Aspects of Insider Threats | p. 1 |
Introduction | p. 1 |
Insiders and Insider Threats | p. 2 |
Insider Threats | p. 5 |
Taxonomies | p. 6 |
Detection and Mitigation | p. 7 |
Policies | p. 9 |
Human Factors and Compliance | p. 11 |
Conclusion | p. 13 |
References | p. 15 |
Combatting Insider Threats | p. 17 |
A Contextual View of Insiders and Insider Threats | p. 17 |
Risks of Insider Misuse | p. 20 |
Types of Insiders | p. 20 |
Types of Insider Misuse | p. 21 |
Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Risks | p. 22 |
Relevant Knowledge and Experience | p. 23 |
Exploitations of Vulnerabilities | p. 24 |
Potential Risks Resulting from Exploitations | p. 25 |
Countermeasures | p. 25 |
Specification of Sound Policies for Data Gathering and Monitoring | p. 27 |
Detection, Analysis, and Identification of Misuse | p. 28 |
Desired Responses to Detected Anomalies and Misuses | p. 29 |
Decomposition of Insider Misuse Problems | p. 29 |
Stages of Development and Use | p. 30 |
Extended Profiling Including Psychological and Other Factors | p. 31 |
Requirements for Insider-Threat-Resistant High-Integrity Elections | p. 33 |
Relevance of the Countermeasures to Elections | p. 36 |
Research and Development Needs | p. 39 |
Conclusions | p. 40 |
References | p. 41 |
Insider Threat and Information Security Management | p. 45 |
Introduction | p. 45 |
Definitions of Insider and the Relevance to Information Security Management | p. 46 |
Risk and Insiderness | p. 49 |
The Importance of Organisational Culture and the Significance of Cultural Risks | p. 51 |
Fieldwork on Culture and the Insider Threat | p. 51 |
The Structure of the ISMS and Traditional Information Security Management Responses to Insiderness | p. 53 |
Analysis - Turning an ISMS Inwards | p. 54 |
The Role of Operationalisation | p. 55 |
Information Security Management Standards, Best Practice and the Insider Threat | p. 56 |
General Security Management Standards | p. 56 |
Guidelines Focused on the Management of the Insider Threat | p. 57 |
Analysis of the Contribution of Best Practice and Guidelines | p. 60 |
Crime theories and insider threat | p. 61 |
Existing Connections between Crime Theories and Information Security Management | p. 62 |
Implications of Crime Theories for ISMS Design | p. 63 |
Application of SCP to the ISO Control Domains | p. 64 |
Implications for ISMS Process Design | p. 66 |
Summary of Crime Theory Contribution | p. 68 |
Conclusions | p. 69 |
References | p. 70 |
A State of the Art Survey of Fraud Detection Technology | p. 73 |
Introduction | p. 73 |
Data Analysis Methodology | p. 74 |
Survey of Technology for Fraud Detection in Practice | p. 76 |
General Approaches for Intrusion and Fraud Detection | p. 76 |
State of the Art of Fraud Detection Tools and Techniques | p. 78 |
Why Fraud Detection is not the Same as Intrusion Detection | p. 80 |
Challenges for Fraud Detection in Information Systems | p. 82 |
Summary | p. 82 |
References | p. 84 |
Combining Traditional Cyber Security Audit Data with Psychosocial Data: Towards Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigation | p. 85 |
Introduction | p. 85 |
Background | p. 88 |
Issues of Security and Privacy | p. 91 |
Predictive Modeling Approach | p. 94 |
Training Needs | p. 106 |
Conclusions and Research Challenges | p. 109 |
Acknowledgments | p. 111 |
References | p. 111 |
A Risk Management Approach to the "Insider Threat" | p. 115 |
Introduction | p. 116 |
Insider Threat Assessment | p. 117 |
Example | p. 120 |
Summary | p. 122 |
Access-Based Assessment | p. 122 |
Psychological Indicator-Based Assessment | p. 126 |
Application of Risk to System Countermeasures | p. 130 |
Example | p. 133 |
Summary | p. 135 |
Conclusion | p. 135 |
References | p. 135 |
Legally Sustainable Solutions for Privacy Issues in Collaborative Fraud Detection | p. 139 |
Introduction | p. 139 |
Monitoring Modern Distributed Systems | p. 140 |
Evidence Model | p. 142 |
Observing Fraudulent Service Behaviours | p. 145 |
Architectural Support | p. 148 |
Introduction to the Legal Perspective | p. 149 |
Basic Principles of Data Privacy Law | p. 150 |
A Set of Six Basic Rules | p. 151 |
General Legal Requirements of Fraud Detection Systems | p. 153 |
Privacy Relevance of Fraud Detection Systems | p. 153 |
Necessary Data for Fraud Detection | p. 154 |
Transparency in the Fraud Detection Context | p. 155 |
Purpose Specification and Binding in Fraud Detection | p. 155 |
Permissibility of Fraud Detection | p. 155 |
Quality of Event Data | p. 156 |
Security of Event Data | p. 156 |
Technical Solutions for Privacy-respecting Fraud Detection | p. 156 |
Technicla Requirements | p. 157 |
Lossless Information Reduction with Covered Data | p. 161 |
Lossy Information Reductions for Timestamps | p. 161 |
Legal Improvements by Pseudonymizing Event Data | p. 165 |
Technical Description | p. 165 |
Privacy Relevance of Pseudonymized Event Data | p. 166 |
Strengthening the Data Privacy Official | p. 167 |
Disclosure With Legal Permission | p. 167 |
Data and System Security | p. 168 |
Conclusion | p. 168 |
References | p. 169 |
Towards an Access-Control Framework for Countering Insider Threats | p. 173 |
Introduction | p. 173 |
Motivation and related work | p. 177 |
Illustrative scenarios | p. 177 |
Definitions of insiders | p. 179 |
Access control | p. 180 |
The insider problem and access control | p. 181 |
Trust, trustworthiness, and the insider problem | p. 182 |
Insiderness | p. 183 |
Trust management and risk assessment | p. 183 |
Pragmatics of identifying suspicious events | p. 184 |
Toward a context-and insider-aware policy language | p. 185 |
Context and request predicates | p. 186 |
Requirements | p. 186 |
Policy transformations via declarative programming | p. 187 |
Discussion of requirements | p. 188 |
Policy transformations | p. 189 |
Risk-and trustworthiness-aware policy composition | p. 190 |
Access-control architectures and the insider problem | p. 191 |
Concluding remarks | p. 192 |
References | p. 194 |
Monitoring Technologies for Mitigating Insider Threats | p. 197 |
Introduction | p. 197 |
Related Research | p. 200 |
Threat Model - Level of Sophistication of the Attacker | p. 201 |
Decoy Properties | p. 202 |
Architecture | p. 207 |
Decoy Document Distributor | p. 207 |
SONAR | p. 208 |
Decoys and Network Monitoring | p. 208 |
Host-based Sensors | p. 211 |
Concluding Remarks and Future Work | p. 215 |
References | p. 217 |
Insider Threat Specification as a Threat Mitigation Technique | p. 219 |
Introduction | p. 219 |
The Insider Threat Problem | p. 220 |
Background | p. 221 |
The Common Intrusion Specification Language | p. 221 |
Panoptis | p. 225 |
Insider Misuse Taxonomies and Threat Models | p. 226 |
The Scope of the Insider Threat Prediction Specification Language | p. 237 |
The Domain Specific Language Programming Paradigm | p. 240 |
Conclusion | p. 242 |
References | p. 242 |
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