Preface | p. 17 |
What Makes a Right Act Right? The Theoretical Alternatives | p. 23 |
Introduction: The Major Ethical Traditions | p. 23 |
Consequentialist Theories | p. 28 |
Ethical Egoism | p. 28 |
Psychological Egoism as Evidence | p. 28 |
The Irrelevance of Psychological Egoism for Ethical Egoism | p. 29 |
The Truth of Psychological Egoism | p. 29 |
Butler and Shaftsbury on Ethical Egoism and Altruism | p. 32 |
Two Strong Objections to Ethical Egoism | p. 33 |
Egoistic Hedonism | p. 34 |
Pleasure Is the Only Difference | p. 34 |
Is Happiness Pleasure? | p. 35 |
Act Utilitarianism | p. 36 |
Rule Utilitarianism | p. 36 |
The Differences Between Act and Rule Utilitarianism | p. 36 |
Objections To Utilitarianism from Revulsion | p. 39 |
Mill and the "Pig Philosophy" Objection | p. 44 |
The Ambiguity Objection | p. 46 |
The "Too Demanding for Humanity" Objection | p. 48 |
Deontological Theories | p. 49 |
Ethical Relativism | p. 51 |
Relativism and the Argument from Variable Practices | p. 53 |
Three Objections from Absolutism | p. 53 |
The Relativist's Response | p. 55 |
Kantianism | p. 58 |
The Good Will and Duty | p. 58 |
The Categorical Imperative: The First Formulation | p. 60 |
Morality and Rationality | p. 61 |
The Categorical Imperative: The Second Formulation | p. 62 |
The Objection from Conflict in Duties | p. 65 |
The Objection from Justice | p. 67 |
A Kantian Reply | p. 68 |
The Usual Objections and Beyond | p. 69 |
Ethical Intuitionism | p. 70 |
Ethical Intuitionism as a Deontological Theory | p. 71 |
The Problem with Intuitionism: The Cambridge Platonists | p. 72 |
Intuition and Unreasoned Feeling | p. 73 |
The Intuitionist's Reply | p. 74 |
Intuitionism, Moral Conflict, and Subjectivism | p. 75 |
Theologism | p. 78 |
The Problems in Theologism | p. 78 |
The Theologist's Response | p. 80 |
Ethical Nihilism and Ethical Skepticism | p. 81 |
The Arguments for Nihilism | p. 82 |
The Response to Nihilism and Skepticism: The Case of the Obliging Stranger | p. 83 |
Emotivism | p. 86 |
Cognitivism and Noncognitivism in Ethics | p. 86 |
Noncognitivism and Positivism | p. 86 |
Emotivism and Moral Discourse | p. 88 |
Objections to Emotivism | p. 88 |
Virtue Ethics | p. 90 |
The Virtues of Virtue Ethics | p. 90 |
Feminist Ethics and Virtue Ethics | p. 93 |
Virtue as the Mean | p. 95 |
A Critique of Virtue Ethics | p. 98 |
The Motivating Argument from Caring | p. 98 |
Ambiguity in the Concept of Virtue | p. 101 |
Virtuous Robbers and Virtuous Murderers | p. 104 |
What's Wrong with Vice? | p. 105 |
Conflict Among Virtues and Moral Guidance | p. 106 |
Concluding Remarks: An Appraisal and Subjectivism | p. 107 |
Recommended Readings | p. 116 |
Why Should I Be Moral? Four Responses | p. 119 |
Introduction: Four Responses to the Question | p. 119 |
The Question Has a Decisive Answer | p. 120 |
Three Proposed Decisive Answers Rejected | p. 121 |
The Question Is Meaningless | p. 128 |
Rejecting Three Arguments for the Meaninglessness of the Question | p. 129 |
The Question Has a Persuasive but Nondecisive Answer | p. 133 |
The Hobbesian-Nielsen Answer: The Immoral Person Is Generally Unhappy | p. 133 |
Rejecting Arguments for the Third Response | p. 135 |
The Question Is Meaningful with No Objective Answer | p. 136 |
Another Argument for the Meaninglessness of "Why Should I Be Moral?" | p. 136 |
Counterreplies | p. 141 |
The Basic Ethical Question Is "How Shall I Live?" | p. 144 |
There Is No Pure Subjectivism | p. 145 |
Conclusion: Subjectivism and the Stability of Society | p. 146 |
Recommended Readings | p. 150 |
What Is Human Happiness? | p. 151 |
Introduction: Happiness as the Goal of Human Behavior | p. 151 |
Happiness and Pleasure: Cyrenaic and Epicurean Hedonism | p. 154 |
Modern Hedonism: Utilitarianism and the Bentham-Mill Debate | p. 157 |
An Assessment of the Debate | p. 159 |
A General Critique of Hedonism: Vindicating the Hedonism of Epicurus and Mill | p. 160 |
The Concept and the Problem of Nonsensory Pleasures | p. 162 |
The Feeling of Happiness: An Examination of One Definition of Happiness | p. 165 |
Happiness as the Product of a Human Judgment | p. 168 |
Another Definition of Happiness | p. 170 |
Two Concepts of Happiness: Sartre and Aristotle | p. 172 |
Objectivism Defeated | p. 177 |
The Pros and Cons of Subjectivism and Objectivism | p. 179 |
The Impossibility of an Unadulterated Subjectivism | p. 182 |
Conclusion: Making Subjectivism Come Out Right | p. 183 |
Recommended Readings | p. 189 |
Stoicism Revisited: Prescriptions for Attaining Human Happiness | p. 193 |
Introduction: Reviewing Subjectivism, Teaching Happiness, and Rejecting the Platonic View | p. 193 |
Happiness and Living in the Future | p. 195 |
Excessive Reliance on Persons, Places, and Things | p. 196 |
Unhappiness in Other Persons, Places, and Things | p. 198 |
Unhappiness in Fear of Failure and Rejection | p. 200 |
Beyond Stoicism | p. 201 |
Conclusion: Marcus Aurelius | p. 204 |
Recommended Readings | p. 206 |
Subject Index | p. 207 |
Name Index | p. 211 |
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