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| Preface | |
| Each chapter ends with notes | |
| Introduction | |
| What is Game Theory? | |
| An Outline of the History of Game Theory | |
| John von Neumann | |
| The Theory of Rational Choice | |
| Coming Attractions: Interacting Decision-Makers | |
| I. Games with Perfect Information | |
| Nash Equilibrium: Theory | |
| Strategic Games | |
| Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| Example: Bach or Stravinsky? | |
| Example: Matching Pennies | |
| Example: The Stag Hunt | |
| Nash Equilibrium | |
| John F. Nash, Jr | |
| Studying Nash Equilibrium Experimentally | |
| Examples of Nash Equilibrium | |
| Experimental Evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| Focal Points | |
| Best Response Functions | |
| Dominated Actions | |
| Equilibrium in a Single Population: Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria | |
| Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations | |
| Cournot's Model of Oligopoly | |
| Bertrand's Model of Oligopoly | |
| Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: Some Historical Notes | |
| Electoral Competition | |
| The War of Attrition | |
| Auctions | |
| Auctions from Babylonia to eBay | |
| Accident Law | |
| Mixed Strategy Equilibrium | |
| Introduction | |
| Some Evidence on Expected Payoff Functions | |
| Strategic Games in Which Players May Randomize | |
| Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium | |
| Dominated Actions | |
| Pure Equilibria When Randomization is Allowed | |
| Illustration: Expert Diagnosis | |
| Equilibrium in a Single Population | |
| Illustration: Reporting a Crime | |
| Reporting a Crime: Social Psychology and Game Theory | |
| The Formation of Players' Beliefs | |
| Extension: Finding All Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria | |
| Extension: Games in Which Each Player Has a Continuum of Actions | |
| Appendix: Representing Preferences by Expected Payoffs | |
| Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory | |
| Extensive Games with Perfect Information | |
| Strategies and Outcomes | |
| Nash Equilibrium | |
| Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | |
| Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite Horizon Games: Backward Induction | |
| Ticktacktoe, Chess, and Related Games | |
| Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations | |
| The Ultimatum Game, the Holdup Game, and Agenda Control | |
| Experiments on the Ultimatum Game | |
| Stackelberg's Model of Duopoly | |
| Buying Votes | |
| A Race | |
| Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion | |
| Allowing for Simultaneous Moves | |
| More Experimental Evidence on Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | |
| Illustration: Entry into a Monopolized Industry | |
| Illustration: Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters | |
| Illustration: Committee Decision-Making | |
| Illustration: Exit from a Declining Industry | |
| Allowing for Exogenous Uncertainty | |
| Discussion: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward Induction | |
| Experimental Evidence on the Centipede Game | |
| Coalitional Games and the Core | |
| Coalitional Games | |
| The Core | |
| Illustration: Ownership and the Distribution of Wealth | |
| Illustration: Exchanging Homogeneous Horses | |
| Illustration: Exchanging Heterogeneous Houses | |
| Illustration | |
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