The Limits of Détente; The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973

by Craig Daigle

• ISBN13: 9780300167139
• ISBN10: 030016713X
• Format: Trade Book
• Copyright: 2012-10-30
• Publisher: Yale University Press

Summary

In the first book-length analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of detente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War detente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, Daigle shows, the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. Daigle further argues that as detente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.Soviet relations.

Author Biography

Craig Daigle is assistant professor of history at the City College of New York.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. ix
List of Abbreviations	p. xv
Introduction	p. 1
From Confrontation to Negotiation, January-September 1969	p. 10
The Rogers Plan, October-December 1969	p. 48
The First Soviet Threat, January-May 1970	p. 83
Crisis on the Suez, June-September 1970	p. 113
Fighting for Sadat, October 1970-August 1971	p. 155
The Race to the Summit, September 1971-May 1972	p. 192
Bombshells and Back Channels, June 1972-February 1973	p. 228
The Contradictions of Leonid Brezhnev, March-October 1973	p. 261
The Crisis of Détente, October 1973	p. 294
Conclusion	p. 332
Notes	p. 347
Index	p. 403
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