An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology

by Steup, Matthias

• ISBN13: 9780130370952
• ISBN10: 0130370959
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1995-09-18
• Publisher: Pearson

Summary

This book offers a systematic and up-to-date account of the landscape of contemporary epistemology. It presupposes only a minimum of prior philosophical knowledge, and includes an account of the logical and conceptual tools needed for philosophical analysis.Focuses on the writings and ideas ofW. Alston, R. Audi, L. BonJour, R. Chisholm, A. Goldman. H. Kornboith, K. Lehrer. A. Plantinga, W. V. Quine, E. Sosa, and B Stroud,among others; links particular theories and arguments to their chief proponents and critics.

Table of Contents

Preface	vii
Knowledge and Justification	1	(20)
Epistemology	1	(1)
Propositional Knowledge	2	(1)
Knowledge as Justified True Belief	3	(1)
The Gettier Problem	4	(1)
Truth	5	(2)
Belief	7	(1)
Justification	8	(2)
The Property and the Activity of Justification	10	(1)
Justification and Evidence	10	(1)
Conclusive and Nonconclusive Evidence	11	(1)
Justification and Defeasibility	12	(2)
Defeasibility and the Gettier Problem	14	(1)
A Failed Attempt at Solving the Gettier Problem	15	(1)
A Defeasibility Solution to the Gettier Problem	16	(1)
An Amended JTB Account of Knowledge	17	(2)
Study Questions and Exercises	19	(2)
Epistemology and Philosophical Analysis	21	(25)
Concepts and Propositions	21	(2)
Necessity and Possibility	23	(1)
Entailment and Necessary Coextension	24	(2)
Conceptual Analysis	26	(2)
Criteriological Analysis	28	(2)
Supervenience in Epistemology	30	(1)
Weak and Strong Supervenience	31	(3)
The Case for Strong Supervenience	34	(2)
Analytical Monism and Pluralism	36	(2)
Principles of Prima Facie Justification	38	(3)
Epistemological Pessimism	41	(2)
Study Questions and Exercises	43	(3)
A Priori Knowledge	46	(23)
Kant's Definition of Apriority	46	(1)
Sensory and Nonsensory Experience	47	(1)
A Priori Justification and Concept Learning	48	(2)
Apriority and Necessity	50	(1)
A Posteriori Justification for Necessary Truths	51	(2)
The Truth Value and Modal Status of Propositions	53	(1)
The Fallibility of A Priori Justification	53	(1)
A Third Way of Defining Apriority	54	(3)
A Fourth Way of Defining Apriority	57	(1)
The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction	58	(2)
Kant's Definition of Analyticity	60	(1)
The Fregean Definition of Analyticity	61	(1)
Two Objections to the Fregean Definition	62	(1)
A Linguistic Definition of Analyticity	63	(1)
Skepticism About Apriority and the Nature of Argumentation	64	(3)
Study Questions and Exercises	67	(2)
The Concept of Epistemic Justification	69	(20)
Epistemic Justification and Two Kinds of Normativity	69	(1)
The Deontological Approach	70	(1)
Epistemic Duty and the End of Believing Truly	71	(2)
Epistemic Duty and Evidence	73	(1)
Epistemic Duty and Doxastic Involuntariness	74	(2)
Feldman's Solution	76	(1)
An Alternative Solution	77	(2)
Epistemic Deontologism and Truth Conduciveness	79	(1)
Two Types of Probability	80	(1)
Justification and Factual Probability	81	(3)
Deontologically Justified Beliefs and Truth Conduciveness	84	(1)
Internalism and Externalism	84	(2)
Study Questions and Exercises	86	(3)
Foundationalism	89	(25)
Basic Beliefs	89	(3)
Foundationalism Defined	92	(1)
A Sample Foundationalist Analysis	92	(1)
The Regress Argument	93	(2)
The Regress Problem and Skepticism	95	(1)
The Regress Problem and Coherentism	96	(1)
Is an Infinite Regress Really Impossible?	97	(2)
Self Justification	99	(1)
Indubitability, Infallibility, and Certainty	100	(1)
Basic Beliefs and Experience	101	(1)
Basic Beliefs and Reliability	102	(1)
Basic Beliefs and Presumptive Reliability	103	(2)
Classical Foundationalism	105	(2)
Modern Foundationalism	107	(1)
Minimal Foundationalism	108	(1)
Foundationalism and Coherence	109	(1)
Study Questions and Exercises	110	(4)
Coherentism	114	(26)
Neurath's Metaphor	114	(1)
Coherentism and Circularity	115	(2)
Putative Elements of Coherence	117	(3)
Lehrer on Acceptance	120	(2)
Coherence as the Beating of Competitors	122	(2)
Trustworthiness	124	(1)
Level Ascent, Acceptance, and Belief	125	(2)
Lehrer's Coherentism and Foundationalism Compared	127	(1)
Laurence BonJour: Coherence as Metajustification	128	(1)
BonJourean Justification and Epistemic Responsibility	129	(1)
BonJourean Level Ascent	130	(1)
Level Ascent and Skepticism	131	(1)
The Isolation Objection	132	(5)
Study Questions and Exercises	137	(3)
The Debate Over Foundationalism and Coherentism	140	(20)
Davidson's ``Circle of Belief'' Argument	140	(2)
BonJour's Argument Against Nondoxastic Justification	142	(2)
A Foundationalist Reply to BonJour's Argument	144	(1)
Coherentism and the Regress of Levels	145	(2)
The BonJourean Level Regress	147	(3)
Supervenience: The Case for Nondoxastic Justification	150	(2)
Lehrer's Coherentism Reconsidered	152	(5)
A Final Verdict	157	(1)
Study Questions and Exercises	158	(2)
Reliabilism	160	(17)
Process Reliabilism	160	(2)
Reliabilism and Naturalistic Epistemology	162	(1)
The Evil-Demon Problem	163	(1)
The Clairvoyance Problem	164	(1)
The Generality Problem	165	(2)
Rule Reliabilism and the Evil-Demon Problem	167	(2)
Strong and Weak Justification	169	(1)
Virtue Reliabilism	170	(1)
The Clairvoyance Problem and the Evil-Demon Problem Revisited	171	(3)
Study Questions and Exercises	174	(3)
Naturalistic and Nonnaturalistic Epistemology	177	(26)
Armchair Epistemology	177	(3)
Quinean Naturalization: Normative Epistemology Eliminated	180	(3)
Epistemological Naturalism	183	(5)
Chisholmian Naturalism and Goldmanian Naturalization	188	(3)
Epistemological Pessimism and Goldmanian Analytic Naturalism	191	(2)
Epistemological Pessimism and Chisholmian Analytic Naturalism	193	(1)
Epistemological Pessimism and Naturalism	194	(1)
Naturalized Epistemology and Antiapriorism	195	(1)
The Darwinian Argument	196	(4)
Study Questions and Exercises	200	(3)
Skepticism	203	(21)
The Evil Demon and the Mad Scientist	203	(1)
Skeptical Arguments	204	(3)
A General Point About Debating the Skeptic	207	(2)
The Antiskepticism of G. E. Moore	209	(1)
Rebutting the BIV Argument Against Justification	210	(3)
The BIV Hypothesis and Defeasibility	213	(1)
The BIV Hypothesis and the Concept of Knowledge	214	(2)
The Argument from Error	216	(2)
A Revised Argument from Error	218	(3)
Study Questions and Exercises	221	(3)
References	224	(5)
Name Index	229	(1)
Subject Index	230