Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics"

by Richardson Lear, Gabriel

• ISBN13: 9781400826087
• ISBN10: 140082608X
• Copyright: 2008-09-02
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of theEthicsis devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entireEthicsas an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of theEthics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. ix
Introduction	p. 1
The Finality Criterion	p. 8
Introduction	p. 8
What It Is to Be an Aristotelian Telos	p. 11
Teleology in the Nicomachean Ethics	p. 15
Teleology, Desire, and Middle-Level Ends	p. 31
The Puzzle in NE I.7 and Two Possible Solutions	p. 37
Ackrill 's Inclusivist Solution	p. 40
The Self-Sufficiency of Happiness	p. 47
Self-Sufficiency: Three Problems for a Monistic Reading of Eudaimonia	p. 48
Self-Sufficiency as a Mark of Finality	p. 51
Self-Sufficiency in the Philebus	p. 53
The Self-Sufficiency of Monistic Goods	p. 59
Choiceworthiness and Self-Sufficiency	p. 63
Self-Sufficient Happiness	p. 69
Acting for the Sake of an Object of Love	p. 72
Love and Final Causation in Aristotle's Scientific Works	p. 73
How Teleological Approximation Could Solve the Problem of Middle-Level Ends	p. 85
Approximation in the Nicomachean Ethics ?88
Theoretical and Practical Reason	p. 93
The Separateness and Similarity of Theoretical and Practical Reason	p. 94
Theoretical Sophia versus Practical Wisdom	p. 108
The Relationship of Phronésis to Theoretical Wisdom	p. 115
Moral Virtue and To Kalon	p. 123
To Kalon Outside Human Action	p. 126
To Kalon in Human Action	p. 130
The Account of Fine Action at Rhetoric I.9	p. 133
To Kalon and Spirited Desire	p. 137
Courage, Temperance, and Greatness of Soul	p. 147
Courage: NE III.6-9	p. 148
Temperance: NE III.1-12	p. 162
Greatness of Soul: NE IV.3	p. 168
Two Happy Lives and Their Most Final Ends	p. 175
The Competition between the Philosophical and Political Lives	p. 177
The Superior Finality of Contemplation	p. 181
Human Approximation of Divine Life: Part One	p. 188
Human Approximation of Divine Life: Part Two	p. 193
Choosing Moral Virtue for the Sake of Contemplation	p. 196
Appendix
Acting for Love in the Symposium	p. 209
Possessing the Object of Love	p. 209
The Intrinsic Value of Intermediate Objects of Love	p. 216
Works Cited	p. 221
Index Locorum	p. 229
General Index	p. 237
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