Intelligent Design : The Bridge Between Science and Theology

by Dembski, William A.

• ISBN13: 9780830815814
• ISBN10: 0830815813
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1999-10-01
• Publisher: Intervarsity Pr

Summary

Intelligent Design is a pivotal, synthesizing work from a thinker whom Phillip Johnson calls "one of the most important of the design theorists who are sparking a scientific revolution by legitimating the concept of intelligent design in science."

Author Biography

William A. Dembski holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Illinois at Chicago. He also has earned degrees in theology and psychology. He is the recipient of two fellowships from the National Science Foundation and currently is a senior fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture. He has done postdoctoral work at the University of Chicago, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton University and Northwestern University.

Table of Contents

Foreword	9	(4)
Michael J. Behe
Preface	13	(12)
Part 1 Historical Backdrop
Recognizing the Divine Finger	25	(24)
Homer Simpson's Prayer	25	(3)
Signs in Decision-Making	28	(3)
Ordinary Versus Extraordinary Signs	31	(4)
Moses and Pharaoh	35	(2)
The Philistines and the Ark	37	(3)
The Sign of the Resurrection	40	(4)
In Defense of Premodernity	44	(5)
The Critique of Miracles	49	(21)
Miracles as Evidence for Faith	49	(2)
Spinoza's Rejection of Miracles	51	(4)
Schleiermacher's Assimilation of Spinoza	55	(3)
Unpacking Schleiermacher's Naturalistic Critique	58	(3)
Critiquing the Naturalistic Critique	61	(6)
The Significance of the Naturalistic Critique	67	(3)
The Demise of British Natural Theology	70	(27)
Pauli's Sneer	70	(3)
From Contrivance to Natural Law	73	(6)
From Natural Law to Agnosticism	79	(3)
Darwin and His Theory	82	(3)
Design and Miracles	85	(5)
The Presupposition of Positivism	90	(7)
Part 2 A Theory of Design
Naturalism & Its Cure	97	(25)
Nature and Creation	97	(2)
The Root of Idolatry	99	(4)
Naturalism Within Western Culture	103	(2)
The Cure: Intelligent Design	105	(4)
Not Theistic Evolution	109	(5)
The Importance of Definitions	114	(6)
A New Generation of Scholars	120	(2)
Reinstating Design Within Science	122	(31)
Design's Departure from Science	122	(2)
Why Reinstate Design?	124	(3)
The Complexity-Specification Criterion	127	(6)
Specification	133	(6)
False Negatives and False Positives	139	(5)
Why the Criterion Works	144	(2)
Irreducible Complexity	146	(3)
So What?	149	(4)
Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information	153	(34)
Complex Specified Information	153	(7)
Generating Information via Law	160	(5)
Generating Information via Chance	165	(2)
Generating Information via Law and Chance	167	(3)
The Law of Conservation of Information	170	(4)
Applying the Theory to Evolutionary Biology	174	(5)
Reconceptualizing Evolutionary Biology	179	(8)
Part 3 Bridging Science & Theology
Science & Theology in Mutual Support	187	(24)
Two Windows on Reality	187	(5)
Epistemic Support	192	(3)
Rational Compulsion	195	(4)
Explanatory Power	199	(4)
The Big Bang and Divine Creation	203	(2)
Christ as the Completion of Science	205	(6)
The Act of Creation	211	(26)
Creation as a Divine Gift	211	(1)
Naturalism's Challenge to Creation	212	(4)
Computational Reductionism	216	(4)
Our Empirical Selves Versus Our Actual Selves	220	(2)
The Resurgence of Design	222	(2)
The Creation of the World	224	(5)
The Intelligibility of the World	229	(5)
Creativity, Divine and Human	234	(3)
Appendix: Objections to Design	237	(43)
A.1 The God of the Gaps	238	(7)
A.2 Intentionality Versus Design	245	(2)
A.3 Scientific Creationism	247	(5)
A.4 But Is It Science?	252	(9)
A.5 Dysteleology	261	(3)
A.6 Just an Anthropic Coincidence	264	(4)
A.7 Applying the Math to Biology	268	(3)
A.8 David Hume's Objections	271	(5)
A.9 Mundane Versus Transcendent Designers	276	(4)
Notes	280	(23)
Index	303

Excerpts

Chapter One

Recognizing the Divine

Finger

1.1 Homer Simpson's Prayer

In an episode of the animated television series The Simpsons , Marge tries to tell her husband Homer that she is pregnant with their third child. "Can't talk now--praying," he interrupts.

Dear Lord, the gods have been good to me and I am thankful. For the first time in my life everything is absolutely perfect the way it is. So here's the deal: you freeze everything as it is and I won't ask for anything more. If that is okay, please give me absolutely no sign. [pause] Okay, deal. In gratitude, I present to you this offering of cookies and milk. If you want me to eat them for you, please give me no sign. [pause] Thy will be done.

    What's wrong with Homer's prayer? Assuming God is the sovereign ruler of the universe, what is to prevent God from answering Homer's prayer by providing no sign? Granted, usually when we want God to confirm something, we look for something extraordinary, some sign that leaves no doubt about God's will. But presumably God could have made it thunder when Homer asked God to freeze everything and God could have made the earth to quake when Homer asked to eat those cookies and milk. Presumably it is just as easy for God to confirm Homer's prayer with no sign as to disconfirm it with a sign. What then is wrong with Homer's prayer?

    Certainly Homer's prayer is self-serving. He clearly wants his life to stay the same, and he also wants to consume those cookies and milk. Since signs are by definition rare, by asking for no sign Homer is virtually guaranteeing that the cookies and milk will be his to consume. As for his life staying unchanged, that's a different matter. Homer's wife Marge is after all pregnant with their third child, a fact that in short order will destroy the "absolute perfection" of Homer's life. Nonetheless if we omit Homer's self-interest, it's not immediately evident what's wrong with his prayer. In the case of the cookies and milk, Homer wants God to confirm a course of action by the absence of a sign. Logically this is equivalent to God confirming the opposite course of action with a sign. "If you want me to eat these cookies and milk, give me no sign" is logically equivalent to "If you give me a sign, then you don't want me to eat these cookies and milk."

    There is, however, an asymmetry between tying a course of action to a sign and tying it to no sign. To see this, consider what would have happened if Homer's prayer had gone something like this:

I present to you this offering of cookies and milk. If you want me to eat them for you, please give me no sign. [loud thunder] Since it's raining outside, I expected the thunder. Thank you for giving me no sign. [powerful earthquake] Since we live on a geological fault, mild tremors aren't out of the ordinary. Thanks for giving me no sign. [radio comes on unexpectedly and the announcer describes the carcinogenic effects of cookies and milk] This part of the country is known for weird atmospheric disturbances, so thanks for giving me no sign. [loud voice exclaims, "Homer, you big dummy, this is God--don't eat those cookies and milk!"] Whoa. Back in my teenage years I used to drop acid. I've had flashbacks and weird mystical experiences ever since. So, God, thank you for giving me no sign. Amen.

The prayer being ended and no sign being given, Homer consumes the cookies and milk.

    What's wrong with this prayer? Certainly it seems that Homer is rationalizing away a whole series of signs. By asking for the absence of a sign to confirm eating the cookies and milk, Homer is equivalently asking for a sign to disconfirm eating the cookies and milk. Such signs seem to have been given to him in abundance, and yet Homer rationalizes each of them. Here then is the problem in seeking confirmation through the absence of a sign. By praying for the absence of a sign, Homer fails to specify a sign. Thus any putative sign that comes along is easily rationalized--"that's not the sort of sign I was looking for."

    Likewise, praying for a sign to confirm something is useless unless the sign is specified. Only if a sign is specified can we avoid rationalizing it once it occurs. So long as no sign is specified, the instruction give me no sign to confirm eating these cookies and milk is not only logically but also functionally equivalent to give me a sign to disconfirm eating these cookies and milk . So long as no sign is specified, it won't be clear whether an event actually does constitute a sign or is merely a coincidence. Indeed a sign is not properly a sign unless it is specified.

    To see this, consider the sign that would have convinced the atheist philosopher Norwood Russell Hanson to become a theist:

I'm not a stubborn guy. I would be a theist under some conditions. I'm open-minded.... Okay. Okay. The conditions are these: Suppose, next Tuesday morning, just after breakfast, all of us in this one world are knocked to our knees by a percussive and ear-shattering thunderclap. Snow swirls, leaves drop from trees, the earth heaves and buckles, buildings topple and towers tumble. The sky is ablaze with an eerie silvery light, and just then, as all of the people of this world look up, the heavens open, and the clouds pull apart, revealing an unbelievably radiant and immense Zeus-like figure towering over us like a hundred Everests. He frowns darkly as lightning plays over the features of his Michelangeloid face, and then he points down, at me , and explains for every man, woman and child to hear: "I've had quite enough of your too-clever logic chopping and word-watching in matters of theology. Be assured Norwood Russell Hanson, that I do most certainly exist!"

    Hanson has here specified a sign and connected it to personal faith in God. If that sign were to happen, Hanson would be obligated to become a theist. Contrast this with Homer Simpson. Homer connects eating cookies and milk to an unspecified sign. Because Homer specifies no sign, anything that happens can be rationalized to permit eating the cookies and milk.

    Although Hanson was clearly having a bit of fun, his challenge illustrates several important truths about signs in guiding human decision-making. First, a sign must be clearly specified--otherwise it can be rationalized away. Second, the sign must be extraordinary. That's not to say it need constitute a miracle. But it must depart from the ordinary course of events. Third, the sign must be clearly tied to some decision. Thus if the sign happens, it must be clear what is to be done or believed. In Hanson's case he would be obliged to believe in God if the sign he requested came to pass. Finally, signs are contingent. In other words, they can happen but don't have to happen. Free agents produce signs and are just as capable of granting them as withholding them. It follows that the absence of a sign provides no guide to decision-making. Thus if the sign Hanson requested does not come to pass, its absence justifies neither belief nor unbelief in God. In chapter five we shall see how these truths about signs, provide the basis for how to detect intelligent causes and therefore design. The search for signs is the search for an intelligent agent.

1.2 Signs in Decision-Making

Let us now examine these truths about signs more closely. We will call the agent who looks for a sign the sign-seeker . Moreover, we will call the agent from whom the sign is sought the sign-giver . The sign-seeker looks for a sign from the sign-giver in order to reach a decision. To leave no doubt about which sign corresponds to which decision, the sign-seeker specifies a sign. In specifying a sign the sign-seeker makes clear which events conform to the sign and which don't. For instance, if the sign specified by the sign-seeker is obtaining a million dollars, then winning a million dollars at a lottery or inheriting a million dollars would both be instances of the sign. On the other hand, going bankrupt would contradict the sign. Note that signs can have time limits. Thus if the sign does not happen within the specified time limit, the sign becomes null and void.

    Having specified a sign, the sign-seeker needs to connect that sign to a decision. The sign and the decision will therefore be connected in the following sort of conditional, what I call a test-conditional:

If the sign happens, then I will decide such-and-such.

Deciding such-and-such may mean committing an act, uttering a statement, embracing a belief or forming a desire. Alternatively it may mean refraining from an act, keeping silence, chucking a belief or quashing a desire. Just as the sign needs to be specified, so does the decision. In specifying the decision the sign-seeker must be clear which courses of action or beliefs conform to the decision and which do not. For instance, if the decision specifies donating a million dollars to education, then giving the million to either one's high school or one's college would both count. Blowing the million gambling in Las Vegas, on the other hand, would not.

    Both the sign and the decision need to be precisely specified. If either or both are fuzzy; then decision-making based on signs becomes fuzzy as well. Only by precisely specifying both the sign and the decision can the sign-seeker's decision-making remain unbiased and disciplined. To see this, consider the following test-conditionals:

FF: If she resists my advances, then I won't bother her.

FC: If she resists my advances, then I'll immediately break off all contact with her.

CF: If tonight she refuses to let me touch her, then I won't bother her.

CC: If tonight she refuses to let me touch her, then I'll immediately break off all contact with her.

    The sign-seeker here is a Lothario, and the sign-giver is the woman he hopes to seduce. The "F" and "C" labeling these conditionals stand for "fuzzy" and "clear" respectively. In the conditional labeled FF both the sign and the decision are fuzzy. Indeed a self-absorbed male convinced of his prowess is unlikely to interpret any act as resisting his advances (short of, perhaps, a knee to the groin). And how could such a self-absorbed male interpret any attention he devotes to a woman as bothering her? The conditional labeled FF is so fuzzy that it permits the Lothario to do exactly as he pleases. Contrast this with the conditional labeled CC. In this conditional both the sign and the decision are clear. The woman's steadfast refusal to let him touch her tonight will be clear. So, too, will his decision to immediately break off all contact with her.

    Interestingly the conditionals labeled FC and CF, though containing a clear element, are just as fuzzy as the conditional labeled FF. Indeed the fuzziness in the sign of FC and in the decision of CF destroys any residual clarity. Consider the conditional labeled FC. Since the Lothario interprets virtually all genuine resistance as "playing hard to get," the decision to immediately break off all contact with her can be deferred indefinitely. Fuzziness in the antecedent of FC subverts the clarity in the consequent. Similarly fuzziness in the consequent of CF subverts the clarity in the antecedent. The sign in this conditional is clear enough. But the Lothario will construe his decision not to bother her so broadly that any attempt at seduction will be considered fair game. FF, FC and CF are equally useless. Only CC provides an effective guide to decision-making.

    To recap, the sign-seeker specifies a sign and a decision and then connects the two in a test-conditional: If sign, then decision . If the sign actually does happen, the sign-seeker is then committed to carrying out the decision. Consequently everything hinges on the sign. Let us therefore turn to the agent capable of giving the sign, namely, the sign-giver. If the sign-giver gives the requested sign, everything proceeds straightforwardly. This is simply a matter of logic. The sign-seeker accepts the conditional if sign, then decision . If the sign-giver gives the sign, the sign-seeker is then obligated to follow through with the decision.

    By giving the sign, the sign-giver presumably endorses the sign-seeker's decision. But what if the sign-giver refuses to give the sign? Does that mean the sign-giver endorses the opposite decision? Consider, for instance, the medieval practice of trial by ordeal. The sign-seeker here is the court and the sign-giver is God. The court takes someone accused of a crime and inflicts on that person a wound. If the wound heals within an allotted time, then the accused is judged innocent (note the test-conditional: if the wound heals, then deem the accused innocent ). Normally the wound would take a long time to heal. But since God (= sign-giver) is capable of healing the wound much more quickly, swift healing is taken as a sign by the court (= sign-seeker) that the accused is innocent.

    But what if God refuses to perform the requested sign? Does that mean the accused is guilty? Hardly. God is a free agent and under no obligation to act when a human court says to act. Indeed God may so despise trials by ordeal that he refuses utterly to provide the signs they request. Trials by ordeal attempt to force God's hand. A sign-giver, however, is always free not to give a sign. Moreover, that refusal to give a sign must properly be interpreted as silence and not as endorsing some course of action. If the sign-giver gives the requested sign, the sign-seeker will not only reach a decision but will also be justified thinking the sign-giver endorsed that decision. On the other hand, if the sign-giver does not give the requested sign, the sign-seeker is not therewith justified in forming a decision. Indeed any decision made in the absence of that sign lacks the endorsement of the sign-giver.

    This asymmetry between a sign and its absence is evident throughout Scripture. Gideon, for instance, asked a sign from God to confirm whether he should go to war with Midian. The condition Gideon put to God was of the form If you make the fleece in my barn on alternate nights wet and dry, then I'll wage war against Midian . Because God performed the sign, Gideon went to war with Midian. (Note that my intent with the Gideon story and the examples that follow is not to argue for the historicity of such Scriptural narratives but simply to show how they illustrate the use of signs and therewith the detection of design.)

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Intelligent Design by William A. Dembski. Copyright © 1999 by William A. Dembski. Excerpted by permission. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.