Logical Investigations Volume 1

by Husserl,Edmund; Moran,Dermot

• ISBN13: 9780415241892
• ISBN10: 0415241898
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 2001-08-24
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology. TheLogical Investigationsis his most famous work and has had a decisive impact n the direction of twentieth century philosophy. This is the first time both volumes of this classic work, translated by J.N. Findlay, have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing theLogical Investigationsin historical context and bringing out its importance for contemporary philosophy.

Table of Contents

Preface	xvii
Michael Dummett
Introduction	xxi
Dermot Moran
Select bibliography	lxxiii
Translator's Introduction (Abridged)	lxxvii
Foreword to First German Edition, Volume I (1900)	1	(2)
Foreword to Second German Edition, Volume I (1913)	3	(6)
PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC Volume I of the German Editions
Volume I of the German Editions	9	(2)
Introduction	11	(1)
The controversy regarding the definition of logic and the essential content of its doctrines	11	(1)
Necessity of a renewed discussion of questions of principle	12	(1)
Disputed questions. The path to be entered	13	(2)
Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline	15	(13)
The theoretical incompleteness of the separate sciences	15	(1)
The theoretical completion of the separate sciences by metaphysics and theory of science	16	(1)
The possibility and justification of logic as theory of science	16	(3)
Continuation. The three most noteworthy peculiarities of grounded validations	19	(2)
The relation of these peculiarities to the possibility of science and the theory of science	21	(2)
Methodical modes of procedure in the sciences are in part validatory, in part auxiliary devices towards validations	23	(1)
The ideas of theory and science as problems of the theory of science	24	(1)
Logic or theory of science as normative discipline and as technology	25	(1)
Relevant definitions of logic	26	(2)
Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines	28	(12)
The controversy regarding the practical character of logic	28	(5)
The concept of a normative science. The basic standard or principle that gives it unity	33	(4)
Normative disciplines and technologies	37	(1)
Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines	38	(2)
Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments	40	(6)
The disputed question as to whether the essential theoretical foundations of normative logic lie in psychology	40	(1)
The line of proof of the psychologistic thinkers	41	(1)
The usual arguments of the opposition and the psychologistic rejoinder	41	(3)
A gap in the psychologistic line of proof	44	(2)
Empiricistic consequences of psychologism	46	(10)
Characterizing two empiricistic consequences of the psychologistic standpoint, and their refutation	46	(2)
The laws of thought as supposed laws of nature which operate in isolation as causes of rational thought	48	(3)
A third consequence of psychologism, and its refutation	51	(3)
Continuation	54	(2)
Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles	56	(14)
The law of contradiction in the psychologistic interpretation of Mill and Spencer	56	(2)
Mill's psychological interpretation of the principle yields no law, but a wholly vague, and scientifically unproven, empirical proposition	58	(3)
Appendix to the last two sections: On certain basic defects of empiricism	59	(2)
Analogous objections against remaining psychological interpretations of our logical principle. Ambiguities as sources of delusion	61	(3)
The supposed two-sidedness of the principle of contradiction, in virtue of which it should be taken both as a natural law of thinking, and as a normal law for its logical regulation	64	(3)
Continuation. Sigwart's doctrine	67	(3)
Syllogistic inferences psychologistically considered. Syllogistic and chemical formulae	70	(5)
Attempts at interpreting syllogistic principles psychologically	70	(2)
Syllogistic and chemical formulae	72	(3)
Psychologism as a sceptical relativism	75	(26)
The ideal conditions for the possibility of a theory as such. The strict concept of scepticism	75	(1)
Scepticism in the metaphysical sense	76	(1)
The concept of relativism and its specific forms	77	(1)
Critique of individual relativism	78	(1)
Critique of specific relativism and, in particular, of anthropologism	78	(4)
General observation. The concept of relativism in an extended sense	82	(1)
Psychologism in all its forms is a relativism	82	(1)
Anthropologism in Sigwart's Logic	83	(7)
Anthropologism in the Logic of B. Erdmann	90	(11)
The psychologistic prejudices	101	(22)
First prejudice	101	(2)
Elucidations	103	(3)
A look back at the opposed arguments of idealism. Their defects and their justified sense	106	(2)
Second prejudice	108	(1)
Refutation. Pure mathematics would likewise be made a branch of psychology	108	(1)
The research domain of pure logic is, like that of mathematics, an ideal domain	109	(2)
Confirmatory indications given by the basic notions of logic and the sense of logical laws	111	(2)
The decisive differences	113	(2)
Third prejudice. Logic as the theory of evidence	115	(1)
Transformation of logical propositions into equivalent propositions about the ideal conditions for the evidence of judgement. The resultant propositions are not psychological	116	(3)
The decisive points in this dispute	119	(4)
Logic and the principle of the economy of thought	123	(11)
Introductory	123	(1)
The teleological character of the principle of Mach and Avenarius and the scientific meaning of an `economy of thought' (Denkokonomik)	123	(3)
Closer treatment of the justified ends of an `economy of thought', in the sphere, mainly, of purely deductive methodology. Its relation to a logical technology	126	(3)
The meaninglessness of an economy of thought for pure logic and epistemology, and its relation to psychology	129	(2)
Continuation. The uστεpoν πpoτεpoν involved in any foundation of pure logic on an economy of thought	131	(3)
End of our critical treatments	134	(10)
Queries regarding readily formed misunderstandings of our logical endeavours	134	(1)
Our links with great thinkers of the past and, in the first place, with Kant	135	(1)
Links with Herbart and Lotze	136	(2)
Links with Leibniz	138	(2)
Need for special investigations to provide an epistemological justification and partial realization of the Idea of pure logic	140	(4)
Appendix: References to F. A. Lange and B. Bolzano	141	(3)
The idea of Pure Logic	144	(16)
The unity of science. The interconnection of things and the interconnection of truths	144	(2)
Continuation. The unity of theory	146	(1)
The essential and extra-essential principles that give science unity. Abstract, concrete and normative sciences	147	(2)
The question as to the ideal conditions of the possibility of science or of theory in general. The question as it relates to actual knowledge	149	(1)
The question as it relates to the content of knowledge	150	(2)
The tasks of pure logic. First: the fixing of the pure categories of meaning, and pure categories of objects and their law-governed combinations	152	(2)
Secondly: the laws and theories which have their grounds in these categories	154	(1)
Thirdly: the theory of the possible forms of theories or the pure theory of manifolds	155	(1)
Elucidation of the Idea of a pure theory of manifolds	156	(2)
Division of labour. The achievement of the mathematicians and that of the philosophers	158	(2)
Broadening of the Idea of pure logic. The pure theory of probability as a pure theory of empirical knowledge	160