Gray Matters: Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

by Goldberg,Sanford

• ISBN13: 9781563248832
• ISBN10: 1563248832
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1997-08-31
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Goldberg and Pessin provide a clearly written introduction to the field presupposing no knowledge of philosophy. The first two chapters introduce and examine the traditional positions on the "mind-body" problem; the middle three chapters turn to the issues which will define philosophy of mind in the coming decade; and the final chapter provides a brief survey of other relevant topics. The book's much needed organization and codification of work in the field will be useful to advanced students as well.

Table of Contents

Preface	xi
Chapter 1: Naturalism	3	(21)
Naturalism and the Philosophy of Mind	3	(5)
Overview	3	(1)
Pretheoretical Doctrines and Accompanying Terminology	4	(4)
The Plausibility of the Doctrine of Naturalism	8	(13)
The Nature of Science	9	(3)
Science and Reality	12	(5)
The Price of Rejecting Naturalism	17	(4)
Naturalism and the Rest of This Book	21	(1)
Further Readings	22	(2)
Chapter 2: The Mind-Body Problem	24	(42)
Dualism	25	(6)
Behaviorism	31	(8)
Identity Theory	39	(7)
Functionalism	46	(10)
Eliminative Materialism	56	(5)
Conclusion	61	(1)
Further Readings	62	(4)
Chapter 3: Theories of Mental Content	66	(61)
Dennett's "Intentional Stance"	69	(4)
Naturalistic Theories of Content	73	(31)
Resemblance	73	(3)
Covariance	76	(8)
First Objection	80	(1)
Second Objection	81	(3)
Teleology	84	(7)
Conceptual Role Semantics and Holism	91	(13)
Interpersonal Understanding	95	(1)
False Beliefs and Reference	96	(3)
Concept Similarity and Identity	99	(2)
The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction	101	(3)
Internalism Versus Externalism	104	(16)
Conclusion	120	(3)
The Resemblance Theory	121	(1)
The Covariance Theory	122	(1)
The Telelogical Theory	122	(1)
Conceptual Role Semantics	122	(1)
Further Readings	123	(4)
Chapter 4: Mental Causation	127	(39)
The Plausibility of the Doctrine of Mental Causation	128	(6)
Illustrations of MC	128	(3)
Example 1 (Mental-Physical Causation): Action	128	(1)
Example 2 (Physical-Mental Causation): Sensation and Perception	129	(2)
Example 3 (Mental-Mental Causation): Belief Acquisition	131	(1)
Related Doctrines	131	(3)
Responsibility	131	(2)
Objectivity	133	(1)
The Problem of Mental Causation	134	(27)
Dualism and the Skeptical Thesis	136	(4)
Physicalism and the Skeptical Thesis	140	(4)
Type Physicalism, Causal Laws, and the Skeptical Thesis	144	(2)
Token Physicalism, Causal Laws, and the Skeptical Thesis	146	(2)
The Argument from the Naturalistic Principle of Causal Relevance	148	(7)
The Argument from the Principle of Causal-Explanatory Exclusion	155	(6)
Conclusion	161	(3)
Further Readings	164	(2)
Chapter 5: Self-Knowledge and Other Minds, I	166	(39)
Introduction to a Philosophical Problem	166	(10)
An Assumption About Self-Knowledge	167	(6)
An Assumption Concerning Knowledge of Other Minds	173	(2)
On the Notion of "Knowing a Mental State"	175	(1)
Knowledge of Mental States	176	(27)
Theories Modeled on the Primacy of Self-Knowledge: The Cartesian Approach	178	(1)
Motivation	178	(1)
A Cartesian Model for Knowledge of One's Own Ideas	179	(7)
The Cartesian Approach to Knowledge of Other Minds	186	(2)
Virtues of the Cartesian Account	188	(3)
Some Objections to the Cartesian Approach	191	(12)
Conclusion	203	(1)
Further Reading	204	(1)
Chapter 6: Self-Knowledge and Other Minds, II	205	(37)
Theories Modeled on the Primacy of Other Minds: The Behaviorist Approach	205	(16)
Motivation	205	(1)
A Behaviorist Model for Knowledge of Other Minds	206	(5)
The Behaviorist Approach to Self-Knowledge	211	(3)
Virtues of the Behaviorist Approach	214	(2)
Some Objections to the Behaviorist Conception of Self-Knowledge	216	(5)
Conclusion	221	(1)
A Nonbehavioristic Alternative: The Avowal Theory	221	(17)
Motivation	223	(1)
The Avowal Theory: A New Theory of First-Person Authority	223	(7)
Implications: The Avowal Theory of "Self-Knowledge"	230	(4)
One Further Issue: The Fact of Coherence	234	(3)
Conclusion	237	(1)
Some Final Remarks: Self-Knowledge and Other Minds	238	(2)
Further Readings	240	(2)
Chapter 7: Consciousness	242	(33)
The Problem of Consciousness	243	(3)
Thomas Nagel's Argument "Against" Physicalism: What Is It Like to Be a Bat?	246	(3)
Colin McGinn's Argument "Against" Physicalism	249	(3)
Frank Jackson's Argument Against Physicalism: The Knowledge Argument	252	(21)
Four Physicalist Responses to the Knowledge Argument	253	(9)
Recasting the Argument	262	(4)
Qualia and Epistemology	266	(5)
Why the Knowledge Argument Can't Refute Physicalism-Ever	271	(2)
Further Readings	273	(2)
Notes	275	(14)
Bibliography	289	(8)
Index	297