Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop : The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 2002-2007

by Giustozzi, Antonio

• ISBN13: 9780231700092
• ISBN10: 0231700091
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2007-11-15
• Publisher: Columbia Univ Pr

Summary

Since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, the Bushadministration has celebrated the imminent demise of the Taliban, with claims of a"moral and psychological defeat" playing a prominent role in the presidentialelections of 2004. Some commentators suggested that "reconstruction and development"had won over the Afghan population, despite widespread criticism of the meagerdistribution of aid and failed attempts at "nation building," not to mention theinfamous corruption of Kabul's power-hoarding elites.In March2006, both Afghan and American officials continued to assert that "the Taliban areno longer able to fight large battles." Unfortunately that theory would sooncollapse beneath the weight of a series of particularly ferocious clashes, causingthe mood in the American media to turn from one of optimism to one of defeatism andimpending catastrophe. Suddenly faced with a very sophisticated and creative form ofguerilla warfare, the West found itself at a loss to fight an insurgency that borelittle resemblance to its former enemy.In the first book everto be published on the neo-Taliban, Antonio Giustozzi provocatively argues that theappearance of the neo-Taliban should in no way have been a surprise. Beginning in2003, a growing body of evidence began to surface that cast doubt on the officialinterpretation of the conflict. With the West cutting corners to maintain peacewithin the country, which included tolerating Afghanistan's burgeoning opium trade,the Taliban was able to regroup and grow in strength, weapons, and recruits.Giustozzi's book poses a bold challenge to contemporary accounts of the invasion andits aftermath and is an important investigation into the rise and dangerous futureof the neo-Taliban.

Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements	p. vii
List of Illustrations	p. xi
Glossary	p. xiii
Introduction	p. 1
Sources of the insurgency	p. 11
How and why the Taliban recruited	p. 33
Organisation of the Taliban	p. 81
The Taliban's strategy	p. 97
Military tactics of the insurgency	p. 147
The counter-insurgency effort	p. 161
Conclusion	p. 229
Bibliography	p. 243
Index	p. 251
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