An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

by E. J. Lowe

• ISBN13: 9780521652858
• ISBN10: 0521652855
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2000-01-28
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

In this book Jonathan Lowe offers a lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind. Using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, he begins with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moves on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge. His discussion is notably broad in scope, and distinctive in giving equal attention to deep metaphysical questions concerning the mind and to the discoveries and theories of modern scientific psychology. It will be of interest to any reader with a basic grounding in modern philosophy.

Table of Contents

Preface	xi
Introduction	1	(7)
Empirical psychology and philosophical analysis	2	(1)
Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind	3	(3)
A brief guide to the rest of this book	6	(2)
Minds, bodies and people	8	(31)
Cartesian dualism	9	(2)
The conceivability argument	11	(2)
The divisibility argument	13	(2)
Non-Cartesian dualism	15	(3)
Are persons simple substances?	18	(3)
Conceptual objections to dualistic interaction	21	(3)
Empirical objections to dualistic interaction	24	(2)
The causal closure argument	26	(3)
Objections to the causal closure argument	29	(3)
Other arguments for and against physicalism	32	(4)
Conclusions	36	(3)
Mental states	39	(30)
Propositional attitude states	40	(1)
Behaviourism and its problems	41	(3)
Functionalism	44	(4)
Functionalism and psychophysical identity theories	48	(3)
The problem of consciousness	51	(2)
Qualia and the inverted spectrum argument	53	(2)
Some possible responses to the inverted spectrum argument	55	(4)
The absent qualia argument and two notions of consciousness	59	(2)
Eliminative materialism and `folk psychology'	61	(3)
Some responses to eliminative materialism	64	(2)
Conclusions	66	(3)
Mental content	69	(33)
Propositions	70	(4)
The causal relevance of content	74	(5)
The individuation of content	79	(3)
Externalism in the philosophy of mind	82	(2)
Broad versus narrow content	84	(5)
Content, representation and causality	89	(3)
Misrepresentation and normality	92	(3)
The teleological approach to representation	95	(4)
Objections to a teleological account of mental content	99	(1)
Conclusions	100	(2)
Sensation and appearance	102	(28)
Appearance and reality	103	(4)
Sense-datum theories and the argument from illusion	107	(3)
Other arguments for sense-data	110	(2)
Objections to sense-datum theories	112	(2)
The adverbial theory of sensation	114	(2)
The adverbial theory and sense-data	116	(3)
Primary and secondary qualities	119	(2)
Sense-datum theories and the primary/secondary distinction	121	(4)
An adverbial version of the primary/secondary distinction	125	(1)
Do colour-properties really exist?	126	(2)
Conclusions	128	(2)
Perception	130	(30)
Perceptual experience and perceptual content	131	(4)
Perceptual content, appearance and qualia	135	(2)
Perception and causation	137	(6)
Objections to causal theories of perception	143	(2)
The disjunctive theory of perception	145	(4)
The computational and ecological approaches to perception	149	(6)
Consciousness, experience and `blindsight'	155	(3)
Conclusions	158	(2)
Thought and language	160	(33)
Modes of mental representation	162	(2)
The `language of thought' hypothesis	164	(3)
Analogue versus digital representation	167	(2)
Imagination and mental imagery	169	(6)
Thought and communication	175	(3)
Do animals think?	178	(5)
Natural language and conceptual schemes	183	(5)
Knowledge of language: innate or acquired?	188	(3)
Conclusions	191	(2)
Human rationality and artificial intelligence	193	(37)
Rationality and reasoning	194	(2)
The Wason selection task	196	(4)
The base rate fallacy	200	(3)
Mental logic versus mental models	203	(5)
Two kinds of rationality	208	(1)
Artificial intelligence and the Turing test	209	(5)
Searle's `Chinese room' thought-experiment	214	(4)
The Frame Problem	218	(3)
Connectionism and the mind	221	(6)
Conclusions	227	(3)
Action, intention and will	230	(34)
Agents, actions and events	231	(4)
Intentionality	235	(5)
The individuation of actions	240	(3)
Intentionality again	243	(3)
Trying and willing	246	(4)
Volitionism versus its rivals	250	(2)
Freedom of the will	252	(5)
Motives, reasons and causes	257	(5)
Conclusions	262	(2)
Personal identity and self-knowledge	264	(34)
The first person	266	(4)
Persons and criteria of identity	270	(7)
Personal memory	277	(5)
Memory and causation	282	(1)
Animalism	283	(5)
Knowing one's own mind	288	(3)
Moore's paradox and the nature of conscious belief	291	(2)
Externalism and self-knowledge	293	(3)
Self-deception	296	(1)
Conclusions	297	(1)
Bibliography	298	(15)
Index	313