Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (2001)

by Tellis, Arthur J.; Fair, Christine C.; Medby, Jamison Jo

• ISBN13: 9780833031013
• ISBN10: 0833031015
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2002-02-11
• Publisher: RAND Corporation

Table of Contents

Preface	iii
Summary	ix
Acknowledgments	xiii
Initialisms	xv
Introduction	1	(4)
Methodology	2	(2)
Report Organization	4	(1)
The Significance of the Kargil Crisis	5	(24)
Pakistan's Perspective	7	(9)
Kargil-like Operations Are Disavowed, But Violence Remains a Legitimate Tool to Achieve Political Objectives	7	(1)
Failure of Grand Strategy Coupled with Surprise and Shock at International Isolation	8	(5)
The Scale of Operations	13	(2)
The Possibility of Conflict Expansion	15	(1)
India's Perspective	16	(11)
India Confirms Its Worst Beliefs About Pakistan	16	(2)
India Strengthened in Its Determination to Marginalize Pakistan on Kashmir	18	(1)
Kargil Was an Intelligence Failure Not to Be Repeated	19	(2)
India Realizes That International Attention to Pakistani Adventurism Can Be Positive	21	(2)
Kargil Demonstrated the Utility of the Media in Military Operations	23	(4)
Summary	27	(2)
Kargil: Lessons Learned On Both Sides	29	(32)
Pakistan's Perspective	32	(18)
Premeditated Kargil-like Operations Are Not an Effective Means of Dispute Resolution, But Kargil Itself May Not Have Been an Unmitigated ``Failure''	32	(5)
Pakistan Must More Effectively Assess and Gauge International Reaction	37	(3)
Need for Broad Assessment and Review of Proposed Operations	40	(2)
Pakistan Needs a Media Strategy to Shape Opinion	42	(3)
Pakistan's Options Are Limited to the Pursuit of Low Intensity Conflict	45	(3)
Nuclear Capabilities Become Key to the Successful Execution of Pakistan's Political Strategies	48	(2)
India's Perspective	50	(7)
India Must Prepare for Future Pakistani Recklessness Across-the-Board	50	(1)
India Must Increase Its Efforts to Contain Intrusions Across the LOC	51	(1)
The Kashmir Issue Requires High-Level Attention	52	(1)
India Must Cultivate International Support That Will Circumscribe Pakistani Adventurism	53	(1)
India Must Sustain the Information Offensive	54	(2)
India Must Treat Nuclear Issues More Seriously	56	(1)
Conclusions	57	(4)
Options For the Future	61	(16)
Pakistan's Perspective	62	(5)
Pakistan Will Seek to Calibrate the Heat of the Insurgency-But Risks Losing Control Over the Process at Great Cost to the Pakistani State	62	(2)
The Peace Initiative Is Believed to Lie with India	64	(2)
Pakistan's Weaknesses Make It Increasingly Politically Irrelevant, and Its Grand Strategy Offers No Exits	66	(1)
India's Perspective	67	(7)
India Will Pursue an Internal Solution to Kashmir	67	(2)
India Will Seek a Hospitable Bilateral Environment	69	(1)
India Will Enhance Its Operational Capabilities and May Contemplate More-Aggressive Actions Along the LOC	70	(4)
Conclusions	74	(3)
Conclusion: Kargil and South Asian Stability	77	(8)
Prospects for Peace and Possibilities of War	78	(1)
Implications of Kargil for ``Ugly Stability''	79	(5)
Areas Requiring Further Investigation	84	(1)
References	85

Excerpts

Indian and Pakistani views of the significance of Pakistan's 1999 foray into the Kargil-Dras sector (the Kargil conflict)