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| Why is the common law efficient | p. 3 |
| The common law process and the selection of efficient rules | p. 16 |
| An economic theory of the evolution of common law | p. 34 |
| A strictly evolutionary model of common law | p. 48 |
| Adjudication as a private good | p. 61 |
| Can litigation improve the law without the help of judges | p. 111 |
| Common law and statute law | p. 136 |
| The common law as central economic planning | p. 155 |
| Evolutionary models in economics and law : cooperation versus conflict strategies | p. 189 |
| Bias in the evolution of legal rules | p. 249 |
| Chaos and evolution in law and economics | p. 283 |
| Path dependence in the law : the course and pattern of legal change in a common law system | p. 311 |
| The role of lawyers in changing the law | p. 379 |
| Litigation and the evolution of legal remedies : a dynamic model | p. 404 |
| The spontaneous evolution of commercial law | p. 421 |
| Dispute and its resolution : delineating the economic role of the common law | p. 439 |
| Evolution of rules in a common law system : differential litigation of the fee tail and other perpetuities | p. 460 |
| Information, litigation, and common law evolution | p. 484 |
| Law and finance | p. 513 |
| The common law and economic growth : hayek might be right | p. 559 |
| The rise and fall of efficiency in the common law : a supply-side analysis | p. 582 |
| Micro and macro legal efficiency : supply and demand | p. 667 |
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