Psychology of Learning and Motivation

by Ross; Bartels; Bauman; Skitka; Medin

• ISBN13: 9780123744883
• ISBN10: 0123744881
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2009-01-09
• Publisher: Elsevier Science

Summary

This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology. The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions. Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts. Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters. The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.

Table of Contents

Contributors	p. ix
Preface	p. xi
Casual Models: The Representational Infrastructure for Moral Judgment	p. 1
Introduction	p. 2
Casual Models	p. 4
Architectural Considerations	p. 7
Roles for Casual Models	p. 9
Moral Principles That Draw on Casual Structure	p. 11
Conclusions	p. 22
References	p. 23
Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge	p. 27
The Moral Grammar Hypothesis	p. 29
The Problem of Descriptive Adequacy	p. 31
Intuitive Legal Appraisal	p. 45
Deontic Rules	p. 51
A Periodic Table of Moral Elements	p. 71
Conversion Rules	p. 81
Conclusion	p. 92
Acknowledgments	p. 93
References	p. 93
Law, Psychology, and Morality	p. 101
Introduction	p. 102
How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Cognitions?	p. 107
How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Behaviors?	p. 113
The Effect of Law on Moral Expression	p. 119
Conclusion	p. 124
Acknowledgments	p. 124
References	p. 124
Protected Values and Omission Bias as Deontological Judgments	p. 133
Introduction	p. 134
Protected Values	p. 137
Relation of PVs to Other Types of Judgment	p. 138
Omission Bias	p. 139
Relation of Omission Bias to Other Biases	p. 141
Study 1: Relation of PVs to Omission Bias	p. 143
Study 2: Relation to Emotion	p. 150
Study 3: The Nature of Omission Bias	p. 156
Conclusion	p. 163
Acknowledgments	p. 165
References	p. 165
Attending to Moral Values Rumen Iliev	p. 169
Introduction	p. 170
Moral Values in the Laboratory	p. 173
A Cognitive Perspective on Sacred Values	p. 178
Attentional Influences and the Acceptability of Trade-Offs	p. 182
General Discussion	p. 188
References	p. 190
Noninstrumental Reasoning over Sacred Values: An Indonesian Case Study	p. 193
Introduction	p. 194
Testing the "Backfire Effect" in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	p. 198
Sequential Offers in Negotiations over Sacred Values	p. 199
Retesting the Backfire Effect in a Study of Indonesian Madrassah Students	p. 200
General Discussion	p. 204
References	p. 205
Development and Dual Processes in Moral Reasoning: A Fuzzy-trace Theory Approach	p. 207
Overview	p. 208
An Introduction to Fuzzy-trace Theory	p. 209
Building Blocks of Moral Reasoning	p. 210
Explaining Reversals and Paradoxes in Moral Reasoning	p. 216
Moral Values and Risky Decisions in Adolescence	p. 227
Conclusions	p. 229
References	p. 232
Moral Identity, Moral Functioning, and the Development of Moral Character	p. 237
Introduction	p. 238
Moral Self-Identity	p. 239
Development of Moral Self-Identity	p. 248
Schemas and Moral Information Processing	p. 256
Moral Development as Ethical Expertise Development	p. 258
New Directions: Neuroscience and Moral Personality	p. 261
Conclusions	p. 264
References	p. 265
"Fools Rush In": A JDM Perspective on the Role of Emotions in Decisions, Moral and Otherwise	p. 275
Instroduction	p. 276
The Emergence of Emotion Research in JDM	p. 280
Feelings and Emotions in Moral Decisions	p. 289
Some Conclusions and Some Suggestions	p. 298
Acknowledgments	p. 301
References	p. 301
Motivated Moral Reasoning	p. 307
Introduction	p. 307
Motivated Reasoning	p. 309
Motivated Moral Reasoning	p. 312
Motivated Assessments of Moral Accountability	p. 315
Motivated Use of Moral Principles	p. 322
Motivated Moral Reasoning and Views of the Moral Thinker	p. 332
References	p. 332
In the Mind of the Perceiver: Psychological Implications of Moral Conviction	p. 339
Introduction	p. 340
What Is Moral Conviction?	p. 341
How Does Research on Moral Conviction and Moral Judgment Differ?	p. 345
The Consequences of Moral Conviction on Choice and Action	p. 353
Implications	p. 358
References	p. 359
Subject Index	p. 363
Contents of Recent Volumes	p. 369
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