207
In Defense of Propositionalism about Evidence	p. 226
New Syntheses	p. 233
Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism	p. 235
Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package	p. 254
Replies	p. 281
Replies	p. 283
ad Bergman	p. 283
ad Greco	p. 285
ad DeRose	p. 287
ad Pritchard	p. 289
ad Rysiew	p. 292
ad Swinburne	p. 294
ad Fumerton	p. 296
ad Huemer	p. 298
ad Kvanvig	p. 299
ad Goldman	p. 302
ad Lehrer	p. 306
ad Steup	p. 308
ad Baehr	p. 310
ad Axtell	p. 314
ad Williamson	p. 316
ad Dougherty	p. 321
Chart Summary of the Arguments	p. 324
Bibliography of Conee and Feldman since the Publication of Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology	p. 330
Index	p. 333
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