Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development

by Platteau; Jean-Philippe

• ISBN13: 9789058230584
• ISBN10: 9058230589
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2000-09-01
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

(Gordon and Breach) The first in a series of texts on development economics. Focuses on the need to develop suitable practices and rules as well as the public agencies and moral environment in order to establish generalized trust and foster development through economic specialization.

Table of Contents

Foreword	xi
Douglass C. North
Acknowledgments	xiii
Introduction	xv
The Subject Put into Perspective	1	(30)
Radicalism vs. gradualism: The intellectual debate of the 1950s and 1960s	1	(5)
Marx and Boserup: Institutional development as an induced mechanism	6	(4)
The new institutional economics: A comparative static approach privileging transaction costs and risk considerations	10	(6)
Social norms and fairness considerations	16	(6)
The evolutionary approach to institutions	22	(9)
Resource Endowments and Agricultural Development	31	(42)
Introduction	31	(3)
Physical isolation and transportation bottlenecks	34	(8)
Low density of road networks	34	(4)
Low quality of the rural road network	38	(2)
Low rates of road utilization	40	(2)
Physical isolation and market underdevelopment	42	(9)
The case of product markets	42	(5)
The case of factor markets	47	(4)
Physical isolation and constraints on the supply of public goods	51	(3)
The complicating presence of technology constraints	54	(5)
Lessons from the debate on the aggregate supply response	59	(5)
Conclusion and policy implications	64	(9)
Appendix: Optimal choice of agricultural policy mix	67	(6)
Property Rights in Land---Part I: Dividing the Commons	73	(48)
Introduction	73	(2)
The view of the property rights school and their evolutionary followers	75	(17)
Property arrangements under land abundance	75	(2)
Property arrangements under land scarcity	77	(12)
The indeterminacy of institutional evolution	89	(3)
Limitations of the (qualified) property rights approach	92	(20)
The questionable view of efficiency as the engine of evolution	92	(2)
Missing the impact of social capital	94	(2)
Ignoring the distributive effects of privatization	96	(11)
Overlooking the role of the state	107	(5)
Conclusion	112	(9)
Property Rights in Land---Part II: Individualization of Land Tenure	121	(68)
Introduction	121	(1)
The ETLR (Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights): A presentation	122	(12)
The evolutionary sequence of land rights	122	(7)
The beneficial effects of land titling	129	(5)
The ETLR put to test: The efficiency effects	134	(29)
Effects of tenure individualization on investment and land yields: The evidence (with special reference to SubSaharan Africa)	134	(5)
Effects of tenure individualization on investment: Discussion	139	(12)
The functioning of the land market: Evidence and discussion	151	(12)
The ETLR put to test: The induced demand-and-supply mechanism	163	(16)
Equity problems raised by the adjudication of private property rights	164	(5)
Adverse distributive effects of the land sale market	169	(5)
The faulty mechanism of induced demand and supply	174	(5)
Conclusion and policy implications	179	(10)
Where the ETLR fails and why	179	(3)
The importance of community-based solutions	182	(7)
Egalitarian Norms and Economic Growth	189	(52)
Introduction	189	(1)
Egalitarian norms in a context of resource abundance and pervasive uncertainties	190	(11)
Three important characteristics of tribal societies	190	(6)
Distributive implications: Egalitarian norms	196	(5)
The role of witchcraft as a deterrent to private accumulation of wealth	201	(5)
The adverse consequences of traditional egalitarian norms for economic growth	206	(6)
General considerations	206	(2)
Efficiency costs: An illustrative discussion	208	(4)
A game-theoretical perspective	212	(4)
Overcoming or evading social restraints on individual wealth pursuit	216	(13)
Entrepreneurial coordination and the emergence of patron-client relationships	216	(5)
Migration and the role of stranger entrepreneurs	221	(5)
Religious conversion	226	(3)
Conclusion and variations on the theme	229	(12)
Concluding comments	229	(2)
Another way?	231	(3)
Redistributive norms in settled agricultural communities	234	(2)
A final remark	236	(5)
Endogeneity in the Rise of Market Order	241	(40)
Introduction	241	(2)
The problem of the market order: Lessons from general equilibrium theory	243	(3)
The problem of the market order: Trust-enforcing mechanisms based on reputation effects	246	(22)
Bilateral reputation mechanisms in village societies	246	(3)
Multilateral reputation mechanisms in village societies	249	(4)
Bilateral reputation mechanisms in proto-capitalist societies	253	(2)
Multilateral reputation mechanisms in proto-capitalist societies	255	(4)
Variations on the theme	259	(4)
Disciplining foreign rulers in proto-capitalist societies: The need to supplement multilateral reputation mechanisms	263	(3)
Overcoming imperfect information through a private third party	266	(2)
The problem of the market order: Lessons from evolutionary game theory	268	(13)
Market Order, the Rule of Law and Moral Norms	281	(44)
The limitations of self-enforcing equilibria	281	(2)
The rule of law as a necessary complement to spontaneous order	283	(8)
The role of moral norms	291	(20)
The function of moral norms and the motivations of norm-following	291	(5)
The role of emotions	296	(5)
Generalized morality and the market order	301	(4)
The need for reinforcement mechanisms	305	(5)
A short digression on Japan	310	(1)
Limited morality at work	311	(14)
Limited morality and the private sector	311	(4)
Limited morality and the public sphere	315	(10)
No Easy Answer	325	(14)
Evolution of moral norms	325	(3)
Path-dependent trajectories in Europe	328	(6)
Path dependence in southern Italy	328	(2)
Path dependence in the ex-Soviet Union	330	(4)
Concluding remarks	334	(5)
References	339	(34)
Index	373