Why has the stalemate in Japanese-Russian relations persisted through the end of the Cold War and Moscow's weakening control over its far eastern territories? In this volume Kimura continues his comprehensive analysis of Russia and Japan's strained and unstable relations to the present day.

Hiroshi Kimura is a professor at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto

Acknowledgments

xi

Abbreviations

xiii

Introduction

xv

PART ONE THE GORBACHEV PERIOD: NEW THINKING

1

(52)

The Policy Effects of Change in Soviet Leadership

3

(14)

Political Leaders and Their Environments

3

(2)

Changes in Style, Personnel, and System

5

(5)

Two Approaches to Foreign Policy

10

(3)

Centrality of the United States

13

(4)

Gradual Acknowledgment of the Territorial Dispute

17

(36)

High Expectations and Rapid Improvements

21

(4)

Temporary Cooling

25

(3)

``Epistemic Communities'' of Soviet Specialists on Japan

28

(4)

Creation of a Working Group for a Peace Treaty

32

(3)

Shevardnadze's De Facto Acknowledgment

35

(4)

The Reasons for Gorbachev's Decision to Visit Japan

39

(1)

Changes in the International Environment: Role of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty

40

(4)

Domestic Difficulties: A Deteriorating Economy

44

(3)

Learning in Leadership

47

(6)

PART TWO THE GORBACHEV PERIOD: THE BLOSSOM FADES

53

(52)

Japan as a Model for Soviet Reform

55

(22)

Where Is the ``Bluebird of Happiness''?

55

(3)

Japan: A Model for Perestroika?

58

(3)

Two Latecomers to Modernization

61

(3)

Guidance from Above

64

(3)

Technology and Crisis Management

67

(3)

Security and Diplomacy

70

(3)

Validity of the Japanese Model

73

(4)

Gorbachev's Visit to Tokyo

77

(20)

Preparation for the Visit

77

(2)

Exploring the Possibility of Compromise

79

(3)

Pressure from Conservatives

82

(4)

``Islands-for-Cash'' Deal?

86

(3)

The Gorbachev-Kaifu Summit

89

(8)

Features of Gorbachev's Policy Toward Japan

97

(8)

Low Priority of Japan

97

(3)

Too Weak, Too Little, Too Late

100

(5)

PART THREE THE YELTSIN PERIOD: THE FIRST TERM

105

(68)

Missed Opportunities? Euphoria in the Early Days of the Yeltsin Period

107

(22)

Before and After the August 1991 Coup

107

(4)

Law and Justice

111

(4)

Some Flexibility on Tokyo's Side

115

(2)

G-7: Guidelines for Aid

117

(3)

Munich Summit and ``Internationalization''

120

(3)

The Allison Group's Recommendations

123

(6)

Two Trip Cancellations: Background Factors

129

(21)

Eruption of Nationalism

129

(5)

Resurgence of Conservatives

134

(2)

Opposition from the Military

136

(3)

Questionable Military Value

139

(3)

Weakening Leadership

142

(4)

The Issue Is Also the Dilemma

146

(4)

The Tokyo Summit

150

(23)

The Hot Summer of 1992

150

(2)

Cancellation: Who Was Responsible?

152

(6)

Second Cancellation and Decision to Visit

158

(4)

Evaluating the Summit

162

(4)

The Tokyo Declaration

166

(7)

PART FOUR THE YELTSIN PERIOD: THE SECOND TERM

173

(64)

From ``Atlanticism'' to ``Eurasianism''

177

(14)

Two Basic Approaches

178

(2)

Yeltsin's Shift to Eurasianism

180

(4)

Ambivalence Toward China

184

(4)

Effects on Russia's Policy Toward Japan

188

(3)

Primakov's Offensive

191

(10)

The ``Joint Economic Development'' Proposal: Its Aims

191

(4)

The Third Step?

195

(2)

Tokyo's Concerns

197

(4)

A Change in Atmospherics: 1997-1998

201

(22)

Japan Softens Its Approach and Tactics

201

(3)

The ``Multilayered'' Approach

204

(7)

Hashimoto's Bold Initiatives

211

(3)

Two ``No-Neckties'' Summits

214

(5)

The Moscow Summit and After

219

(4)

Features of Yeltsin's Policy Toward Japan

223

(14)

Yeltsin's Way of Decision Making

223

(6)

Yeltsin Repeats Gorbachev's Strategy

229

(8)

PART FIVE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE

237

(36)

Linkage of Politics and Economics

239

(12)

A Modest Record of Economic Exchanges

239

(3)

The Myth of Economic Complementarity

242

(4)

The Negative Impact of Politics on Trade

246

(5)

Lessons from German and Chinese Successes

251

(13)

Are ``Positive Economic Sanctions'' Effective? Lessons from Germany

251

(4)

Pandora's Box Has Already Been Opened

255

(3)

Lessons from the Chinese Experience

258

(6)

Who Decides the Issue?

264

(9)

From Centralized to Peripheralized Federalism

264

(3)

De Facto ``Japanization''

267

(6)

Conclusion

273

(8)

Notes

281

(44)

Selected Bibliography

325

(16)

Name Index

341

(6)

Subject Index

347

(8)

About the Author

355

What is included with this book?

The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.

The Used, Rental and eBook copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.