Federalism and the Market: Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World

by Erik Wibbels

• ISBN13: 9780521843812
• ISBN10: 0521843812
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2005-05-02
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

This research develops a new comparative model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for variation in the capacity of federations in the developing world to undertake economic policy reform, suggesting that many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival. As the degree of national-regional disagreement mounts, collective action on reforms that require implementation at multiple levels of government becomes more difficult. The degree to which the two factors conflict depends on four factors: the individual electoral interests, a shared intergovernmental fiscal system, the manner in which regional interests are represented in national policy making, and the levers of partisan influence national leaders have over subnational politicians. In testing the argument with combination of cross-sectional time-series and case study analysis, this book contributes to the broad literatures on development and the comparative political economy of federalism and decentralization.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
1 Intergovernmental Bargaining and Economic Policy in Federations	1	(16)
2 From Market-Preserving to Market-Distorting Federalism: Divergent Incentives and Economic Reform in Developing Nations	17	(36)
3 Federalism and the Decentralized Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance	53	(33)
4 Testing the Model: Macroeconomic Reform Beyond the Federal-Unitary Distinction	86	(37)
5 Partisan Harmony, Intergovernmental Coordination, and Market Transitions: The Case of Argentina	123	(39)
6 Regional Competition, Fiscal Dependence, and Incentives in the Argentine Provinces	162	(35)
7 The View from Below: The Politics of Public Sector Reform in Three Argentine Provinces	197	(26)
8 Conclusion: Federalism, Reform, and Enduring Puzzles	223	(26)
References	249	(24)
Index	273