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Acknowledgments | p. xi |
Abbreviations | p. xv |
Introduction | p. 1 |
The Evolution of Terrorism as a Strategic Threat | p. 3 |
A Word About Scope and Terms | p. 6 |
The Conceptual Framework | p. 7 |
Case Selection | p. 8 |
Overview of Chapters | p. 9 |
Decapitation: Catching or Killing the Leader | p. 14 |
what decapitation Means | p. 16 |
The Arrest of Top Leaders | p. 17 |
Abimael Guzman and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) | p. 18 |
Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | p. 20 |
Mickey McKevitt and the Real Irish Republican Army | p. 22 |
Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo | p. 23 |
Assassination or "Targeted Killing" | p. 24 |
The Philippines' Abu Sayyaf | p. 27 |
Russia and Chechen Leaders | p. 28 |
Israel's "Targeted Killings" | p. 29 |
How Decapitation Ends Terrorism | p. 31 |
Negotiations: Transition toward a Legitimate Political Process | p. 35 |
why Government Negotiate | p. 36 |
Why Groups Negotiate | p. 39 |
Case Studies of Negotiations | p. 42 |
The Northern Ireland Peace Process | p. 42 |
Analysis of the Agreement | p. 47 |
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process | p. 48 |
Terrorism and the Talks | p. 55 |
The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers) | p. 57 |
Analysis of the Failure | p. 61 |
Promising and Unpromising Circumstances for Negotiation | p. 62 |
Stalemate | p. 63 |
Strong Leadership | p. 64 |
Sponsors | p. 65 |
Suicide Campaigns | p. 66 |
Splintering | p. 67 |
Spoilers | p. 69 |
Setting and Story | p. 70 |
How Negotiations End Terrorism | p. 71 |
Success: Achieving the Objective | p. 73 |
What Does "Success" Mean? | p. 74 |
Survival | p. 75 |
Achievement of Objectives | p. 77 |
Perpetuating Terrorism: Tactical or "Process" Goals | p. 77 |
Ending Terrorism: Strategic or"Outcome" Goals | p. 80 |
Cases of Success | p. 82 |
Irgun Zvai Le'umi (Irgun or IZL) | p. 82 |
The African National Congress and Umkhonto | p. 85 |
Other Notable Cases | p. 89 |
How Success Ends Terrorism | p. 91 |
Conclusion | p. 92 |
Failure: Imploding, Provoking a Backlash, or Becoming Marginalized | p. 94 |
Implosion: Mistakes, Burnout, and Collapse | p. 95 |
Failure to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation | p. 95 |
Generational Patterns: Left-Wing Groups In The 1970S | p. 97 |
Generational Patterns: Right-Wing Groups In The 1990S | p. 98 |
Infighting and Fractionalization | p. 100 |
Loss of Operational Control | p. 102 |
Accepting an Exit | p. 103 |
Marginalization: Diminishing Popular Support | p. 104 |
The Ideology Becomes Irrelevant | p. 105 |
Loss of Contact with "the People" | p. 107 |
Targeting Errors and Backlash | p. 108 |
How Failure Ends Terrorism | p. 110 |
Repression: Crushing Terrorism with Force | p. 115 |
Analyzing The Strategies of Terrorism | p. 117 |
Case Studies of Repression | p. 122 |
Russia and Narodnaya Volya | p. 123 |
Peru and Sendero Luminoso | p. 125 |
Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | p. 128 |
Uruguay and the Tupamaros | p. 129 |
Russia and Chechnya | p. 131 |
Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1928-1966 | p. 137 |
How Repression Ends Terrorism | p. 141 |
Reorientation: Transitioning to Another Modus Operandi | p. 146 |
Criminality and Terrorism | p. 148 |
Colombia and the FARC | p. 149 |
The Philippines and Abu Sayyaf | p. 152 |
Insurgency and Terrorism | p. 153 |
Algeria and the G1A | p. 155 |
Terrorism as a Catalyst for Major War | p. 157 |
India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Separatist Groups | p. 159 |
Outdates Paradigms, Practical Implications | p. 162 |
How War Ends Terrorism | p. 166 |
How Al-Qaeda Ends: The Relevance and Irrelevance of History | p. 167 |
Is Al-Qaeda Unique? | p. 168 |
Resilient Structure | p. 169 |
Methods of Radicalization and Recruitment | p. 171 |
Means of Support | p. 174 |
Means of Communication | p. 175 |
The Relevance and Irrelevance of History for Al-Qaeda: Applying the Framework | p. 177 |
Decapitation:Capturing or Killing the Leaders | p. 177 |
Negotiations: Talking to Al-Qaeda or Its Associates | p. 179 |
Success: Achieving Al-Qaeda's Objectives | p. 182 |
Failure through Implosion | p. 183 |
Failure through Diminishment of Popular Support | p. 187 |
Repression: Crushing Al-Qaeda with Force | p. 190 |
Reorientation: Transitioning to Other Means | p. 191 |
Al-Qaeda's Decline and Demise | p. 193 |
Conclusion | p. 197 |
Understanding How Terrorism Ends | p. 201 |
Appendix: Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns | p. 207 |
Notes | p. 223 |
Selected Bibliography | p. 283 |
Index | p. 297 |
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