Foundations of Ethics The Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 1935-6

by Ross, W. David

• ISBN13: 9780198241621
• ISBN10: 0198241623
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2000-12-07
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

Oxford Scholarly Classics brings together a number of great academic works from the archives of Oxford University Press. Reissued in a uniform series design, they will enable libraries, scholars, and students to gain fresh access to some of the finest scholarship of the last century.

Table of Contents

Introductory
Our method will be the critical study of the moral consciousness and of the main moral theories	2	(1)
Two main ways of regarding the moral life-as obedience to laws, or as a striving after goods. Our main task is therefore the study of the nature of, and the relations between, rightness and goodness	3	(2)
The main attempts at definitions of ethical terms may be classified as definitions by reference to a mental attitude (reaction theories), or by reference to results (causal theories)	5	(1)
They may also be classified as naturalistic or non-naturalistic	6	(2)
It is not always clear, at first sight, to what type a well-known theory (e.g. Hedonism) belongs	8	(4)
Naturalistic Definitions of `Right'
Evolutionary theories have no plausibility as definitions of `right'	12	(3)
nor as accounts of the ground of rightness	13	(2)
It is sometimes thought that they have successfully explained rightness away. (a) The inquiry into the origin of moral ideas may be thought to have undermined their validity; but this cannot be made out	15	(2)
(b) The discovery of differences between moral codes may be thought to have undermined them all; but such differences usually imply differences not on fundamental moral questions but on matters of fact which form the minor premisses of our ethical thinking	17	(2)
and in any case difference of opinion cannot prove that no opinion is true	19	(2)
Reaction theories: classification of them	21	(1)
Private reactions theory: objections to it	22	(2)
Public reaction theory: objections	24	(1)
The view that defines rightness by reference to the reaction of the agent: objections	25	(1)
Causal theories. Hedonism is unplausible as an account of the meaning of `right'	26	(1)
The various attempts at defining `right' would be more plausible if recast as attempts (a) to state the ground of rightness (as such they will be examined in chs. 4, 5)	27	(1)
or (b) as attempts to explain rightness away but few people are prepared to make this attempt; differences of opinion are usually as to what is right, not as to whether anything is right	28	(2)
The positivist theory. This is based on the view that all significant propositions are either (i) tautologous, or (ii) empirical hypotheses	30	(2)
Since `judgements' with `right' or `good' as the predicate do not appear to be either (i) or (ii), Mr. Carnap says they are not judgements but commands; objections to this	32	(2)
and Mr. Ayer says they are not judgements but mere expressions of dislike	34	(1)
The positivist theory examined by studying (a) its view that universal synthetic a priori propositions are really only statements about the use of language	35	(1)
(b) its account of judgements about the past	36	(1)
Examination of the positivist view about the relation between the meaning of judgements and their capacity of being tested by experience	36	(2)
Mr. Ayer's attempt to escape the objection that subjectivistic theories make difference of opinion about moral questions impossible	38	(4)
The Nature of Rightness and Obligation
The most important non-naturalistic definition of `right' is the definition of it as meaning `productive of the greatest possible amount of good'. But it would be more plausible to put this forward as the ground, not as the very essence, of rightness	42	(1)
The difference between `right' and `obligatory'	43	(2)
Prof. Broad's discussion of the meaning of `ought' and `right'. His distinction (a) of two senses and (b) of three applications of `ought'. Discussion of these distinctions	45	(3)
His view that `ought' is usually confined to cases where there are motives against doing the right action. Discussion	48	(3)
His definition of `right' as meaning `suitable, in a unique and indefinable way, to a situation'	51	(2)
Is there any real affinity between moral and other suitability? Perhaps between it and aesthetic suitability	53	(3)
Emotions as well as acts may be right, but only acts can be obligatory; and that is only a loose way of saying that men ought to behave in certain ways	56	(1)
Theories About the Ground of Rightness
For every theory about the definition of rightness there is a possible corresponding theory about the ground of rightness, and these are in one respect more plausible, while in another respect some are less plausible, than the attempts at definition	57	(1)
Evolutionary theories. Spencer starts by saying that actions are right because they are highly evolved, but in the end says they are right because conducive to pleasure; he adopts a psychological view, of the causal variety	58	(1)
Reaction theories. (a) The private reaction theory: objections	59	(2)
The public reaction theory: objections	61	(1)
The view that an act is right because the agent approves of it. This cannot be correct as it stands, but an action may perhaps be sight in one sense by being thought right in another	62	(2)
Causal theories. Hedonism will not be examined at length, (a) because it has been ably refuted by other writers	64	(1)
because it is only one species of a wider view which seems open to criticism, the view that actions are right only when and because they seem likely to produce the maximum good	65	(2)
The wider theory, ideal or agathistic Utilitarianism, to be examined. It seems to have been accepted as axiomatic, but there are difficulties, viz	67	(2)
It seems right to produce a fairly high concentration of pleasure, or of good activity, rather than a thin distribution of it, even if the total amount to be produced were greater in the latter case	69	(2)
We do not think it morally indifferent how happiness is to be distributed between the good and the bad	71	(1)
or between the agent and other people	72	(1)
These facts may be explained (i) by saying that there are duties other than that of maximizing good, or (ii) by saying that there are goods of higher order (in the mathematical sense), as well as simple goods like virtuous action and pleasure	73	(2)
We think the duty of not inflicting pain more stringent than the duty of producing a corresponding amount of pleasure	75	(1)
The duties of compensation for wrongs we have done, of making return for benefits received, and of fulfilment of promise seem independent of the duty of maximizing good	76	(3)
Prof. Broad's account of rightness as depending partly on utility, partly on suitability, accepted, with two minor differences	79	(3)
Current objections to Intuitionism: that it does not base duty on one single principle	82	(1)
that the supposed intuitions would entail that the same act is both right and wrong. This to be met by treating the general principles as stating not absolute but prima facie obligations	83	(1)
Advantages and disadvantages of this phrase: alternative phrases	84	(3)
The Obligation to Fulfil Promises
Mr. Pickard-Cambridge's criticism of this form of Intuitionism. His charge of `inconsistency of principle'	87	(2)
His claim that the ideal utilitarian method is easier to apply	89	(2)
His explanation of the duty of promise-keeping by reference to the goods to be produced by keeping promises. He seems to confuse two questions: (a) Can the keeping of particular promises be justified on utilitarian grounds ? (b) Can the general condemnation of promise-breaking by public opinion be justified on utilitarian grounds?	91	(3)
His discussion of cases in which non-fulfilment of promise would be generally approved	94	(4)
In general, he interprets promises without taking account of the unexpressed conditions implicit in ordinary speech	98	(1)
His argument that if the duty of promise-keeping were independent of in that of maximizing good, it ought to be always equally stringent. The degree of bindingness of promises is a product of two factors--the good to be produced and the explicitness of the promise	99	(3)
His distinction between the objective and the subjective good to be to produced by keeping promises. This does not account for certain instances in which most of the usual good results are excluded by the nature of the case	102	(3)
Mr. Katkov's attempt to bring promise-fulfilment under the maximization of good	105	(3)
The duty of promise-keeping requires careful statement if we are to avoid objectionable consequences. It is a duty not to effect a certain result, but to try to do-so	108	(1)
It is cancelled if the effecting of the result has become impossible (though not if it has become difficult)	109	(1)
or if it is clear that the promisee no longer desires its fulfilment	109	(2)
if we think doing something else will benefit the promisee more than keeping the promise would, the latter duty is not cancelled, but may be overborne by the former	111	(3)
The General Nature of What is Right: Some Theories
Is the being under the influence of certain motives the whole, or a part, of our duty?	114	(1)
If we have not one of these motives, it is not our duty to have it, for we cannot produce it by an act of choice. If we have one of them, it is not our duty to be under its influence, but to do the act to which it points	115	(1)
It can hardly be our duty to act from some other motive but never from the best, viz. sense of duty; and it cannot be our duty to act from the sense of duty, since this, when properly expanded into the form `it is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A', involves a self contradiction	116	(2)
Prof. Reid's view is open to the objection that it counts the being under the influence of a certain motive, which is the precondition of the choice, as part of the object of choice	118	(3)
To say that it is our duty to do certain acts, and not to act from certain motives, does not make the moral life discontinuous and external, because the cultivation of good motives is one of our main duties (though one best achieved, in general, by indirection)	121	(2)
If I want to do my duty, my motive will be the same, whichever act I come to think to be my duty, and therefore cannot be what makes one act my duty rather than another	123	(1)
What we in fact attend to, when we are trying to discover our duty, is not our motives but the nature and probable consequences of possible acts	123	(1)
Mr. Joseph's view that in certain cases the nature of the motive is what makes an action right	124	(2)
His analysis of a motived act into motive and physical movement	126	(1)
Ambiguity of the phrase `separating the act from the motive'	127	(1)
His account of our thinking that we ought to produce pleasure for another rather than for ourselves	128	(2)
His account of action done from sense of duty	130	(3)
Later he admits that where we act from a sense of duty alone, the action's being a duty cannot spring from its being done from a sense of duty	133	(1)
Prof. Field's view that the fundamental fact is the goodness of certain motives, and that our sense of prima facie obligations is due to the normal connexion of certain types of act with good, or with bad, motives	134	(2)
But it would be sheer confusion of thought to have any compunction about telling a lie from a good motive, merely because telling lies usually proceeds from bad motives	136	(1)
His view that if we can choose a certain act, we can choose what motive we shall act from	137	(1)
Aristotle, Kant, and the utilitarians agree in excluding motive from that which makes right acts right	138	(2)
Mr. Joseph's theory that in certain cases the rightness of an act depends on the goodness of the system which it forms with its context	140	(1)
Criticism of this view	141	(5)
The General Nature of What Is Right: Positive Consideration of the Question
If an act's rightness is its suitability to the situation, is it its suitability to the objective situation, or to the subjective, i.e. to the agent's opinion about the objective situation?	146	(1)
Considerations in favour of the objective view	147	(1)
Prof. Prichard's discussion of the question. He contends that our ordinary thought in part supports the objective view, but on the whole is more in agreement with the subjective	148	(5)
His contention that an obligation must be an obligation not to effect a certain result, but to set oneself to effect it	153	(1)
This contention supports the subjective view	154	(1)
His contention that rightness is not a character of actions, but that being obliged is a characteristic of a man, also supports the subjective view	155	(1)
The act which it is reasonable for a man to do if he wants to do his duty, is not that which will produce certain results, nor that which wiser men would think likely to produce them, but that which he thinks likely to produce them	156	(3)
The view that we ought to produce certain results, and the view that we ought to act from certain motives, are (though mistaken) natural, because actions that produce certain results, and actions from certain motives, are in different respects suitable to the situation	159	(2)
Three self-exertions that have some claim to be what the agent ought to do: all are in different senses right, but the one he ought to do is that which he thinks most suitable to the circumstances as he thinks them to be	161	(3)
This double dose of subjectivity not really objectionable	164	(1)
Relation of the morally good act to the right act	165	(3)
The Knowledge of What Is Right
The rightness of particular acts was originally apprehended directly, and the general principles reached by intuitive induction	168	(3)
When the general principles have been grasped, is the rightness of particular acts deduced from them? Only when the general principle (1) is accepted on authority, or (z) is not self evident but has itself been reached by reasoning	171	(2)
We often judge acts to be right or wrong, on the ground of only one of their probable consequences; the justification for this, when it is justified	173	(2)
When no act presents itself as obviously right, and (1) no principle of special obligation is involved, our problem is to estimate (a) the probable effects of different acts, and (6) the goodness of their effects	175	(1)
Difficulties of (a); it is done by analogical reasoning, with the aid of some a priori insight	175	(4)
Difficulties of (b) estimating the comparative goodness of different goods	179	(1)
Prof. Price's view that only ordinal and not cardinal numbers can be assigned to goods: this would not enable us to choose between actions of which one would produce one great good, and the other two lesser goods, which we seem sometimes able to do	180	(3)
But we can only assess the goodness of different goods as falling within certain fairly wide limits	183	(1)
The assessment of the goodness of probable results is not a logical deduction, but it has other judgements as necessary psychological preliminaries	183	(2)
Complication introduced by the principle of organic values	185	(1)
Where duties of special obligation are involved, we have the additional task of balancing them against the duty of maximizing goods	186	(2)
Consideration of Prof. Reid's objection to intuitionist ethics	188	(3)
In trying to discover our objective duty, we can usually discover our subjective duty	191	(1)
The Psychology of Moral Action
Moral action, except from sense of duty, agreed to be motived by desire. Aristotle's account of action as preceded by desire of an end, deliberation about means, and choice of means	192	(3)
It might seem that we choose an end before we choose the means; but the two choices are (t) a choosing to take whatever means are best towards a desired end, and (z) a choosing to take certain means as being the best	195	(1)
Aristotle describes deliberation as moving in a straight line from end to means; really it is normally much more complex	196	(2)
Choice of the means deemed most expedient is followed by a different activity, that of setting oneself to bring about some change	198	(1)
Deliberation often proceeds in the opposite direction to that contemplated by Aristotle, beginning with the suggestion of a possible act; most people are in fact suggestible, rather than planners, by nature	199	(4)
Decisions, no less than acts of self-exertion, can be good or bad, and can be right or wrong	203	(2)
Is action from a sense of duty motived by desire? Kant's view to the contrary is insufficiently grounded; dutiful action is motived by the desire to do one's duty	205	(1)
Dutiful action is the adoption of means to an end, not because the end is desired but because the adopting of means to the end is desired, as being one's duty	206	(2)
Indeterminacy and Indeterminism
Prof. Broad's view of the a priori argument for Determinism	208	(4)
His view admits determination as regards the broad features of any situation and denies its necessity as regards the details. This view might be justified if the belief in determination rested on a posteriori evidence; universal causation cannot be proved a posreriori	212	(1)
Belief in the law of causation cannot even be confirmed by experience, except in a Pickwickian sense	213	(1)
The situation which has given rise to the theory of indeterminacy; typical statements by physicists	214	(2)
`An electron has not at any moment both a determinate position and a determinate momentum': different interpretations of this	216	(1)
Confusion in Heisenberg's denial of the law of causation, in which he is not followed by Einstein and Planck	217	(2)
Sir A. Eddington's denial of causation much more sweeping than Prof. Broad's- he wishes to substitute probability and statistical generalizations for causal determination	219	(1)
His distinction of three sorts of inference from observed facts to causes	220	(1)
All these types of inference are equally valid, though inferences of the third type are incapable, as yet, of being confirmed by experience	221	(1)
Empirical verification of the law of causation much more imperfect in the realm of moral action than in that of physical events, but the a priori necessity of its acceptance the same in both cases	222	(1)
Doubt of it rests I on the supposed intuition of freedom, (2) on the thought that morality involves freedom. (1) Suggested that what intuition assures us of is that we sometimes refuse to act on the strongest desire of the moment; but it is a self determined by its past and by its system of interests that refuses	223	(3)
The case not different in principle when the sense of duty comes in	226	(1)
Even if dutiful action is motived not by desire but by a unique emotion, it does not thereby escape from being determined	227	(1)
The uniqueness of choice consists not in being undetermined, but in being determined neither b the strongest sin le desire nor b the whole array of desires; under the influence of the strongest group of co-operating desires we prevent the others from affecting our action	228	(2)
Though complete indetermination is impossible, and if possible would have no moral value, we all naturally incline to believe in it, when not philosophizing	230	(1)
The belief in indeterminism largely due to the consideration that we can cause any one of two or more changes in the physical world. This is true in the sense that the will can influence the body (within limits) as it wishes	231	(2)
But this, being a fact about the result of an act of self-exertion, throw no light on the question whether that act is itself caused	233	(1)
The real question is not whether we could produce different bodily effects if we set ourselves to do so, but whether, being the beings we are, we could indifferently set ourselves to produce different bodily effects	234	(1)
This is impossible, yet the ordinary conditions for a judgement of possibility are present, viz. (1) that we do not know that we shall perform act A, nor that we shall perform act B, (2) that, motives for each act being present in us, there is an appreciable probability that we shall do act A, and an appreciable probability that we shall do act B	235	(2)
The thought `I can do my duty' is useful as well as in the above sense true	237	(1)
and it is not made useless by the presence of the thought `I may not do my duty'	238	(2)
When I say `I can do this', I do not think all the conditions of my `doing this' are present. The phrase really means `I shall do this if I pre-dominantly desire to do it'	240	(1)
It does not mean either `I can do this whether I want or not' or `I can do this if I want, and I can produce the want'	241	(1)
Thus in a certain sense it is true that we can do either of several actions but what we do will be determined by the predominant mass of desire	242	(1)
While the metaphysical argument is in favour of determinism, the facts of the moral consciousness are not all against it; cf. our reliance on people's behaving according to their character, our reaction when they behave unexpectedly, the stress laid on the formation of habits, and our judgements about people's characters	243	(3)
The uniqueness of moral conduct not to be found in freedom from the law of causation, but in the unique nature of the activities involved--choice, self-exertion, and the thought of duty	246	(1)
The thought of responsibility, as involved in the phenomena of remorse, blame, and punishment	246	(2)
Mr. Wisdom's view that the belief in responsibility can be reconciled with belief in the law of causation only by supposing the individual soul to Have had no beginning in time	248	(1)
This gives the individual a part-responsibility for all his acts, but it will not satisfy the craving for escape from determination by one's own past	249	(1)
The only account of responsibility that seems compatible with belief in the law of causation	250	(2)
The Nature of Goodness
Reasons why a student of ethics must study the nature of goodness. `Good' applied to a great variety of things; it may be that (as Aristotle suggests) the various meanings are derived from a single central meaning	252	(2)
The only universal precondition of our using the word is a favourable attitude towards the object; but words mean something different from the attitude they express, and `good' is no exception	254	(1)
`Goodness of its kind', as ascribed (a) to persons, (b) to things	255	(2)
Predicative applications of good: (a) good as a means to something good in itself, (b) good in itself, (i) on the whole, or (ii) through and through. Our main questions-which can hardly be considered separately--are (1) what kind of thing `goodness through and through is and (2) what things are good in this sense ?	257	(1)
Is goodness a relation or relational property? i.e. is a thing's being good identical with its being the object of a certain kind of reaction on some one's part?	258	(1)
We often have not this explicitly in mind when we call a thing good; but further, such a definition does not express explicitly what was implicitly in our mind; `good' expresses an attitude of the judger, but asserts a characteristic of the object	259	(2)
Instead of identifying what we mean by `good' with being the object of a certain attitude, it would be more plausible to say that nothing has the characteristic we mean when we call a thing good. But the whole attitude of approval implies the conviction that some things are good in themselves	261	(1)
Prof. Campbell's view that while virtuous action is good in itself, scientific and artistic activity, and pleasure, are merely objects of a definite kind of liking, one that is independent, integral and relatively permanent	262	(3)
His view that these things are `objects of liking to human nature' must either be an inductive generalization from observed human nature, in which case it does not express what we mean by `good', or involve the thought of an ideal human nature and therefore of certain things' being worthy of liking, i.e. good in themselves	265	(3)
Prof. Campbell's two claims for his account: (1) that it yields a list of goods identical with the intrinsic goods believed in by others, (2) that it accounts better than the objective view for varieties of opinion as to what things are good. (1) admitted, (2) rejected	268	(2)
Knowledge and artistic activity owe their goodness not to our reaction to them, but to their own nature	270	(1)
In what sense is pleasure good? (1) For `good' as applied to moral, intellectual, or artistic activity we can substitute `admirable' or `commendable', but not for `good' as applied to pleasure. (2) While in virtue of performing good activities a man is himself good, no one is good in virtue of feeling pleasure. (3) While the goodness of other good things entails a duty to maximize them, there is no duty to maximize (a) pleasures that are the manifestation of a bad character, or (b) pleasures for oneself	271	(1)
Justification of the statements (a) that we have a duty to maximize pleasure for others, and (b) that we have no duty to maximize it for ourselves	272	(3)
We do not think the goodness of pleasure comparable with that of good activities	275	(1)
Therefore pleasure can be good only in a different sense from that in which good activities are so; for any man the pleasures of others (when not vicious) are good in the sense of being worthy objects of satisfaction	275	(2)
It might be suggested that the production of pleasure for oneself is right but not obligatory, since there is no possiblity of a moral conflict about it; but the suggestion cannot be accepted	277	(1)
The goodness of good activities seems to be an intrinsic property of them; the goodness of the pleasures that are good is a relational property, consisting in the fact that it is right to feel satisfaction in the pleasure of others	278	(1)
This view about the goodness of pleasures is identical with that of the Brentano school about goodness in general; but we do not accept the view of that school that goodness in general is one of a class of irreal predicates	279	(3)
Summary of conclusions about goodness. Things that are good in the two different senses are not comparable in respect of goodness	282	(2)
For any man, his own pleasures are good only in a third sense, viz. that his reaction to them is a favourable one; in other words `good' is used only as expressing an attitude, not as signifying a characteristic	284	(1)
Should the duties of special obligation be brought under the duty of maximizing good, by treating them as duties of producing `situational' goods which, like the pleasure of others, are good in the sense of being worthy objects of satisfaction?	285	(1)
Or are the results of the discharge of these duties worthy objects of satisfaction only because there is first a duty to produce them?	286	(1)
This question considered with reference to the various duties of special obligation	287	(3)
Moral Goodness
The class of things morally good includes (1) certain types of voluntary action, (2) certain desires, (3) certain emotions	290	(1)
certain permanent modifications of character	291	(2)
Action is usually held to owe its goodness to its motive	293	(1)
An attempted classification of motives, starting from Butler's classification	293	(6)
The view that only future states of oneself can be desired	299	(1)
Each kind of motive can exist in varying degrees of generality	300	(1)
An attempted ordering of motives in respect of goodness	301	(4)
Kant appears to be mistaken (1) in his attitude towards combinations of motives, (2) in his attitude towards all motives but sense of duty	305	(1)
Actions are good or bad not only in virtue of their motives, but also in virtue of the indifferences, or lack of repulsions, which they exhibit	306	(2)
In view of this, a completely good act must necessarily be a right act; yet moral goodness and rightness in some respects remain entirely independent	308	(3)
Summary	311