Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction

by Peter C. Ordeshook

• ISBN13: 9780521315937
• ISBN10: 052131593X
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1986-09-26
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

This book integrates political theory and mathematical models of political and economic processes.

Table of Contents

Preface	ix
Acknowledgments	xv
Individual preference and individual choice	1	(52)
Some fundamental notation and definitions	2	(8)
Actions	3	(1)
Outcomes	4	(5)
States of nature	9	(1)
Preferences	10	(6)
The preference relation	12	(1)
Ordinal utility	13	(3)
Multiattribute outcomes	16	(12)
Decision making under certainty	28	(9)
Constrained economic decisions	29	(3)
Constrained political decisions	32	(5)
Decision making under risk	37	(5)
The meaning of cardinal utility	42	(6)
Cardinal utility and subjective probability	48	(3)
Allais's paradox	48	(1)
The calculus of voting	49	(2)
Summary	51	(2)
Individual preference and social choice	53	(44)
Arrow's impossibility result	56	(9)
Paradoxes of voting	65	(6)
The agenda paradox	65	(1)
The contrived Condorcet paradox	66	(1)
The dominated-winner paradox	67	(1)
The inverted-order paradox	68	(1)
The winner-turns-loser paradox	69	(1)
The truncated point-total paradox	70	(1)
The majority-winner paradox	70	(1)
The power of agendas	71	(11)
Misrepresentation of preferences	82	(7)
Vote trading	89	(5)
Summary	94	(3)
Basic theory of noncooperative games	97	(47)
Noncooperative games: an example	98	(1)
Games in extensive form: the game tree	99	(7)
Strategy and the normal form	106	(6)
Normal form of infinite games	112	(2)
Best-response strategies and domination	114	(3)
Pure-strategy equilibria	117	(3)
Some conditions for existence of pure-strategy equilibria	120	(13)
Games of perfect information	120	(1)
Some simple voting games	121	(6)
Concave---convex games and the fundamental theorem	127	(6)
Mixed strategies	133	(4)
Perfect equilibria	137	(5)
Summary	142	(2)
Elections and two-person zero-sum games	144	(59)
Zero-sum games	144	(2)
Interchangeability and equivalence	146	(3)
Maxmin and minmax	149	(5)
Concave games and resource allocations in elections	154	(4)
Symmetric games and candidate objectives	158	(2)
Two-candidate elections with a single issue	160	(6)
Two-candidate multidimensional elections	166	(9)
Disequilibrium with income redistribution policies	175	(5)
Mixed strategies and the uncovered set in elections	180	(7)
Rational expectations and voter ignorance	187	(9)
N-person zero-sum games	196	(4)
Summary	200	(3)
Nonzero-sum games: political economy, public goods, and the prisoners' dilemma	203	(40)
Nonzero-sum games	203	(3)
The two-person prisoners' dilemma	206	(4)
Public goods and externalities	210	(5)
An analogous game with a continuum of strategies	215	(5)
Other prisoners' dilemmas	220	(15)
Arms races	221	(1)
Interest groups and collective action	222	(3)
Political participation	225	(8)
Vote trading	233	(2)
Demand-revealing mechanisms	235	(6)
Summary	241	(2)
Institutions, strategic voting, and agendas	243	(59)
Sincere voting, issue by issue	245	(12)
Sophisticated voting, issue by issue	257	(6)
The disappearance of stability without separability	263	(3)
Sophisticated voting and agendas	266	(18)
Binary agendas	267	(4)
Amendment agendas	271	(10)
Congressional agendas	281	(2)
Partially sophisticated committees	283	(1)
Some experimental and empirical evidence	284	(7)
Incomplete information and sophisticated voting	291	(7)
Summary	298	(4)
Cooperative games and the characteristic function	302	(37)
Strong equilibria	304	(2)
The characteristic function, v(C)	306	(7)
Simple games	313	(4)
The special case of transferable utility	317	(5)
Some examples of characteristic-function games	322	(8)
The valley of the dump	322	(1)
Normalized games	322	(3)
Market games	325	(1)
Pollution, externalities, and the prisoners' dilemma	325	(5)
Alternative forms of v(C)	330	(2)
Ambiguities in v(C)	332	(5)
Summary	337	(2)
The core	339	(48)
The core	340	(5)
The core and Pareto-optimality	345	(4)
Transferable utility games	349	(6)
Transferable utility and the core	349	(4)
The Coase theorem	353	(2)
Balanced games	355	(6)
A necessary and sufficient condition for existence	355	(2)
Market games	357	(4)
Committees with a single issue	361	(3)
An extended example: the Genossenschaften	364	(6)
Multiple dimensions and some experimental evidence	370	(6)
Logrolling and some experimental ambiguities	376	(2)
Extraordinary majorities	378	(4)
The core and ambiguities with v(C)	382	(2)
Summary	384	(3)
Solution theory	387	(54)
The stable set	389	(4)
Some properties of V-sets	393	(5)
Relationship of V to the core	393	(1)
Existence and uniqueness of V	394	(4)
Bargaining sets for simple voting games	398	(4)
Cooperative vs. noncooperative analysis of committees	402	(2)
Extensions of the bargaining set	404	(4)
The size principle	408	(6)
Problems with nontransferable utility games	414	(4)
The competitive solution	418	(8)
Some experimental evidence	426	(8)
Spatial committees	426	(1)
Weighted voting systems	427	(4)
Vote trading	431	(1)
Experimental anomalies	432	(2)
A noncooperative view and alternative ideas	434	(3)
Summary	437	(4)
Repeated games and information: some research frontiers	441	(44)
The repeated prisoners' dilemma	442	(6)
The balance of power	448	(3)
A finitely repeated game: the chain store paradox	451	(11)
The Shapley value and the power index	462	(8)
The Nash bargaining model	470	(5)
Relating the Shapley value to Nash's scheme	475	(3)
Reciprocity and repeated games	478	(5)
Summary	483	(2)
References and a guide to the literature	485	(16)
Index	501