The Logic Of Political Survival

by Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair; Siverson, Randolph M.; Morrow, James D.

• ISBN13: 9780262524407
• ISBN10: 0262524406
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-01-14
• Publisher: The MIT Press

Summary

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

Author Biography

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Professor of Politics at New York University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Alastair Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.

Randolph M. Siverson is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.

James D. Morrow is Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the University of Michigan.

Table of Contents

Preface	xi
I A THEORY OF POLITICAL INCENTIVES	1	(126)
Reining in the Prince	3	(34)
Three Puzzles	4	(3)
The Essence of the Argument	7	(1)
Organization of the Investigation	8	(1)
A Theory of Political Incentives: Part I	9	(3)
Policy Choice and Political Survival: Part II	12	(1)
Choosing Institutions for Political Selection: Part III	13	(2)
Why Focus on Political Survival?	15	(8)
Threats to Political Survival	23	(3)
Challenges to Political Survival	26	(5)
Easy Answers, Inadequate Answers	31	(3)
An Incomplete Theory of Institutional Political Laws	34	(3)
The Theory: Definitions and Intuition	37	(40)
The Elements of the Polity	38	(3)
The Selectorate (S)	41	(10)
The Winning Coalition (W)	51	(4)
Illustrative Examples of Small, Restrictive Winning Coalitions	55	(2)
Sources of Risks and Rewards	57	(2)
The Challenger's Commitment Problem	59	(1)
Affinity	60	(9)
The Replacement or Deposition Rule	69	(1)
Political Systems: Analogies But Not Equivalence	69	(5)
What Is Missing from Our Theory	74	(1)
Conclusion	75	(2)
A Model of the Selectorate Theory	77	(50)
Economic Activity, Policy Provision, and Payoffs	78	(2)
Equilibria of the Selectorate Model	80	(10)
Alternative Equilibrium	90	(1)
How Institutions Structure Incentives	91	(8)
Further Implications	99	(5)
Bridging from Theory to Testable Hypotheses	104	(1)
Conclusion	104	(2)
Appendix	106	(21)
II POLICY CHOICE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL	127	(200)
Institutions for Kleptocracy or Growth	129	(44)
Measurement Issues	132	(1)
Institutional Variables	133	(7)
Measurement of Labor, Leisure, and Taxes	140	(3)
Evidence: Labor or Leisure	143	(4)
Evidence: Taxation	147	(2)
Economic Growth	149	(12)
Government Expenditures, Expenditures Per Capita and Opportunities for Kleptocracy	161	(10)
Conclusion	171	(2)
Institutions, Peace, and Prosperity	173	(42)
The Shift from Public to Private Goods in Sparta	173	(6)
Empirical Assessments: Core Public Goods	179	(7)
General Public Goods	186	(12)
Public Goods Summary	198	(2)
Empirical Assessment of the Provision of Private Goods	200	(7)
Montesquieu, Madison, Population, and Public Welfare	207	(1)
Leopold II: An Illustration	208	(5)
Conclusion	213	(2)
War, Peace, and Coalition Size	215	(58)
The Democratic Peace	218	(2)
The Debate	220	(4)
The Dyadic Selectorate Model	224	(2)
Structure of the Dyadic Selectorate Game	226	(6)
Solving the Game	232	(4)
The Decision to Fight or to Negotiate	236	(7)
The Selectorate Peace: Interaction of Polities	243	(5)
Diversionary War and Compromise Agreements	248	(2)
Empirical Assessments	250	(13)
Conclusion	263	(2)
Appendix	265	(8)
Political Survival	273	(54)
Survival as Explained by the Selectorate Theory	276	(13)
Mamluk Egypt	289	(3)
Empirical Assessment of Political Survival	292	(19)
Extrapolitical Risks of Deposition	311	(8)
A Tale of Two Countries	319	(5)
Conclusion	324	(3)
III CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS	327	(160)
Institutional Preferences: Change from Within	329	(76)
The Selectorate Theory and Institutional Preferences	331	(7)
Oppression	338	(16)
Political Actions to Alter Institutions	354	(1)
Population Migration: The Disenfranchised and the Selectorate	355	(6)
Protest, Civil War, and Revolution	361	(21)
Purges and Coups d'etat: Actions by Coalition Members	382	(18)
Actions by Leaders: Constructing Autocracy	400	(2)
Conclusion	402	(3)
The Enemy Outside and Within: War and Changes of Leaders and Regimes	405	(56)
Selection Institutions and War Aims	406	(18)
The Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran	424	(2)
Testing the War Aims Argument	426	(13)
Leadership Removal	439	(2)
War and Domestic Change	441	(10)
Nation Building After Disputes	451	(3)
Franco, Mussolini, and the Enemy Within	454	(1)
Conclusion	455	(1)
Appendix	456	(5)
Promoting Peace and Prosperity	461	(26)
The Hobbes Index	461	(4)
Explaining the Hobbes Index	465	(18)
What Can Be Done?	483	(2)
Conclusion	485	(2)
Notes	487	(16)
References	503	(16)
Index	519