An Introduction to Game Theory

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  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2099-11-30
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Game theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory presents the main ideas underlying this theory and shows how it can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. Emphasizing the ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression, it assumes no specific knowledge beyond basic mathematics. It defines all concepts precisely and uses logical reasoning throughout.

Table of Contents

Each chapter ends with notes
What is Game Theory?
An Outline of the History of Game Theory
John von Neumann
The Theory of Rational Choice
Coming Attractions: Interacting Decision-Makers
I. Games with Perfect Information
Nash Equilibrium: Theory
Strategic Games
Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma
Example: Bach or Stravinsky?
Example: Matching Pennies
Example: The Stag Hunt
Nash Equilibrium
John F. Nash, Jr
Studying Nash Equilibrium Experimentally
Examples of Nash Equilibrium
Experimental Evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma
Focal Points
Best Response Functions
Dominated Actions
Equilibrium in a Single Population: Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria
Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations
Cournot's Model of Oligopoly
Bertrand's Model of Oligopoly
Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: Some Historical Notes
Electoral Competition
The War of Attrition
Auctions from Babylonia to eBay
Accident Law
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Some Evidence on Expected Payoff Functions
Strategic Games in Which Players May Randomize
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Dominated Actions
Pure Equilibria When Randomization is Allowed
Illustration: Expert Diagnosis
Equilibrium in a Single Population
Illustration: Reporting a Crime
Reporting a Crime: Social Psychology and Game Theory
The Formation of Players' Beliefs
Extension: Finding All Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria
Extension: Games in Which Each Player Has a Continuum of Actions
Appendix: Representing Preferences by Expected Payoffs
Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory
Extensive Games with Perfect Information
Strategies and Outcomes
Nash Equilibrium
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite Horizon Games: Backward Induction
Ticktacktoe, Chess, and Related Games
Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations
The Ultimatum Game, the Holdup Game, and Agenda Control
Experiments on the Ultimatum Game
Stackelberg's Model of Duopoly
Buying Votes
A Race
Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion
Allowing for Simultaneous Moves
More Experimental Evidence on Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Illustration: Entry into a Monopolized Industry
Illustration: Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters
Illustration: Committee Decision-Making
Illustration: Exit from a Declining Industry
Allowing for Exogenous Uncertainty
Discussion: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward Induction
Experimental Evidence on the Centipede Game
Coalitional Games and the Core
Coalitional Games
The Core
Illustration: Ownership and the Distribution of Wealth
Illustration: Exchanging Homogeneous Horses
Illustration: Exchanging Heterogeneous Houses
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