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Preface to the Dover Edition | p. iii |
Preface (1982) | p. vii |
Summary of Results: A Guideline for the Reader | p. xxi |
Contents of Other Possible Courses | p. xxvii |
Notations | p. xxix |
Optimization and Convex Analysis | p. 1 |
Minimization Problems and Convexity | p. 3 |
Strategy sets and loss functions | p. 4 |
Optimization problem | p. 4 |
Allocation of available commodities | p. 5 |
Resource and service operators | p. 6 |
Extension of loss functions | p. 8 |
Sections and epigraphs | p. 10 |
Decomposition principle | p. 11 |
Product of a loss function by a linear operator | p. 11 |
Example: Inf-convolution of functions | p. 12 |
Decomposition principle | p. 13 |
Another decomposition principle | p. 15 |
Mixed strategies and convexity | p. 17 |
Motivation: extension of strategy sets and loss functions | p. 18 |
Mixed strategies and linearized loss functions | p. 19 |
Interpretation of mixed strategies | p. 21 |
Case of finite strategy sets | p. 21 |
Representation by infinite sequences of pure strategies | p. 22 |
Linearized extension of maps and the barycentric operator | p. 24 |
Interpretation of convex functions in terms of risk aversion | p. 25 |
Elementary properties of convex subsets and functions | p. 25 |
Indicators, support functions and gauges | p. 27 |
Indicators and support functions | p. 28 |
Reformulation of the Hahn-Banach theorem | p. 31 |
The bipolar theorem | p. 32 |
Recession cones and barrier cones | p. 34 |
Interpretation: production sets and profit functions | p. 35 |
Gauges | p. 38 |
Existence, Uniqueness and Stability of Optimal Solutions | p. 42 |
Existence and uniqueness of an optimal solution | p. 43 |
Structure of the optimal set | p. 43 |
Existence of an optimal solution | p. 45 |
Continuity versus compactness | p. 45 |
Lower semi-continuity of convex functions in infinite dimensional spaces | p. 45 |
Fundamental property of lower semi-continuous and compact functions | p. 46 |
Uniqueness of an optimal solution | p. 47 |
Non-satiation property | p. 48 |
Minimization of quadratic functionals on convex sets | p. 48 |
Hilbert spaces | p. 49 |
Existence and uniqueness of the minimal solution | p. 49 |
Characterization of the minimal solution | p. 50 |
Projectors of best approximation | p. 51 |
The duality map from an Hilbert space onto its dual | p. 52 |
Minimization of quadratic functionals on subspaces | p. 54 |
The fundamental formula | p. 54 |
Orthogonal right inverse | p. 56 |
Orthogonal left inverse | p. 57 |
Another decomposition property | p. 58 |
Interpretation | p. 59 |
Perturbation by linear forms: conjugate functions | p. 60 |
Conjugate functions | p. 60 |
Characterization of lower semi-continuous convex functions | p. 61 |
Examples of conjugate functions | p. 62 |
Elementary properties of conjugate functions | p. 64 |
Interpretation: cost and profit functions | p. 65 |
Stability properties: an introduction to correspondences | p. 66 |
Upper semi-continuous correspondences | p. 66 |
Lower semi-continuous correspondences | p. 68 |
Closed correspondences | p. 70 |
Construction of upper semi-continuous correspondences | p. 73 |
Compactness and Continuity Properties | p. 75 |
Lower semi-compact functions | p. 76 |
Coercive and semi-coercive functions | p. 76 |
Functions such that f* is continuous at 0 | p. 77 |
Lower semi-compactness of linear forms | p. 78 |
Constraint qualification hypothesis | p. 79 |
Case of infinite dimensional spaces | p. 81 |
Extension to compact subsets of mixed strategies | p. 82 |
Proper maps and preimages of compact subsets | p. 83 |
Proper maps | p. 84 |
Compactness of some strategy sets | p. 85 |
Examples where the map L* + 1 is proper | p. 88 |
Continuous convex functions | p. 90 |
A characterization of lower semi-continuous convex functions | p. 90 |
A characterization of continuous convex functions | p. 91 |
Examples of continuous convex functions | p. 93 |
Continuity of gL and Lf | p. 94 |
Continuous convex functions (continuation) | p. 95 |
Strong continuity of lower semi-continuous convex functions | p. 96 |
Estimates of lower semi-continuous convex functions | p. 97 |
Characterization of continuous convex functions | p. 98 |
Continuity of support functions | p. 99 |
Maximum of a convex function: extremal points | p. 100 |
Differentiability and Subdifferentiability: Characterization of Optimal Solutions | p. 103 |
Subdifferentiability | p. 105 |
Definitions | p. 105 |
Examples of subdifferentials | p. 106 |
Subdifferentiability of continuous convex functions | p. 108 |
Upper semi-continuity of the subdifferential | p. 109 |
Characterization of subdifferentiable convex functions | p. 110 |
Differentiability and variational inequalities | p. 111 |
Definitions | p. 111 |
Differentiability and subdifferentiability | p. 112 |
Legendre transform | p. 113 |
Interpretation: marginal profit | p. 114 |
Variational inequalities | p. 114 |
Differentiability from the right | p. 115 |
Definition and main inequalities | p. 115 |
Derivatives from the right and the support function of the subdifferential | p. 117 |
Derivative of a pointwise supremum | p. 118 |
Local [epsilon]-subdifferentiability and perturbed minimization problems | p. 120 |
Approximate optimal solutions in Banach spaces | p. 121 |
The approximate variational principle | p. 123 |
Local [epsilon]-subdifferentiability | p. 124 |
Perturbation of minimization problems | p. 126 |
Proof of Ekeland-Lebourg's theorem | p. 130 |
Introduction to Duality Theory | p. 133 |
Dual problem and Lagrange multipliers | p. 135 |
Lagrangian | p. 136 |
Lagrange multipliers and dual problem | p. 137 |
Marginal interpretation of Lagrange multipliers | p. 139 |
Example | p. 140 |
Case of linear constraints: extremality relations | p. 142 |
Generalized minimization problem | p. 143 |
Extremality relations | p. 145 |
The fundamental formula | p. 146 |
Minimization problem under linear constraints | p. 148 |
Minimization of a quadratic functional under linear constraints | p. 148 |
Minimization problem under linear equality constraints | p. 149 |
Duality and the decomposition principle | p. 150 |
The decentralization principle | p. 151 |
Conjugate function of gL | p. 152 |
Conjugate function of f[subscript 1]+f[subscript 2] | p. 153 |
Minimization of the projection of a function | p. 154 |
Minimization on the diagonal of a product | p. 154 |
Existence of Lagrange multipliers in the case of a finite number of constraints | p. 155 |
The Fenchel existence theorem | p. 156 |
Stability properties | p. 157 |
Applications to subdifferentiability | p. 158 |
Case of nonlinear constraints: The Uzawa existence theorem | p. 159 |
Game Theory and the Walras Model of Allocation of Resources | p. 363 |
Two-Person Games: An Introduction | p. 165 |
Some solution concepts | p. 167 |
Description of the game | p. 167 |
Shadow minimum | p. 367 |
Conservative solutions and values | p. 168 |
Non-cooperative equilibrium | p. 169 |
Pareto minimum | p. 170 |
Core of a two-person game | p. 171 |
Selection of strategy of the core | p. 171 |
Examples: some finite games | p. 172 |
Example | p. 173 |
Coordination game | p. 175 |
Prisoner's dilemma | p. 178 |
Game of chicken | p. 180 |
The battle of the sexes | p. 182 |
Example: Analysis of duopoly | p. 183 |
The model of a duopoly | p. 184 |
The set of Pareto minima | p. 185 |
Conservative solutions | p. 185 |
Non-cooperative equilibria | p. 186 |
Stackelberg equilibria | p. 187 |
Stackelberg disequilibrium | p. 187 |
Example: Edgeworth economic game | p. 189 |
The set of feasible allocations | p. 190 |
The biloss operator | p. 190 |
The Edgeworth box | p. 192 |
Pareto minima | p. 193 |
Core | p. 193 |
Walras equilibria | p. 194 |
Two-person zero-sum games | p. 195 |
Duality gap and value | p. 195 |
Saddle point | p. 197 |
Perturbation by linear functions | p. 198 |
Case of finite strategy sets: Matrix games | p. 200 |
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games: Existence Theorems | p. 204 |
The fundamental existence theorems | p. 206 |
Existence of conservative solutions | p. 208 |
Decision rules | p. 211 |
Finite topology on convex subsets | p. 211 |
Existence of an optimal decision rule | p. 212 |
The Ky-Fan inequality | p. 213 |
The Lasry theorem | p. 214 |
The minisup theorem | p. 216 |
The Nikaido theorem | p. 217 |
Existence of saddle points | p. 218 |
Another existence theorem for saddle points | p. 218 |
Extension of games without and with exchange of informations | p. 219 |
Definition of extensions of games | p. 220 |
Mixed extensions | p. 222 |
Extensions without exchange of information | p. 223 |
Sequential extensions | p. 225 |
Extensions with exchange of information | p. 227 |
Iterated games | p. 230 |
Iterated extensions | p. 231 |
The Moulin theorem | p. 233 |
Proof of playability of iterated extensions | p. 233 |
A system of functional equations | p. 236 |
A lemma on successive approximations | p. 239 |
Proof of existence of saddle decision rules | p. 240 |
The Fundamental Economic Model: Walras Equilibria | p. 241 |
Description of the model | p. 242 |
The subset of available commodities | p. 242 |
Appropriation of the economy | p. 244 |
Demand correspondences | p. 244 |
Walras equilibrium | p. 245 |
Examples of subsets of available commodities and of appropriations | p. 245 |
Example: Quadratic demand functions | p. 247 |
Existence of a Walras equilibrium | p. 248 |
Existence of a Walras pre-equilibrium | p. 248 |
Surjectivity of correspondences: the Debreu-Gale-Nikaido theorem | p. 250 |
Demand correspondences defined by loss functions | p. 251 |
Statement of the existence theorem | p. 251 |
Upper semi-continuity of the demand correspondence | p. 253 |
Compactification of an economy | p. 254 |
Proof of the existence of a Walras equilibrium | p. 256 |
Economies with producers | p. 257 |
Description of the model | p. 257 |
Statement of the existence theorem | p. 258 |
Compactification | p. 259 |
Proof of the existence of a Walras equilibrium | p. 262 |
Non-Cooperative n-Person Games | p. 263 |
Existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium | p. 264 |
Games described in strategic form | p. 264 |
Conservative values and multistrategies | p. 265 |
Non-cooperative equilibria | p. 266 |
The Nash theorem | p. 267 |
Stability | p. 268 |
Associated variational inequalities | p. 269 |
Case of quadratic loss functions; application to Walras-Cournot equilibria | p. 270 |
Non-cooperative games with quadratic loss functions | p. 271 |
Existence of solutions of variational inequalities | p. 272 |
Examples | p. 274 |
Multistrategy sets defined by linear constraints | p. 274 |
Walras-Cournot equilibria | p. 276 |
Constrained non-cooperative games and fixed point theorems | p. 279 |
Selection of a fixed point | p. 279 |
Equilibria of constrained non-cooperative games | p. 282 |
Fixed-point theorems | p. 283 |
Non-cooperative Walras equilibria | p. 285 |
Description of the model | p. 285 |
Existence of a non-cooperative Walras equilibrium: the Arrow-Debreu theorem | p. 286 |
Non-cooperative Walras equilibria of economies with producers | p. 289 |
Main Solution Concepts of Cooperative Games | p. 293 |
Behavior of the whole set of players: Pareto strategies | p. 295 |
Pareto strategies | p. 295 |
Rates of transfer | p. 297 |
Pareto multipliers | p. 297 |
Pareto allocations | p. 300 |
Selection of Pareto strategies and imputations | p. 303 |
Normalized games | p. 304 |
Pareto strategies obtained by using selection functions | p. 305 |
Closest strategy to the shadow minimum | p. 306 |
The best compromise | p. 307 |
Existence of Pareto strategies | p. 308 |
Interpretation: threat functionals | p. 308 |
Imputations: the Nash bargaining solution | p. 309 |
Behavior of coalitions of players: the core | p. 310 |
Coalitions | p. 311 |
Cooperative game described in strategic form and its core | p. 312 |
The multiloss operator F[superscript A]# of the coalition A | p. 313 |
Examples of multistrategy sets X(A) | p. 313 |
Economic games and core of an economy | p. 314 |
Cooperative game described in characteristic form and its core | p. 314 |
Behavior of fuzzy coalitions: the fuzzy core | p. 316 |
Fuzzy coalitions | p. 316 |
Extension of a family of coalitions | p. 317 |
Debreu-Scarf coalitions | p. 318 |
Fuzzy coalitions on a continuum of players | p. 319 |
Fuzzy games described in characteristic form | p. 320 |
Characterization of the core of a (fuzzy) game | p. 320 |
Fuzzy economic games and fuzzy core of an economy | p. 321 |
Fuzzy games described in strategic form and fuzzy core | p. 324 |
Selection of elements of the core: cooperative equilibrium and nucleolus | p. 329 |
Canonical cooperative equilibrium | p. 329 |
Least-core | p. 331 |
Nucleolus | p. 333 |
Games With Side-Payments | p. 336 |
Core of a fuzzy game with side-payments | p. 338 |
Core of a game with side-payments | p. 338 |
Linear games | p. 340 |
Non-emptiness of the core of fuzzy games with side-payments | p. 341 |
Core of fuzzy market games | p. 343 |
Core of a game with side-payments | p. 344 |
Convex cover of a game | p. 345 |
Non-emptiness of the core of a balanced game | p. 346 |
Balanced family of multistrategy sets | p. 347 |
Balanced characteristic functions and convex loss functions | p. 348 |
Further properties of convex functions and balances | p. 351 |
Values of fuzzy games | p. 353 |
The diagonal property | p. 354 |
Sequence of fuzzy values | p. 355 |
Existence and uniqueness of a sequence of fuzzy values | p. 356 |
Relations between core and fuzzy value | p. 359 |
Best approximation property of fuzzy values | p. 358 |
Generalized solution to locally Lipschitz games | p. 359 |
Shapley value and nucleolus of games with side-payments | p. 360 |
The Shapley value | p. 360 |
Existence and uniqueness of a Shapley value | p. 361 |
Simple games | p. 367 |
Nucleolus of games with side-payments | p. 367 |
Games Without Side-Payments | p. 370 |
Equivalence between the fuzzy core and the set of equilibria | p. 370 |
Representation of a game | p. 371 |
Equilibrium of a representation | p. 373 |
Cover associated with a representation | p. 374 |
Fuzzy core of a representation | p. 376 |
The equivalence theorem | p. 376 |
Non-emptiness of the fuzzy core of a balanced game | p. 378 |
Statement of theorems of non-emptiness of the fuzzy core | p. 379 |
Upper semi-continuity of the associated side-payment games | p. 382 |
Existence of approximate cooperative equilibria | p. 384 |
Proof of the non-emptiness of the core | p. 386 |
Equivalence between the fuzzy core of an economy and the set of Walras allocations | p. 386 |
Representation of economic games | p. 386 |
Fuzzy core and Walras allocations | p. 389 |
The equivalence theorem | p. 390 |
Non-Linear Analysis and Optimal Control Theory | p. 391 |
Minimax Type Inequalities, Monotone Correspondences and [gamma]-Convex Functions | p. 393 |
Relaxation of compactness assumptions | p. 395 |
Existence of a conservative solution | p. 395 |
Proof of existence of a conservative solution | p. 397 |
Existence of optimal decision rules and minisup under weaker compactness assumptions | p. 399 |
Relaxation of continuity assumptions: variational inequalities for monotone correspondences | p. 405 |
Variational inequalities | p. 406 |
Existence of a solution to variational inequalities for completely upper semi-continuous correspondences | p. 408 |
Pseudo-monotone functions: the Brezis-Nirenberg-Stampacchia theorem | p. 410 |
Existence of a solution to variational inequalities for pseudo-monotone maps | p. 413 |
Pseudo-monotonicity of monotone maps | p. 414 |
Monotone and cyclically monotone correspondences | p. 416 |
Maximal monotone correspondences | p. 417 |
Relaxation of convexity assumptions | p. 423 |
Definition of [gamma]-convex functions | p. 424 |
The fundamental characteristic property of families of [gamma]-convex functions | p. 424 |
The minisup theorem for [gamma subscript x]-convex-[gamma subscript y]-concave functions | p. 426 |
Existence of optimal decision rules for functions [gamma subscript y]-concave with respect to y | p. 428 |
Example: Image of a cone of convex functions by [pi]* | p. 429 |
Relations between convexity and [gamma]-convexity | p. 431 |
Example: [beta]-convex set functions | p. 434 |
Example: Convex functions of atomless vector measures | p. 436 |
Introduction to Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control | p. 438 |
Duality in infinite dimensional spaces | p. 441 |
Lagrangian of a minimization problem under linear constraints | p. 443 |
Extremality relations | p. 446 |
Existence of a Lagrange multiplier under the Slater condition | p. 447 |
Relaxation of the Slater condition | p. 449 |
Generalized Lagrangian of a minimization problem | p. 451 |
Characterization of a Lagrangian by perturbations of the minimization problem | p. 456 |
Duality in the case of non-convex integral criterion and contraints | p. 458 |
Modulus of non-convexity of a function | p. 459 |
Estimate of the duality gap | p. 461 |
The Shapley-Folkman theorem | p. 463 |
Sharp estimate of the duality gap | p. 465 |
Applications | p. 468 |
Extremality relations | p. 470 |
The Aumann-Perles duality theorem | p. 472 |
The approximation procedure | p. 474 |
Duality in calculus of variations | p. 476 |
The Green formula | p. 480 |
Abstract problem of calculus of variations | p. 482 |
The Hamiltonian system | p. 484 |
Lagrangian of a problem of calculus of variations | p. 486 |
Existence of a Lagrange multiplier | p. 487 |
Example: the Dirichlet variational problem | p. 488 |
The maximum principle for optimal control problems | p. 492 |
Optimal control and impulsive control problems | p. 497 |
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of a control problem | p. 498 |
Construction of the closed loop control | p. 502 |
The principle of optimality | p. 503 |
The quadratic case: Riccati equations | p. 505 |
The Bensoussan-Lions variational inequalities of a stopping time problem | p. 508 |
Construction of the optimal stopping time | p. 511 |
The Bensoussan-Lions quasi-variational inequalities of an impulsive control problem | p. 511 |
Construction of the optimal impulsive control | p. 515 |
Fixed Point Theorems, Quasi-Variational Inequalities and Correspondences | p. 518 |
Fixed point and surjectivity theorems for correspondences | p. 518 |
The Browder-Ky-Fan existence theorem for critical points | p. 519 |
Properties of inward and outward correspondences | p. 527 |
Critical points of homotopic correspondences | p. 530 |
Other existence theorems for critical points | p. 532 |
Quasi-variational inequalities | p. 534 |
Selection of fixed point by pseudo-monotone functions | p. 535 |
Fixed point theorem for increasing maps | p. 538 |
Quasi-variational inequalities for increasing correspondences | p. 539 |
Other properties and examples of upper and lower semi-continuous correspondences | p. 542 |
Lower semi-continuity of preimages of linear operators | p. 543 |
Lower semi-continuity of correspondences defined by constraints | p. 547 |
Continuous selection theorem | p. 548 |
Weak Hausdorff topology on the family of closed subsets of topological vector spaces | p. 552 |
Relations between hemi-continuity and semi-continuity | p. 554 |
Summary of Linear Functional Analysis | p. 558 |
Hahn-Banach theorems | p. 558 |
Paired spaces | p. 559 |
Topologies of uniform convergence | p. 561 |
Topologies associated with a duality pairing | p. 563 |
The Banach-Steinhauss theorem | p. 565 |
The Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz Lemma | p. 566 |
Barycentric subdivision of simplexes | p. 566 |
Sequence of barycentric subdivisions | p. 569 |
The Sperner lemma | p. 570 |
The Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma | p. 572 |
The Brouwer theorem | p. 575 |
Lyapunov's Theorem on the Range of A Vector Valued Measure | p. 577 |
Comments | p. 579 |
References | p. 587 |
Subject Index | p. 614 |
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