Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction To Epistemology

by Hetherington,Stephen Cade

• ISBN13: 9780813324876
• ISBN10: 0813324874
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 1996-02-01
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.InKnowledge Puzzles,Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduced through a puzzle, and readers are invited to work their own ways toward a solution. Hetherington's light and undogmatic style encourages class discussion and independent thought rather than the memorization of "book" answers.Covering all of the most important epistemological issues, informed by classical and contemporary literature, and rich in probing questions and suggestions for further readings,Knowledge Puzzlesis a pedagogical breakthrough. Whether it is used as a main text or supplement, this lucid and engaging text will be welcomed by both teachers and students.

Author Biography

Stephen Cade Hetherington is senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of New South Wales in Sydney.

Table of Contents

Preface	xiii
Introducing Epistemology	1	(6)
What Is Epistemology?	1	(2)
Why Do Epistemology?	3	(2)
Avoiding Dogmatism	5	(2)
Further Reading	6	(1)
Truth	7	(6)
Knowledge Entails Truth	7	(1)
Objective Truth	7	(2)
Semantic Paradox	9	(1)
Rejecting Objective Truth	10	(1)
Finding the Objective Truths	11	(2)
Further Reading	12	(1)
Belief	13	(6)
Does Knowledge Entail Belief?	13	(1)
Is Saying Believing?	14	(1)
Using Beliefs to Find Beliefs	15	(1)
Again, Does Knowledge Entail Belief?	16	(3)
Further Reading	18	(1)
Justification	19	(6)
Does Knowledge Entail Justification?	19	(3)
Pragmatic Justification	22	(1)
Justification and Truth	22	(1)
Justification and Objectivity	23	(2)
Further Reading	24	(1)
The Gettier Problem	25	(6)
Gettier Cases	25	(2)
Does Knowledge Matter?	27	(1)
Doing More to Have Knowledge	28	(3)
Further Reading	30	(1)
Surface Reliability	31	(6)
Believing Reliably	31	(1)
Reliability and Gettier Cases	32	(1)
Reliability and Guesses	33	(1)
Restricting Reliabilism	33	(4)
Further Reading	36	(1)
Underlying Reliability	37	(8)
Reliability and Belief-Forming Methods	37	(1)
Reliability and Good Belief-Forming Methods	38	(2)
Reliability and the Senses	40	(2)
Reliable Methods and Gettier Cases	42	(3)
Further Reading	43	(2)
Causality	45	(6)
The Basic Idea of a Causal Account of Knowledge	45	(1)
Causality and Gettier Cases	46	(1)
Appropriate Causal Connections	47	(2)
Causality and A Priori Knowledge	49	(2)
Further Reading	50	(1)
Defeasibility	51	(6)
The Basic Idea of Defeasibility	51	(2)
Defeasibility and Gettier Cases	53	(1)
Which Facts Are Undercover Facts?	54	(3)
Further Reading	55	(2)
Social Defeasibility	57	(6)
Social Defeasibility	58	(1)
Social Defeasibility and Gettier Cases	59	(1)
Restricted Social Defeasibility	60	(3)
Further Reading	62	(1)
False Evidence	63	(6)
Avoiding All Falsity	63	(1)
Avoiding Significant Falsity	64	(1)
Why Avoid Falsity?	65	(1)
Avoiding More Falsity by Thinking Less	66	(3)
Further Reading	68	(1)
Induction	69	(6)
Induction and Gettier Cases	69	(1)
What Is Good Inductive Thinking?	70	(1)
The Paradox of the Ravens	71	(1)
The Problem of Grue	72	(3)
Further Reading	74	(1)
A Priori Knowledge	75	(6)
The Basic Idea of A Priori Knowledge	75	(1)
A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truths	76	(2)
Kripke's Puzzles	78	(2)
A Priori Knowledge and Gettier Cases	80	(1)
Further Reading	80	(1)
Externalism	81	(8)
The Basic Idea of Externalism	81	(2)
Externalism and Dogmatism	83	(2)
Externalism and Pointless Evidence	85	(4)
Further Reading	87	(2)
Internalism	89	(8)
The Basic Idea of Internalism	89	(1)
Internalism and Dogmatism	90	(1)
Internalism and Being Too Open-Minded	91	(2)
Internalism and Good Inquiry	93	(4)
Further Reading	95	(2)
Vagueness	97	(8)
Is Knowledge Understandable?	97	(1)
Vagueness and Knowledge	98	(1)
Slippery Slopes and Reliability	99	(2)
Generalizing the Puzzle	101	(1)
Escaping the Slippery Slope	101	(4)
Further Reading	103	(2)
Fallibilism	105	(6)
Fallibilism and the Slippery Slope	105	(3)
Fallibilism and the Lottery Paradox	108	(1)
Rejecting Fallibilism	109	(2)
Further Reading	110	(1)
Infallibility Skepticism	111	(6)
The Basic Idea of Skepticism	111	(1)
Skepticism and Infallibility	112	(1)
The Evil Demon	113	(4)
Further Reading	116	(1)
External World Skepticism	117	(8)
The Cogito	117	(1)
A Less Powerful Evil Demon	118	(2)
The Dreaming Argument	120	(2)
Possible Responses to the Dreaming Argument	122	(3)
Further Reading	123	(2)
Inductive Skepticism	125	(8)
The Basic Idea of Inductive Skepticism	125	(1)
The Humean Skeptical Argument	126	(2)
The Humean Skeptical Solution	128	(5)
Further Reading	131	(2)
Rule Skepticism	133	(6)
Knowing One's Own Mind	133	(1)
The Basic Idea of Rule Skepticism	134	(1)
The Rule Skeptical Argument	135	(4)
Further Reading	138	(1)
Regress Skepticism	139	(8)
Inferential Justification	139	(1)
Epistemic Regress and Skepticism	140	(4)
Possible Responses to the Regress	144	(3)
Further Reading	145	(2)
Foundationalism	147	(8)
The Basic Idea of Foundationalism	147	(1)
Cartesian Foundations	148	(2)
Sensory Foundations	150	(5)
Further Reading	153	(2)
Contextualism	155	(8)
Real Doubts	155	(2)
Contextual Doubts	157	(2)
Contextualism and Epistemic Regress	159	(4)
Further Reading	161	(2)
Coherentism	163	(8)
The Basic Idea of Coherentism	163	(1)
Coherentism and Epistemic Regress	164	(1)
Coherentism and Consistency	165	(1)
Coherentism and Fiction	166	(5)
Further Reading	169	(2)
Pyrrhonian Skepticism	171	(8)
The Basic Idea of Pyrrhonism	171	(1)
The Pyrrhonist Argument	172	(2)
Pyrrhonism and Belief	174	(1)
Pyrrhonism and Intellectual Tranquillity	175	(4)
Further Reading	177	(2)
Questioning Epistemology	179	(6)
The Problem of the Criterion	179	(3)
Applying Pyrrhonism to Epistemology	182	(1)
Puzzling Theories	183	(2)
Further Reading	184	(1)
References	185	(4)
About the Book and Author	189	(2)
Index	191