Moral and Epistemic Virtues

by Brady, Michael; Pritchard, Duncan

• ISBN13: 9781405108782
• ISBN10: 1405108789
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2004-02-13
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Summary

Whilst virtue ethics has long been a focus for discussion in moral philosophy, it is only recently that an analogue virtue-based theory has come to the fore in the field of epistemology. This volume brings together papers by some of the leading figures working on virtue-theoretic accounts in both ethics and epistemology, including Guy Axtell, Julia Driver, Antony Duff, Miranda Fricker, John Greco, Christopher Hookway, Michael Slote, Lawrence Solum and Linda Zagzebski. It is the first volume to combine papers on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.

Author Biography

Michael Brady is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published widely in ethics, including articles in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Journal of Value Inquiry and Philosophical Quarterly.

Duncan Pritchard is Lecturer in Philosophy and Leverhulme Trust Special Research Fellow at the University of Stirling. He has published widely in epistemology, including articles in American Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese and International Journal of Philosophical Studies.

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors	vii
Introduction
Moral and Epistemic Virtues	1	(12)
Michael Brady
Duncan Pritchard
Part One: Theory
The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good	13	(16)
Linda Zagzebski
The Pursuit of Epistemic Good	29	(18)
Philip Percival
Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences	47	(20)
Juli Eflin
Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered: A Reply to Eflin	67	(8)
Andrew McGonigal
Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy	75	(18)
Christopher Hookway
Reply to Hookway	93	(8)
Marie McGinn
The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue	101	(16)
Julia Driver
Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project	117	(13)
Michael Slote
Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism	130
Michael Brady