Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity

by Kolm; Mercier Ythier

• ISBN13: 9780444506979
• ISBN10: 0444506977
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2006-09-08
• Publisher: Elsevier Science

Summary

The Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism provides a comprehensive set of reviews of literature on the economics of nonmarket voluntary transfers. The foundations of the field are reviewed first, with a sequence of chapters that present the hard core of the theoretical and empirical analyses of giving, reciprocity and altruism in economics, examining their relations with the viewpoints of moral philosophy, psychology, sociobiology, sociology and economic anthropology. Secondly, a comprehensive set of applications are considered of all the aspects of society where nonmarket voluntary transfers are significant: family and intergenerational transfers; charity and charitable institutions; the nonprofit economy; interpersonal relations in the workplace; the Welfare State; and international aid. *Every volume contains contributions from leading researchers *Each Handbook presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a particular topic *The series provides comprehensive and accessible surveys

Table of Contents

Introduction to the Series	vii
Contents of the Handbook	ix
Preface to the Handbook	xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity
SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM	1	(126)
Abstract	4	(1)
Foreword	5	(2)
Part I: General overview	7	(47)
1. The economics of moral sentiments	7	(1)
2. Motives for altruism and altruistic giving	8	(2)
3. Structures of altruism	10	(6)
4. Altruism and democracy: Altruistic joint giving and its public implementation	16	(2)
5. Motives and reasons for nonaltruistic giving	18	(2)
6. The structure of nonaltruistic giving	20	(3)
6.1. From motives to forms	20	(2)
6.2. Contradiction and possibilities in the logic of motives	22	(1)
7. The inefficiency of individual giving when joint or public giving is possible: The perplexing joint giving theorem	23	(2)
8. Reciprocities	25	(7)
8.1. An overview	25	(2)
8.2. "Human rocks on which societies are built"	27	(3)
8.3. The special games of reciprocity	30	(2)
9. Importance and scope of giving, altruism, and pro-social conducts	32	(15)
9.1. Overview	32	(1)
9.2. Families	32	(2)
9.3. The political and public sector	34	(3)
9.4. Giving in philanthropy, solidarity, and charity	37	(3)
9.5. General respect, civility, sociality, and help	40	(1)
9.6. The correction of "failures" of exchanges and organizations	41	(1)
9.7. Associations, clubs, cooperatives	42	(1)
9.8. The workplace and labour relations	43	(1)
9.9. Social giving: Relation, symbol, status	43	(2)
9.10. Normative economics and the good society	45	(2)
10. Giving reactions	47	(3)
10.1. About two particular issues that caught the fancy of economists: Intertemporal giving and the internalization of the gift externality	47	(2)
10.2. Interferences with altruistic giving: General view	49	(1)
11. Solving "Adam Smith's problem"	50	(2)
12. The causes of and reasons for altruism	52	(2)
Part II: Altruisms and giving	54	(36)
13. Altruisms: Types and causes or reasons	54	(17)
13.1. General presentation	54	(3)
13.2. Natural or hedonistic altruism	57	(3)
13.3. Normative altruisms	60	(11)
14. Altruism and justice; impartial altruism	71	(9)
14.1. Altruism and justice	71	(3)
14.2. Impartial altruism	74	(3)
14.3. History	77	(1)
14.4. Altruism and justice: Consistency or conflict, force or freedom	78	(2)
15. Giving: An abundance and variety of motives and reasons	80	(10)
15.1. An overview	80	(1)
15.2. Social effects	81	(3)
15.3. Intrinsically normative (non-altruistic) giving	84	(1)
15.4. Self-interested giving	84	(5)
15.5. Giving in social relations and communities	89	(1)
Part III: Values and history	90	(18)
16. The normative economics of altruism and giving	90	(13)
16.1. The ethics of economics	90	(2)
16.2. The intrinsic value of altruism and giving	92	(1)
16.3. Giving as improving fairness in freedom	92	(1)
16.4. Altruism, giving, reciprocity, and failures of economic interactions	93	(1)
16.5. Liberal social contracts and joint giving	94	(4)
16.6. Retro-gifts and the process-liberal public debt	98	(1)
16.7. Selfish altruism: The situation of the other person may be your own	99	(2)
16.8. Justice from altruism, and distribution as a public good: The distributive or moral surplus	101	(2)
17. Historical landmarks	103	(24)
17.1. Economics and altruism	103	(1)
17.2. Interdependent utilities and social choice	104	(1)
17.3. Altruism and uncertainty	105	(1)
17.4. Interdependent utilities and interdependent giving	106	(1)
17.5. A notable debate: Blood and the efficiency of giving	107	(1)
17.6. Volumes in the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity	108	(1)
Appendix: The joint giving theorem	108	(2)
References	110	(4)
Further reading	114	(13)
PART 1:
FOUNDATIONS 1A: Social view
Chapter 2 The Empirical Analysis of Transfer Motives
ERIK SCHOKKAERT	127	(56)
Abstract	128	(1)
Keywords	128	(1)
1. Introduction	129	(1)
2. Some basic insights from the psychological literature	130	(7)
2.1. A list of motivations	131	(1)
(a) self-interest	131	(1)
(b) reciprocity	132	(1)
(c) norms and principles	133	(1)
(d) pure altruism and empathy	134	(1)
2.2. Some broader questions	135	(2)
3. Tastes and motivations: Why are economists interested? Why should they be interested?	137	(7)
3.1. The empirical predictions of the pure public goods model	138	(2)
3.2. Other consequences for government policy	140	(1)
3.3. The analysis of philanthropic markets and non-profit organizations	141	(1)
3.4. Rationality and egoism: The homo economicus	142	(2)
4. Charitable giving and volunteering	144	(21)
4.1. Giving as a private good: Tax prices and income	144	(9)
4.2. Crowding out and the warm-glow of giving	153	(4)
4.3. Status of sociological and demographic variables	157	(2)
4.4. Direct evidence on preferences	159	(6)
5. Interhousehold and intrafamily transfers of money and time	165	(9)
5.1. Altruism versus exchange or reciprocity: A sketch	166	(2)
5.2. Motives for interhousehold transfers	168	(3)
5.3. Gifts: The deadweight loss of Christmas?	171	(3)
6. Conclusion	174	(2)
Acknowledgements	176	(1)
References	176	(7)
Chapter 3 Altruistic Behavior and Altruistic Motivations
JON ELSTER	183	(24)
Abstract	184	(1)
Keywords	184	(1)
1. Introduction	185	(1)
2. The nature and sources of altruistic motivations	185	(2)
3. Can interest mimic altruism?	187	(5)
4. Can passion mimic altruism?	192	(8)
5. Transmutation of motivations	200	(2)
6. Is altruism possible and knowable?	202	(3)
References	205	(2)
Chapter 4 The Gift and Reciprocity: Perspectives from Economic Anthropology
CHRIS HANN	207	(20)
Abstract	208	(1)
Keywords	208	(1)
1. Introduction	209	(1)
2. History and theory	210	(6)
2.1. Malinowski and Mauss	210	(3)
2.2. Polanyi and Sahlins	213	(1)
2.3. Recent contributions	214	(2)
3. Ethnographic examples	216	(4)
3.1. Food sharing	216	(2)
3.2. Socialist and postsocialist networking	218	(2)
4. Cross-cultural experiments	220	(1)
5. Conclusions	221	(1)
References	221	(6)
1B: Overall views
Chapter 5 The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth
JEAN MERCIER YTHIER	227	(144)
Abstract	228	(1)
Keywords	229	(1)
1. Introduction	230	(2)
2. Gift-giving in social equilibrium theory: A preliminary overview	232	(11)
2.1. Preferences and rights	232	(4)
2.2. Four characteristic properties	236	(5)
2.3. Theory and facts	241	(2)
3. Perfectly substitutable transfers in a pure distributive social system	243	(24)
3.1. Pure distributive social system and equilibrium	244	(3)
3.2. Diagrammatic representation	247	(4)
3.3. Three studies of pure distributive equilibrium	251	(10)
3.4. Existence, determinacy	261	(6)
4. Perfectly substitutable transfers in a competitive market economy	267	(16)
4.1. Interdependent preferences	269	(6)
4.2. General equilibrium with benevolent gift-giving and competitive market exchange	275	(7)
4.3. Perfectly substitutable transfers and the transfer problem	282	(1)
5. The effectiveness of public redistribution with perfectly substitutable transfers	283	(13)
5.1. Neutrality in general Pareto social systems	285	(3)
5.2. Neutrality in BBV distributive social systems	288	(8)
6. Efficient redistribution with perfectly substitutable transfers	296	(33)
6.1. General theory	297	(21)
6.2. Free-riding and population size in BBV distributive social systems	318	(10)
6.3. Mechanism design in BBV distributive social systems	328	(1)
7. Imperfectly substitutable transfers	329	(12)
7.1. Logical tests of the perfect substitutability of transfers	329	(7)
7.2. Empirical tests of the perfect substitutability of transfers	336	(5)
8. Conclusion	341	(1)
Appendix A	341	(20)
A.1. Proofs	341	(13)
A.2. Mechanisms for private contributions to public goods	354	(7)
References	361	(10)
Chapter 6 Reciprocity: Its Scope, Rationales, and Consequences
SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM	371	(174)
Abstract	375	(1)
Part I: Facts and forms	376	(1)
1. Introduction	376	(1)
1.1. Evidence, scope, and motives of reciprocity	376	(2)
1.2. Social scope and values of reciprocity	378	(2)
1.3. Equality and fraternity: The two, three or four types of reciprocity	380	(2)
1.4. Reciprocity and the general motives for giving	382	(2)
1.5. Reciprocity and reciprocating good or bad	384	(1)
1.6. Understanding and explaining reciprocity	385	(1)
1.7. Organisation	386	(1)
2. The evidence, scope, and pervasiveness of the reciprocity relationship	387	(1)
2.1. Society as reciprocity and general respect	387	(1)
2.2. Relations of reciprocity	388	(1)
2.3. Extended reciprocities	389	(2)
2.4. Reciprocity and exchange and markets	391	(1)
2.5. Reciprocity and organizations and labour	392	(1)
2.6. Established groups, cooperatives, associations	393	(1)
2.7. Reciprocity and community	393	(1)
2.8. Public aid	394	(1)
2.9. Intergenerational reciprocities	395	(1)
2.10. Evidence and history	395	(2)
3. Reciprocity as the quintessential sociality and social bond	397	(1)
4. Definitions, givings and exchanges	398	(1)
4.1. Concepts and distinctions	398	(2)
4.2. Motives for giving, notably in reciprocity	400	(8)
4.3. Sequential exchange	408	(3)
5. Reciprocities: Forms and structures	411	(1)
5.1. Facts and relations	411	(1)
5.2. Reciprocal structures	411	(5)
5.3. Larger reciprocities	416	(1)
5.4. Reciprocity as social or economic system	417	(1)
5.5. Reciprocity, revenge, reciprocation	418	(2)
5.6. Reciprocity as giving or as reciprocation	420	(1)
Part II: Motives	421	(1)
6. Motives: The three worlds of reciprocity	421	(1)
6.1. Three basic reasons	421	(2)
6.2. An outlook of the general structure	423	(1)
6.3. Comparative, matching, compensatory, or balance reciprocity	424	(5)
6.4. Liking reciprocities	429	(10)
6.5. Continuation reciprocity	439	(2)
6.6. Comparing the three polar motives of reciprocity	441	(1)
6.7. Relational, process, status, or symbolic reciprocities	441	(1)
6.8. Imitation and conforming	442	(1)
6.9. The graph of reciprocity	442	(1)
6.10. The six basic reciprocations	443	(1)
6.11. The motives of extended reciprocations	443	(1)
7. Reciprocity and other social sentiments	444	(1)
7.1. Fairness, equity, justice	444	(4)
7.2. The principle of universalization: the categorical imperative	448	(1)
7.3. Other social sentiments	449	(1)
8. Reciprocity in the modes of economic realization	449	(4)
Part III: Values and reasons	453	(1)
9. The values of reciprocity	453	(1)
9.1. The issues	453	(2)
9.2. General respect and sociability from reciprocity	455	(1)
9.3. Reciprocal corrections of market failures	456	(9)
9.4. Reciprocity in trust, relational capital, and efficiency	465	(2)
9.5. The intrinsic values of reciprocity	467	(1)
10. Normative uses of reciprocity	468	(1)
10.1. The values of reciprocity	468	(1)
10.2. Cooperatives	469	(1)
10.3. General rules of society	469	(1)
10.4. Putative reciprocities	470	(1)
10.5. Macrojustice	470	(1)
10.6. The Good Society: The classical scientific directing utopia	471	(1)
11. How and why? Understanding and explaining reciprocity	472	(1)
11.1. Understanding	472	(1)
11.2. Biology?	475	(1)
11.3. Social and cultural evolution	478	(4)
Part IV: Formal analysis and interaction	482	(39)
12. Formal analysis of reciprocity	482	(1)
12.1. Methodology	482	(1)
12.2. Comparative, matching, or balance reciprocities	486	(1)
12.3. Liking-reciprocity	492	(12)
13. Strategic interaction and process preferences: Games of reciprocity and their consequences	504	(1)
13.1. Presentation	504	(1)
13.2. General properties about processes	508	(1)
13.3. Solutions of the return-gift and reciprocity games	513	(1)
13.4. Comparison of reciprocities with other processes	520	(1)
Part V: Reciprocity in economics	521	(8)
14. Reciprocity in economics	522	(1)
14.1. A short overview and a corrected bias	522	(1)
14.2. Completing economics	526	(3)
References	529	(5)
Further reading	534	(11)
1C: Experimental social psychology
Chapter 7 The Formation of Social Preferences: Some Lessons from Psychology and Biology
LOUIS LÉVY-GARBOUA, CLAUDE MEIDINGER AND BENOIT RAPOPORT	545	(70)
Abstract	546	(1)
Keywords	547	(1)
1. Introduction	548	(2)
2. The evolutionary emergence of social types	550	(11)
2.1. The problem of selection of social behavior in non-cultural species	550	(5)
2.2. From animal societies to human societies	555	(6)
3. Social learning	561	(5)
3.1. Theoretical perspectives	561	(2)
3.2. Empirical findings: The role of the family	563	(1)
3.3. The role of other socializers	564	(1)
3.4. Cross-cultural differences	565	(1)
3.5. Conclusion	565	(1)
4. Cognitive theories of moral and pro-social development	566	(7)
4.1. How children use the rules of a game and how conscious of these rules they are	566	(1)
4.2. How children form moral judgements	566	(4)
4.3. Other theories of stages	570	(2)
4.4. Cognitive correlates of pro-social development	572	(1)
5. Social cognition	573	(8)
5.1. Perspective-taking, identification with, and projection of self onto others	573	(2)
5.2. Identification with a known other and self-projection onto unknown others	575	(3)
5.3. Social cognition and the stages of pro-social development	578	(1)
5.4. Choosing and valuing an income distribution	579	(2)
6. Social norms and reciprocity	581	(8)
6.1. The fairness heuristic	581	(2)
6.2. Social norms of fairness in proposal-response games	583	(2)
6.3. Some evidence on social norms	585	(1)
6.4. The working of a social norm: Homans' "cash posters"	586	(3)
7. In-group favoritism and self-anchored altruism	589	(8)
7.1. Categorization and the preference for similarity	589	(2)
7.2. In-group favoritism and out-group discrimination in minimal groups	591	(2)
7.3. Self-anchored altruism	593	(2)
7.4. Comparing behavior in social dilemmas and in social choices	595	(2)
8. Social drives and emotions	597	(6)
8.1. Social comparison	597	(2)
8.2. Reducing inequity	599	(1)
8.3. Helping others in need: Is the motivation truly altruistic?	600	(3)
9. Some lessons from psychology and biology: A summary	603	(1)
References	604	(11)
Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
ERNST FEHR AND KLAUS M. SCHMIDT	615	(80)
Abstract	616	(1)
Keywords	616	(1)
1. Introduction and overview	617	(4)
2. Empirical foundations of other-regarding preferences	621	(15)
2.1. Other-regarding behavior in simple experiments	621	(7)
2.2. Other-regarding preferences or irrational behavior	628	(3)
2.3. Neuroeconomic foundations of other-regarding preferences	631	(5)
3. Theories of other-regarding preferences	636	(17)
3.1. Social preferences	637	(7)
3.2. Interdependent preferences	644	(3)
3.3. Models of intention based reciprocity	647	(5)
3.4. Axiomatic approaches	652	(1)
4. Discriminating between theories of other-regarding preferences	653	(16)
4.1. Who are the relevant reference actors?	654	(2)
4.2. Equality versus efficiency	656	(4)
4.3. Revenge versus inequity reduction	660	(2)
4.4. Does kindness trigger rewards?	662	(2)
4.5. Maximin preferences	664	(2)
4.6. Preferences for honesty	666	(1)
4.7. Summary and outlook	667	(2)
5. Economic applications	669	(14)
5.1. Cooperation and collective action	669	(4)
5.2. Endogenous formation of cooperative institutions	673	(3)
5.3. How fairness, reciprocity and competition interact	676	(4)
5.4. Fairness and reciprocity as a source of economic incentives	680	(3)
6. Conclusions	683	(1)
References	684	(11)
1D: Human nature
Chapter 9 The Economics of Human Relationships
PIER LUIGI SACCO, PAOLO VANIN AND STEFANO ZAMAGNI	695	(36)
Abstract	696	(1)
Keywords	696	(1)
1. Introduction	697	(1)
2. 'Communicative' aspects of reciprocity and altruism and the concept of 'socially provided goods'	698	(2)
3. The positional side of economic interaction	700	(4)
3.1. Positional competition and labor issues	701	(1)
3.2. Positional competition and growth	702	(2)
4. The relational side of economic interaction	704	(13)
4.1. Relational orientation and labor issues	706	(2)
4.2. Relational orientation and economic growth	708	(3)
4.3. The case of private growth and social impoverishment	711	(6)
5. Cultural and economic selection: The evolutionary foundations of altruism and pro-sociality	717	(6)
6. Back to the basics in the economic analysis of human interaction?	723	(3)
References	726	(5)
Chapter 10 Human nature and sociality in economics
NICHOLAS BARDSLEY AND ROBERT SUGDEN	731	(40)
Abstract	732	(1)
Keywords	732	(4)
1. Hobbes's asocial model of man	736	(2)
2. Convention	738	(4)
3. Rousseau and the 'most remarkable change in man'	742	(3)
4. Fellow-feeling	745	(3)
5. Other-oriented motivations in modern economics	748	(8)
5.1. Rational choice altruism	749	(2)
5.2. Warm glow	751	(1)
5.3. Inequality aversion	752	(2)
5.4. Rabin's theory of reciprocity	754	(2)
6. Expressive rationality	756	(2)
7. Team reasoning	758	(3)
8. Sociality and the 'private language' argument	761	(3)
9. Conclusions	764	(1)
Acknowledgements	765	(1)
References	765	(6)
1E: Special topics
Chapter 11 Natural Kantian or ZOO ECONOMICUS? Evolutionary theories of selfishness and altruism among men and beasts
THEODORE C. BERGSTROM	771	(48)
Abstract	772	(1)
Keywords	772	(2)
1. Selfishness and group selection	774	(3)
2. Games and social interactions	777	(4)
2.1. What is the game and who is playing?	777	(1)
2.2. Prisoners' dilemma games	778	(1)
2.3. Stag hunt games	779	(1)
2.4. Evolutionary dynamics and altruism	780	(1)
3. Haystack models	781	(13)
3.1. Maynard Smith's mice	781	(2)
3.2. General haystack models and assortative matching	783	(1)
3.3. Cohen and Eshel's generalized haystack models	784	(3)
3.4. The iron rule of selfishness	787	(1)
3.5. Haystacks and the iron rule	788	(1)
3.6. Migration and stochastic extinction	789	(1)
3.7. Relative and absolute payoffs	790	(1)
3.8. "Too stringent to be realistic?"	791	(3)
4. Assortative matching	794	(12)
4.1. Measures of assortativity	794	(1)
4.2. Hamilton's kin selection theory	795	(3)
4.3. Evolutionary dynamics with assortative mating	798	(3)
4.4. Assortative matching with partner choice	801	(2)
4.5. Assortative matching induced by spatial structure	803	(3)
5. Repeated games and group selection	806	(7)
5.1. Group selection from multiple Nash equilibria	806	(1)
5.2. How can costly punishment survive?	807	(4)
5.3. Evidence from psychology and anthropology	811	(2)
6. Conclusion	813	(1)
6.1. Further reading	813	(1)
References	814	(5)
Chapter 12 Solidarity Norms and Institutions in Village Societies: Static and Dynamic Considerations
JEAN-PHILIPPE PLATTEAU	819
Abstract	820	(1)
Keywords	820	(1)
1. Introduction	821	(2)
2. Other-regarding norms in agrarian societies	823	(6)
3. The customary system of land tenure	829	(6)
3.1. Land access and guaranteed livelihoods	829	(4)
3.2. The commons as embodiment of the community	833	(2)
4. Erosion of the social security function of customary land tenure	835	(19)
4.1. The transformation of the commons	836	(10)
4.2. Individualization of land tenure rights	846	(8)
5. Voluntary reciprocal contingent transfers	854	(20)
5.1. General considerations	854	(2)
5.2. A short survey of the economic theory of informal insurance mechanisms	856	(7)
5.3. Empirical evidence	863	(11)
6. Conclusion: Institutional change and solidarity mechanisms in village societies	874	(4)
References	878
Author Index of Volume 1	I-1
Subject Index of Volume 1	I-19