Moral Judgment and Decision Making

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  • Edition: 1st
  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2009-01-01

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This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology. The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions. Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts. Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters. The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.

Table of Contents

Contributorsp. ix
Prefacep. xi
Casual Models: The Representational Infrastructure for Moral Judgmentp. 1
Introductionp. 2
Casual Modelsp. 4
Architectural Considerationsp. 7
Roles for Casual Modelsp. 9
Moral Principles That Draw on Casual Structurep. 11
Conclusionsp. 22
Referencesp. 23
Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledgep. 27
The Moral Grammar Hypothesisp. 29
The Problem of Descriptive Adequacyp. 31
Intuitive Legal Appraisalp. 45
Deontic Rulesp. 51
A Periodic Table of Moral Elementsp. 71
Conversion Rulesp. 81
Conclusionp. 92
Acknowledgmentsp. 93
Referencesp. 93
Law, Psychology, and Moralityp. 101
Introductionp. 102
How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Cognitions?p. 107
How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Behaviors?p. 113
The Effect of Law on Moral Expressionp. 119
Conclusionp. 124
Acknowledgmentsp. 124
Referencesp. 124
Protected Values and Omission Bias as Deontological Judgmentsp. 133
Introductionp. 134
Protected Valuesp. 137
Relation of PVs to Other Types of Judgmentp. 138
Omission Biasp. 139
Relation of Omission Bias to Other Biasesp. 141
Study 1: Relation of PVs to Omission Biasp. 143
Study 2: Relation to Emotionp. 150
Study 3: The Nature of Omission Biasp. 156
Conclusionp. 163
Acknowledgmentsp. 165
Referencesp. 165
Attending to Moral Values Rumen Ilievp. 169
Introductionp. 170
Moral Values in the Laboratoryp. 173
A Cognitive Perspective on Sacred Valuesp. 178
Attentional Influences and the Acceptability of Trade-Offsp. 182
General Discussionp. 188
Referencesp. 190
Noninstrumental Reasoning over Sacred Values: An Indonesian Case Studyp. 193
Introductionp. 194
Testing the "Backfire Effect" in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflictp. 198
Sequential Offers in Negotiations over Sacred Valuesp. 199
Retesting the Backfire Effect in a Study of Indonesian Madrassah Studentsp. 200
General Discussionp. 204
Referencesp. 205
Development and Dual Processes in Moral Reasoning: A Fuzzy-trace Theory Approachp. 207
Overviewp. 208
An Introduction to Fuzzy-trace Theoryp. 209
Building Blocks of Moral Reasoningp. 210
Explaining Reversals and Paradoxes in Moral Reasoningp. 216
Moral Values and Risky Decisions in Adolescencep. 227
Conclusionsp. 229
Referencesp. 232
Moral Identity, Moral Functioning, and the Development of Moral Characterp. 237
Introductionp. 238
Moral Self-Identityp. 239
Development of Moral Self-Identityp. 248
Schemas and Moral Information Processingp. 256
Moral Development as Ethical Expertise Developmentp. 258
New Directions: Neuroscience and Moral Personalityp. 261
Conclusionsp. 264
Referencesp. 265
"Fools Rush In": A JDM Perspective on the Role of Emotions in Decisions, Moral and Otherwisep. 275
Instroductionp. 276
The Emergence of Emotion Research in JDMp. 280
Feelings and Emotions in Moral Decisionsp. 289
Some Conclusions and Some Suggestionsp. 298
Acknowledgmentsp. 301
Referencesp. 301
Motivated Moral Reasoningp. 307
Introductionp. 307
Motivated Reasoningp. 309
Motivated Moral Reasoningp. 312
Motivated Assessments of Moral Accountabilityp. 315
Motivated Use of Moral Principlesp. 322
Motivated Moral Reasoning and Views of the Moral Thinkerp. 332
Referencesp. 332
In the Mind of the Perceiver: Psychological Implications of Moral Convictionp. 339
Introductionp. 340
What Is Moral Conviction?p. 341
How Does Research on Moral Conviction and Moral Judgment Differ?p. 345
The Consequences of Moral Conviction on Choice and Actionp. 353
Implicationsp. 358
Referencesp. 359
Subject Indexp. 363
Contents of Recent Volumesp. 369
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