Institutional Games and the U.s. Supreme Court

by Rogers, James R.; Flemming, Roy B.; Bond, Jon R.

• ISBN13: 9780813925271
• ISBN10: 0813925274
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2006-08-30
• Publisher: Univ of Virginia Pr

Summary

Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices' votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so.In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government.Contributors:Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, Lawrence Baum

Table of Contents

Preface	vii
Foreword	xiii
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
PART 1 Strategic Games with Congress and the States
Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the Supreme Court	3	(21)
ANDREW D. MARTIN
Why Expert Judges Defer to (Almost) Ignorant Legislators: Accounting for the Puzzle of Judicial Deference	24	(19)
JAMES R. ROGERS
Institutions and Independence in Models of Judicial Review	43	(26)
CHRISTOPHER ZORN
"John Marshall Has Made His Decision": Implementation, Transparency, and Public Support	69	(28)
GEORG VANBERG
Court-State Interactions: National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause	97	(30)
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA AND JAMES R. ROGERS
PART 2 Strategic Games within the Judicial Hierarchy
A Court of Appeals in a Rational-Choice Model of Supreme Court Decision Making	127	(46)
THOMAS H. HAMMOND, CHRIS W. BONNEAU, AND REGINALD S. SHEEHAN
Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selection, and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies	173	(32)
CHARLES M. CAMERON AND LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER
Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communications	205	(25)
ETHAN BUENO DE MESQUITA AND MATTHEW STEPHENSON
Decision Making by an Agent with Multiple Principals: Environmental Policy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals	230	(31)
STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST AND SUSAN B. HAIRE
Afterword: Studying Courts Formally	261	(14)
LAWRENCE BAUM
Appendix: A Primer on Game Theory	275	(22)
JAMES R. ROGERS
References	297	(18)
Notes on Contributors	315	(4)
Index	319