Making War to Keep Peace

by Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.

• ISBN13: 9780061252945
• ISBN10: 0061252948
• Edition: Large
• Format: Paperback
• Publisher: HarperCollins Publications
• More Book Details
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Summary

When Jeane J. Kirkpatrick died in December 2006, she left behind more than her legacy as a "heroine of conservatives." She had just completed work on this extraordinary survey of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War age: a bold and revisionist review of two decades of American interventions abroad-a troubled period of small successes, tragic failures, and important lessons for our future.

Author Biography

Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick was the U.S. Ambassasdor to the United Nations from 1981 to 1985, the founder of Empower America, and a professor of government at Georgetown University.

Table of Contents

Introduction	p. 1
Iraq Invades Kuwait	p. 15
Saving Somalia	p. 102
Haitians' Right to Democracy?	p. 194
The Balkan Wars: Making War to Keep the Peace	p. 267
Kosovo	p. 414
Conclusion: Afghanistan and Iraq	p. 468
Postscript	p. 531
Appendix	p. 535
Notes	p. 543
Acknowledgments	p. 637
Index	p. 639
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

Excerpts

Making War to Keep Peace LP

Chapter One

Iraq Invades Kuwait

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait shattered the peace and optimism of the summer. This was the first clear act of international aggression after the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had ended the cold war. The United States, the Gulf States, and their allies were not ready for the invasion. To some Americans, it recalled Hitler's swift moves across Europe at the start of World War II and the consequences of appeasing an aggressor. To others, it recalled the Soviet Union's surprise invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the long, terrible war that followed.

The story of how President George H.W. Bush and the United States responded to this foreign policy challenge is a chronicle of the birth of the new world order. It raises the fundamental questions of how the United States decides what is in its national interest, when it should use military force, the nature of our relationship with the United Nations and the world, and how long our responsibilities to a nation or people persist after military intervention. The crisis also offers an object lesson on the danger of waiting for international consensus when time is of the essence.

President Bush's initial response resembled that of Harry Truman when North Korean forces attacked South Korea in 1950. "By God," Truman said, "I'm going to let them have it!" Later, more introspectively, Truman wrote: "If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the Second World War."1

Saddam Hussein's invasion was not part of a global contest between two superpowers. But it was a clear-cut case of aggression, and Bush had to act.

In fact, Bush was an activist. He hated bullies and was prepared to use American power unilaterally to bring them to order. When Manuel Noriega stole the elections in Panama in 1989, the Organization of American States (OAS) did nothing.2 When Noriega "declared war" on the United States and murdered a U.S. serviceman in the Canal Zone, Bush moved quickly. He was not inhibited by the lack of an OAS resolution of approval and seemed little concerned when Democratic congressmen complained about the use of force without multinational sanctions.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a clear act of aggression across an international border, but in this case its meaning for the United States was less clear. Panama was in our own neighborhood, and the two countries had special ties. The United States had played a role in the creation of Panama, and the canal was built in large measure by U.S. citizens and with American money. Iraq was on the other side of the globe—not part of an historic American sphere of interest.

The First Post–Cold War Conflict

Desert Storm was not the war the United States had planned for. Before 1989, strategic thinkers had assumed a continuing political-military competition with an expansionist Soviet Union that was ready to exploit any weakness and profit from any crisis. Containing Soviet expansion and regional violence had been the principal goal of U.S. policy for decades. The Soviet Union had been our main adversary in a global struggle, but Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not caused by Soviet expansionism.

Iraq was neither an historic enemy of the United States nor a global power, but Saddam Hussein nevertheless posed a serious challenge. He was a ruthless ruler with a boundless appetite for power and an unlimited capacity for violence, a man who needed war like fire needs oxygen. He had made war against his own countrymen; for eight years he made war against Iran; now he made war against Kuwait. Saddam made no distinction between legal and illegal weapons; military and civilian targets; children and adults; men and women; Persians, Kurds, Jews, and Arabs. All within his reach were potential targets. His powerful army threatened the Gulf oil that was vitally important to Europe and Asia; his attack on Kuwait dramatized the vulnerability of traditional regimes in the area.

Bush himself had a long-standing interest in the Persian Gulf, especially Kuwait. He had spent time in the region and knew the rulers and the oil companies. It was clear to him that something had to be done to undo the aggression. But this would be much more difficult than any previous use of force in his administration—it would be a global confrontation, with global implications.

Until then, the United States had preserved normal relations with this repressive government, though Bush and most other Americans disapproved of the Iraqi regime for its autocratic character, brutal practices, use of chemical weapons against Iran, and repeated threats of violence against Israel. Bush had signed a Presidential Directive on October 2, 1989, that found normal relations with Iraq to be in the U.S. interest.3 The Bush team believed that political realism sometimes required the United States to deal with unsavory regimes in the interest of strategic goals. Bush saw his policy as essentially a continuation of the Reagan administration's; the Bush team and the State Department had hoped that a policy of cooperation would moderate the policies of the government of Iraq.4 America's principal allies had followed suit, tilting toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.

But neither the conciliatory policy of the Western nations, nor the offer of new credits using enhanced trade relations and economic incentives, induced better behavior from Iraq. Instead, Saddam grew bolder and more threatening. On April 2, 1990, he publicly confirmed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons, which he had already used against Iran and against Iraqi dissidents. He also threatened that, if attacked, "We will make the fire eat up half of Israel."5 Still, U.S. policy toward Iraq continued to emphasize American flexibility.

Making War to Keep Peace LP. Copyright © by Jeane Kirkpatrick. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. Available now wherever books are sold.

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Excerpted from Making War to Keep Peace: Trials and Errors in American Foreign Policy from Kuwait to Baghdad by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.