History in Dispute

by Frankel, Benjamin; Showalter, Dennis E.; Allison, Robert J.

• ISBN13: 9781558624146
• ISBN10: 1558624147
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2002-03-01
• Publisher: St James Pr

Table of Contents

About the Series	xiii
Preface	xv
Dennis Showalter
Chronology	xxi
Alienation of Soldiers: Did soldiers who had fought at the front feel permanently alienated from civilian culture?	1	(9)
Yes. The conditions of the fighting and the remoteness of many theaters combined to establish a barrier of understanding between those who fought and those who did not	2	(4)
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The myth that front-line soldiers were alienated from homefront society is based on the experience of a small, vocal group	6	(4)
H. B. McCartney
American Military Independence: Was U.S. insistence on maintaining military independence a decisive element in the Allied victory?	10	(11)
Yes. Military independence allowed the American forces to defend Paris successfully in the summer of 1918 and to spearhead the decisive counteroffensive in September of the same year	11	(3)
Paul Du Quenoy
No. American troops performed poorly under their own officers, and the Allied victory can be attributed simply to the American role in introducing two million fresh troops at a time when the Central Powers had no more manpower reserves	14	(4)
James Corum
No. General Pershing's intransigence concerning the integration of U.S. troops into existing Allied units cost lives and time when both were in short supply	18	(3)
James J. Cooke
American Tactics: Was General Pershing's emphasis on open warfare appropriate for the Western Front?	21	(8)
Yes. General Pershing recognized that the war could not be decided from the trenches. The problem of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was less a failure of strategy than defective training systems	22	(3)
James J. Cooke
No. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) went to Europe with a tactical doctrine unsuitable to the nature of the war and, as a result, U.S. forces paid a heavy price	25	(4)
Mark E. Grotelueschen
Anglo-German Naval Race: Was the naval arms race the central factor in the growth of Anglo-German antagonism prior to World War I?	29	(8)
Yes. As the premier naval power at the turn of the twentieth century, Great Britain felt threatened by the growing naval capabilities and heavy-handed diplomacy of Germany	30	(3)
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The German naval threat was almost welcome, as the one challenge Britain was confident it could defeat. German hostility was instead the price Britain paid for rapprochement with her imperial rivals, France and Russia	33	(4)
John Abbatiello
Arab Uprising: Did the Arab uprising of 1916 contribute significantly to the military and political developments in the Middle East?	37	(6)
Yes. The Arab revolt gave the Allies political leverage in the region and established Arab nationalism as a postwar force	38	(1)
John Wheatley
No. The Arab revolt represented a minor military event that was peripheral to the more significant fighting taking place west of the Jordan River	39	(4)
Edward J. Erickson
Austria-Hungary: Did Austria-Hungary's abandonment of great-power status to concentrate on the Balkans play a major role in generating the Great War?	43	(8)
Yes. Austria-Hungary in 1914 had become, de facto, another Balkan power, and it was correspondingly indifferent to the consequences of its actions in Europe	44	(3)
Graydon A. Tunstall
No. The policy of Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand reflected a determination to maintain the Dual Monarchy's status as a great power, able and willing to act independently in defense of its own vital interests	47	(4)
John Wheatley
BEF Technology: Did the integration of tanks in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) contribute to the Allied victory?	51	(8)
Yes. Armor was the central element of British Expeditionary Force (BEF) tactics in the final offensives of 1918	52	(3)
Robert M. Citino
No. In the final Allied offensives of 1918 mechanical warfare and tanks were less significant to victory than traditional technologies, especially artillery	55	(4)
William J. Astore
Combat Experience: Did blood lust prolong the war?	59	(7)
Yes. The blood lust exhibited by frontline soldiers throughout the conflict stopped only with the collapse of the German war effort	60	(1)
William R. Forstchen
No. The ordinary frontline soldier was no more inclined to act aggressively against the enemy than to adopt a ``live and let live'' approach toward him	61	(5)
Mary Habeck
Culture of the Offensive: Were the war plans of 1914 manifestations of a ``culture of the offensive'' at any cost?	66	(11)
Yes. Between 1871 and 1914 European armies moved toward an intellectualized concept of the offensive as a sovereign recipe for victory, without regard for the objective analyses of developments in technology and administration that predicted a prolonged war	67	(2)
William R. Forstchen
No. Many military planners before 1914 envisioned a limited offensive war of short duration in which the European balance of power would be maintained	69	(3)
Daniel Lee Butcher
No. The general commitment to offensive warfare reflected a careful calculation of prewar armies' perceived strengths, weaknesses, and potential as well as the similarities characterizing those armies	72	(5)
Robert T. Foley
David Lloyd George: Was David Lloyd George an effective wartime prime minister?	77	(7)
Yes. Lloyd George provided strong leadership when Britain was under intense pressure on many fronts. His personal charm and political skills were major assets, and it is unlikely any of his contemporaries could have done better	78	(3)
Philip Giltmer
No. Lloyd George's pursuit of victory at all costs committed Britain to policies that could not be sustained, and the nation's survival depended upon strokes of good fortune	81	(3)
Robert McJimsey
East Africa: Was the 1914-1918 campaign of German general Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa a success?	84	(7)
Yes. As both a military operation and an example of creating a multiethnic army, Lettow-Vorbeck's campaign was brilliant	85	(2)
Michelle Moyd
No. The demographic and ecological havoc wrought by Lettow-Vorbeck's operations had little impact on the German war effort	87	(4)
William J. Astore
Eastern Europe: Did German occupation policies in Eastern Europe prefigure those of the Third Reich?	91	(11)
Yes. The Nazis, who added genocidal racism to the mix, perpetuated German views of the East and its peoples as fields of conquest and development	92	(5)
Lawrence A. Helm
No. The German occupation of Eastern Europe was concerned initially with providing administration and security and subsequently with reorganizing the conquered territory along traditional imperialist lines	97	(5)
Paul Du Quenoy
Easterners and Westerners: Was the conflict between Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Chief of Staff Sir William Robertson the result of a basic disagreement on war strategy?	102	(7)
Yes. David Lloyd George emphasized military operations in the East while Sir William Robertson advocated continuing the offensive in the West	103	(2)
Michael S. Neiberg
No. David Lloyd George and Sir William Robertson had flexibility in their respective positions, but they were unable to find a way of working together systematically	105	(4)
William J. Astore
Firepower and Mobility: Was the crucial military problem of World War I an imbalance between firepower and mobility on the battlefield?	109	(8)
Yes. By successfully addressing the tactical problem of the ``last 300 yards of no man's land,'' the Allies won the Great War	110	(2)
William J. Astore
No. The crucial military problem of World War I was that Allied leaders formulated offensive strategies that never accommodated the realities of trench warfare	112	(5)
David J. Ulbrich
Gallipoli: Was the Allied effort on the Gallipoli Peninsula doomed from the start?	117	(7)
Yes. Allied planners seriously underestimated Turkish fighting capabilities and defensive preparations	118	(3)
Edward J. Erickson
No. Poor decisions made on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels determined the failure of the Gallipoli campaign	121	(3)
Dennis Showalter
Gender Roles: Were women excluded from the Great War?	124	(8)
Yes. World War I essentially was a masculine activity	125	(3)
David J. Ulbrich
No. The Great War was an experience that both transcended and denied sex-role stereotyping	128	(4)
William J. Astore
German Commerce Raiders: Were German surface-commerce raiders effective?	132	(7)
Yes. Surface raiders exercised continuous pressure on commercial shipping in open waters	133	(2)
Sanders Marble
No. Surface-commerce raiding was obsolescent as early as 1914, having no more than a nuisance value against the British maritime empire	135	(4)
David H. Olivier
German Economic Mobilization: Was the 1916-1917 Hindenburg-Ludendorff program for German economic mobilization a failure?	139	(7)
Yes. The mobilization of national resources intended by the program took little account of German economic realities	140	(3)
Dennis Showalter
No. The program eventually did succeed in integrating the army, industry, and labor behind the war effort to a significant degree	143	(3)
David N. Spires
Internal French Politics: Did internal French politics prior to World War I significantly weaken relations between the civil government and the military?	146	(8)
Yes. The mutual suspicion and hostility of the years before 1914 endured throughout the conflict and negatively shaped French conduct in the war	147	(4)
Michael S. Neiberg
No. Prewar political animosity dissipated with the need to confront a common challenge and enemy	151	(3)
Eugenia C. Kiesling
Irish Independence: How did the Great War affect the Irish independence movement?	154	(9)
The Great War renewed the historical divisions of British intransigence and Irish nationalist factionalism, resulting in the drift of the independence movement into militancy	155	(1)
Robert McJimsey
The Great War afforded the Irish independence movement with an opportunity to strike against Britain while its attention was concentrated on the Continent	156	(4)
William Kautt
By declaring the defense of the rights of small nations among its war aims, Britain lost its moral authority in Ireland and inadvertently strengthened the independence movement there	160	(3)
James S. Corum
Jewish Community: What impact did the war have on the European Jewish community?	163	(7)
Physical devastation and a surge in anti-Semitism combined to make the lot of European Jews far worse in 1919 than in 1914	164	(2)
Michael S. Neiberg
By the end of the war Europe was more tolerant of Jews as evidenced by their greater role in political, cultural, and intellectual life	166	(4)
Paul Du Quenoy
Kerensky: Did the Kerensky government make a mistake when it tried to keep Russia in the war?	170	(9)
Yes. The decision of the new government antagonized the proponents of the slogan ``Peace, Land, Bread!''	171	(3)
Josh Sanborn
No. The new government needed all the help it could get, and the promise of generous French and British support made staying in the war a reasonable calculated risk	174	(5)
Paul Du Quenoy
Lorraine: Was the 1914 German offensive in Lorraine an appropriate response to altered circumstances on the Western Front?	179	(7)
Yes. Having defeated the initial French offensive in Lorraine, the Germans were justified in committing reserves t reinforce theirposition	180	(2)
Dennis Showalter
No. Diverting forces to a secondary theater in the south seriously hampered German efforts in Belgium	182	(4)
Paul Du Quenoy
Lost Generation: Did the Great War create a ``lost generation''?	186	(7)
Yes. The war did in fact exact a disproportionate physical and psychic toll on Europe's ``best and brightest'' young men	187	(1)
Mary Habeck
No. The ``lost generation'' was an invention of the interwar years, a convenient excuse for those who failed to mee the challenges that arose after 1918	188	(5)
Adrian Gregory
New Weapons: Did World War I accelerate the technological development of weaponry?	193	(9)
Yes. The synergies of technical development of weaponry during World War I represented a marked change in the conduct of war as well as the attitudes about it	194	(3)
William J. Astore
No. The technological innovations introduced in 1914-1918 were part of a continuum of increasingly improved firepower capabilities	197	(5)
William Kautt
Organized Religion: Did organized religion support the war efforts of the various nations involved in the Great War?	202	(9)
Yes. Many Christian denominations, motivated by patriotism, viewed the struggle as a spiritual test of their respective nations' moral virtue	203	(4)
William J. Astore
No. The churches provided one of the first influential sources of challenge to specific aspects of the war's conduct	207	(4)
William Kautt
Ottoman Empire: Did the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the war establish the conditions for the rise of the Turkish state afterward?	211	(7)
Yes. Conflict with various European nations and internal Arab rebellion reduced the Ottoman Empire to a core Turkish state	212	(2)
Michael S. Neiberg
No. The achievements of the Ottoman Empire during the war were remarkable, and its weaknesses and handicaps in no way prefigured a Turkish nationalist successor state	214	(4)
Edward J. Erickson
Passchendaele: Should the Passchendaele offensive of 1917 have been called off once it became clear that a breakthrough was impossible?	218	(7)
Yes. Because of the early high casualties and failed initial assaults, the British should have stopped the offensive before the heavy rains began	219	(4)
William J. Astore
No. A steadily increasing British battlefield superiority legitimated Sir Douglas Haig's belief that the attack was worth pursuing, even under the appalling weather conditions	223	(2)
Dennis Showalter
Permanent Alliances: Did the system of permanent alliances that arose in Europe after 1871 cause World War I?	225	(7)
Yes. The alliances encouraged belligerence and risk taking by making all the great powers believe they would be supported by their allies in almost any situation	226	(2)
Richard L. Dinardo
No. If any factor shaped diplomacy, it was the perceived weakness of pre-1914 alliance treaties, all of which featured escape clauses and reservations as opposed to affirming mutual support	228	(4)
Paul Du Quenoy
Plan XVII: Was Plan XVII the blueprint for a French offensive?	232	(7)
Yes. Plan XVII was an aggressive military strategy that dictated the need to seize the initiative from the Germans and not allow them time to coordinate a proper defense	233	(2)
Robert B. Bruce
No. Plan XVII made provisions only for the mobilization and concentration of French troops and not their offensive use on the battlefield	235	(4)
Eugenia C. Kiesling
Poison Gas: Was the poison gas used in World War I essentially a nuisance weapon?	239	(6)
Yes. Gas was used primarily for harassment, increasing the misery of war and lowering morale	240	(1)
David N. Spires
No. When used properly, in conjunction with small arms fire and artillery barrages, gas was a lethal weapon	241	(4)
James Corum
Schlieffen Plan: Was the Schlieffen Plan of the German General Staff a sound war strategy?	245	(9)
Yes. The various directives that made up the German war plan indicate a high level of flexibility and a willingness to respond to events	246	(2)
Robert T. Foley
No. The Schlieffen Plan was predicated on an inexorable progression to an all-or-nothing victory	248	(3)
Antulio Echevarria
No. The Schlieffen Plan seriously underestimated the capabilities of enemy forces and did not take into account their tenacity and rapid deployment	251	(3)
John Wheatley
Socialists: Did European Socialists give their ultimate loyalty to national governments rather than the universal proletariat during the war?	254	(9)
Yes. Socialist parties sustained national war efforts with recruits, votes, and propaganda	255	(5)
Paul Du Quenoy
No. Socialists took advantage of the general war weariness to advance the cause of workers	260	(3)
Dennis Showalter
Soldiers' Motivations: What motivated soldiers in all armies to fight?	263	(8)
The essential reason why millions of soldiers continued to fight was consent, derived from love of country, hatred of the enemy, and a crusading spirit	264	(3)
William J. Astore
Comradeship and coercion ultimately kept soldiers at their posts	267	(4)
David J. Ulbrich
The Somme: Were the British doomed in the Battle of the Somme (1916) by the decision to seek a decisive breakthrough?	271	(6)
Yes. Sir Douglas Haig's decision to seek a decisive breakthrough damaged his army's ability to sustain itself in the later stages of the operation	272	(1)
Dennis Showalter
No. The problems experienced by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at the Somme reflected inexperience in planning for such an offensive	273	(4)
Albert Palazzo
Treaty of Versailles: Did the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 provide the framework for a durable peace?	277	(10)
Yes. The Versailles settlement was purposely designed to establish lasting international stability. It was no harsher than comparable treaties and was entirely appropriate for the political environment of 1919	278	(3)
Michael S. Neiberg
No. The Treaty of Versailles was disastrous because it embittered Germany and fostered political radicalism in that country	281	(6)
Paul Du Quenoy
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare: Was the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare a commitment to total war?	287	(8)
Yes. By targeting all shipping and sinking vessels without warning, Germany practiced a form of total war on its enemies	288	(2)
John Abbatiello
No. Although the desire to remove Great Britain from the conflict was great, Germany was incapable of accomplishing such a task	290	(5)
Mark Karau
War and America: Did the Great War have a positive impact on the United States?	295	(8)
Yes. The war provided focus for the United States and introduced the nation to the nature of its responsibilities as a great power	296	(3)
Kristi L. Nichols
No. World War I highlighted and exacerbated internal ethnic, social, and economic tensions, while militarizing the country to a far greater degree than even the Civil War	299	(4)
Michael S. Neiberg
References	303	(8)
Contributors' Notes	311	(2)
Index	313