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9781402071157

Game Theory and Decision Theory in Agent-Based Systems

by ; ; ;
  • ISBN13:

    9781402071157

  • ISBN10:

    1402071159

  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2002-06-01
  • Publisher: Kluwer Academic Pub
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Supplemental Materials

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Summary

Game Theory And Decision Theory In Agent-Based Systems is a collection of papers from international leading researchers, that offers a broad view of the many ways game theory and decision theory can be applied in agent-based systems, from standard applications of the core elements of the theory to more cutting edge developments. The range of topics discussed in this book provide the reader with the first comprehensive volume that reflects both the depth and breadth of work in applying techniques from game theory and decision theory to design agent-based systems. Chapters include: Selecting Partners; Evolution of Agents with Moral Sentiments in an IPD Exercise; Dynamic Desires; Emotions and Personality; Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory; Shopbot Economics; Finding the Best Way to Join in; Shopbots and Pricebots in Electronic Service Markets; Polynomial Time Mechanisms; Multi-Agent Q-learning and Regression Trees; Satisficing Equilibria; Investigating Commitment Flexibility in Multi-agent Contracts; Pricing in Agent Economies using Multi-agent Q-learning; Using Hypergames to Increase Planned Payoff and Reduce Risk; Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information; Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids.

Table of Contents

List of Figures
ix
List of Tables
xiii
Preface xv
Contributing Authors xix
Introduction xxv
Simon Parsons
Piotr Gmytrasiewicz
Michael Wooldridge
Game Theory and Decision Theory
1(28)
Simon Parsons
Michael Wooldridge
Introduction
1(1)
Decision Theory
2(8)
Game Theory
10(10)
The Prisoner's Dilemma
20(6)
Summary
26(3)
Selecting Partners
29(14)
Bikramjit Banerje
Sandip Sen
Introduction
29(1)
A Sample Problem
30(1)
Coalition Formation
31(1)
Payoff-structures of Partnerships
32(1)
Selecting the Potentially most Beneficial Partnership for Limited Interactions
32(2)
An Example Evaluation
34(2)
Comparative Evaluation with a Decision Mechanism for Infinite Interactions
36(1)
Evaluation Scenario
37(1)
Experimental Results
37(2)
Conclusions
39(4)
Evolution of Agents with Moral Sentiments in an IPD Exercise
43(22)
Ana L. C. Bazzan
Rafael H. Bordini
John A. Campbell
Introduction
44(1)
Moral Sentiments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
45(3)
The Unwitting Benefits of Altruism
48(3)
An Evolutionary Setting for the Simulations
51(1)
Playing with Moral Sentiments Secures the Survival of the Group
52(4)
A Case for Benevolence in Agents
56(4)
Conclusions
60(5)
Dynamic Desires
65(16)
Mehdi Dastani
Zhisheng Huang
Leendert van der Torre
Introduction
66(1)
Utilities, Desires and Goals
67(5)
An Example from Negotiation
72(2)
Dynamic Logic
74(5)
Future Research
79(1)
Concluding Remarks
79(2)
Emotions and Personality
81(16)
Piotr J. Gmytrasiewicz
Christine L. Lisetti
Introduction
82(2)
Decision-Theoretic Preliminaries
84(3)
Emotional States and Personality
87(4)
Conclusions and Future Work
91(2)
Acknowledgements
93(4)
Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory
97(22)
Piotr J. Gmytrasiewicz
Sanguk Noh
Background on Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory
98(3)
Knowledge Base Design
101(5)
RMM's Solution Method
106(3)
Rational Communication
109(1)
Experiments in Air Defense Domain
110(4)
Conclusions
114(5)
Shopbot Economics
119(40)
Jeffrey O. Kephart
Amy R. Greenwald
Introduction
120(1)
Model
121(2)
Sellers
123(5)
Buyers
128(10)
Shopbot
138(12)
Related Work
150(2)
Conclusions and Future Work
152(7)
Appendix: No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
153(6)
Finding the Best Way to Join in
159(18)
Laszlo A. Koczy
Introduction
159(1)
Game Theoretic Foundations
160(3)
The Accession Game
163(5)
Solving More General Games
168(6)
Conclusions
174(3)
Shopbots and Pricebots in Electronic Service Markets
177(20)
Panos M. Markopoulos
Lyle H. Ungar
Introduction and Definitions
177(3)
Our Model of an Electronic Service Market
180(6)
Comparisons
186(3)
Related Literature
189(2)
Conclusions
191(6)
Appendix: The Derivation of Equilibrium for the XX Market Configuration
192(5)
Polynomial Time Mechanisms
197(20)
Thomas C. O'Connell
Richard E. Stearns
Introduction
198(2)
Mechanism Design
200(3)
Polynomial Time Mechanisms
203(3)
Dominant Strategy Implementation
206(2)
Nash Implementation
208(4)
Upper Bounds on Approximability
212(1)
Conclusions
213(4)
Multi-Agent Q-learning and Regression Trees
217(18)
Manu Sridharan
Gerald Tesauro
Introduction
218(1)
Model Agent Economies
219(3)
Single and Multi-Agent Q-learning
222(3)
Q-learning with Regression Trees
225(2)
Results
227(4)
Conclusions
231(4)
Satisficing Equilibria
235(32)
Wynn C. Stirling
Michael A. Goodrich
Dennis J. Packard
Introduction
236(1)
A Comparative Paradigm
237(6)
Praxeic Utility
243(4)
Multi-Agent Systems
247(5)
Satisficing Games
252(6)
Summary and Discussion
258(9)
Investigating Commitment Flexibility in Multi-agent Contracts
267(26)
Vanessa Teague
Liz Sonenberg
Introduction
267(3)
The Scenario
270(2)
Some Analysis of Special Cases
272(8)
Empirical Work
280(8)
Conclusions and Further Work
288(5)
Pricing in Agent Economies using Multi-agent Q-learning
293(22)
Gerald Tesauro
Jeffrey O. Kephart
Introduction
294(3)
Model Agent Economies
297(4)
Single-agent Q-learning
301(4)
Multi-agent Q-learning
305(5)
Conclusions
310(5)
Using Hypergames to Increase Planned Payoff and Reduce Risk
315(22)
Russell Vane
Paul Lehner
Introduction
315(2)
Discussion
317(10)
Results
327(6)
Conclusions
333(4)
Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information
337(18)
Julita Vassileva
Chhaya Mudgal
Introduction
338(1)
The Application Area
338(2)
The Negotiation Mechanism
340(3)
Evaluation
343(7)
Related Work on Negotiation
350(1)
Conclusions
351(4)
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids
355(20)
Makoto Yokoo
Yuko Sakurai
Shigeo Matsubara
Introduction
356(2)
Generalized Vickrey Auction Protocol (GVA)
358(3)
Robust Protocol against False-name Bids
361(5)
Proof of Incentive Compatibility
366(2)
Evaluation
368(1)
Discussion
369(2)
Conclusions
371(4)
Index 375

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