The Evolution Of Animal Communication

by Searcy, William A.; Nowicki, Stephen

• ISBN13: 9780691070957
• ISBN10: 0691070954
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-08-15
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Gull chicks beg for food from their parents. Peacocks spread their tails to attract potential mates. Meerkats alert family members of the approach of predators. But are these--and other animals--sometimes dishonest? That's what William Searcy and Stephen Nowicki ask inThe Evolution of Animal Communication. They take on the fascinating yet perplexing question of the dependability of animal signaling systems. The book probes such phenomena as the begging of nesting birds, alarm calls in squirrels and primates, carotenoid coloration in fish and birds, the calls of frogs and toads, and weapon displays in crustaceans. Do these signals convey accurate information about the signaler, its future behavior, or its environment? Or do they mislead receivers in a way that benefits the signaler? For example, is the begging chick really hungry as its cries indicate or is it lobbying to get more food than its brothers and sisters? Searcy and Nowicki take on these and other questions by developing clear definitions of key issues, by reviewing the most relevant empirical data and game theory models available, and by asking how well theory matches data. They find that animal communication is largely reliable--but that this basic reliability also allows the clever deceiver to flourish. Well researched and clearly written, their book provides new insight into animal communication, behavior, and evolution.

Author Biography

William A. Searcy is the Robert E. Maytag Professor of Ornithology at the University of Miami Stephen Nowicki is Bass Fellow and Professor of Biology, Psychological and Brain Sciences, and Neurobiology at Duke University

Table of Contents

Figures, Boxes, and Table	ix
Acknowledgments	xiii
1 Introduction	1	(23)
Definitions	2	(4)
Some History	6	(7)
Categories of Signal Costs	13	(3)
Alternative Explanations for Reliability	16	(1)
Deception Redux	17	(3)
Evolutionary Interests of Signalers and Receivers	20	(4)
2 Signaling When Interests Overlap	24	(54)
Signaling Between Relatives: Theory	24	(12)
Begging	36	(17)
Alarms	53	(15)
Food Calls	68	(5)
Individually Directed Skepticism	73	(4)
Conclusions	77	(1)
3 Signaling When Interests Diverge	78	(56)
Mating Signals: Theory	78	(8)
Carotenoid Pigmentation	86	(11)
Songs in Oscine Birds	97	(26)
Tail Length in Birds	123	(8)
Conclusions	131	(3)
4 Signaling When Interests Oppose	134	(47)
Signaling in Aggressive Contexts: Theory	134	(7)
Postural Displays of Aggression in Birds	141	(6)
Badges of Status	147	(13)
Weapon Displays in Crustaceans	160	(9)
Dominant Frequency in Calls of Frogs and Toads	169	(9)
Conclusions	178	(3)
5 Honesty and Deception in Communication Networks	181	(26)
Third-Party Receivers	182	(1)
"Eavesdropping" versus "Interception"	183	(2)
Eavesdropping in Signaling Interactions	185	(18)
Third-Party Receivers and Reliability	203	(3)
Conclusions	206	(1)
6 Conclusions	207	(18)
Reliability	208	(6)
Alternatives to the Handicap Mechanism	214	(4)
Deceit	218	(5)
The Balance of Reliability and Deceit	223	(2)
References	225	(32)
Author Index	257	(6)
Subject Index	263