Moral Psychology, Volume 1 The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness

by Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Miller, Christian B.

• ISBN13: 9780262693547
• ISBN10: 0262693542
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2007-10-19
• Publisher: Bradford Books

Summary

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field.

Author Biography

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Philosophy Department and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He edited the previous volumes in Moral Psychology.

Christian B. Miller is A. C. Reid Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University and Director of the Character Project (www.thecharacterproject.com).

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. xi
Introduction	p. xiii
Naturalizing Ethics	p. 1
Three Cheers for Naturalistic Ethics	p. 27
Response to Duke Naturalists	p. 33
Naturalism Relativized?	p. 37
What Is the Nature of Morality? A Response to Casebeer, Railton, and Ruse	p. 45
Can a General Deontic Logic Capture the Facts of Human Moral Reasoning? How the Mind Interprets Social Exchange Rules and Detects Cheaters	p. 53
Ought We to Abandon a Domain-General Treatment of "Ought"?	p. 121
Can Evolutionary Psychology Assist Logicians? A Reply to Mallon	p. 131
Comment on Cosmides and Tooby	p. 137
When Falsification Strikes: A Reply to Fodor	p. 143
Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest: Discerning Adaptations from By-products	p. 165
Edward Westermarck on the Meaning of "Moral"	p. 191
Aversions, Sentiments, Moral Judgments, and Taboos	p. 195
Response to Joyce and Wolf	p. 205
Kindness, Fidelity, and Other Sexually Selected Virtues	p. 209
Why Moral Virtues Are Probably Not Sexual Adaptations	p. 245
The Conflict-Resolution Theory of Virtue	p. 251
Response to Comments	p. 263
Symbolic Thought and the Evolution of Human Morality	p. 269
A Just-So Story for Symbolic Thought? Comment on Tse	p. 299
Morality and the Capacity for Symbolic Cognition: Comment on Tse	p. 303
Reply to Dietrich and Wallace	p. 315
Nativism and Moral Psychology: Three Models of the Innate Structure That Shapes the Contents of Moral Norms	p. 319
Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality	p. 345
The Poverty of the Moral Stimulus	p. 353
Reply to Harman and Mikhail	p. 361
Is Morality Innate?	p. 367
How Not to Argue That Morality Isn't Innate: Comments on Prinz	p. 407
The Nativism Debate and Moral Philosophy: Comments on Prinz	p. 419
Reply to Dwyer and Tiberius	p. 427
References	p. 441
Contributors	p. 497
	p. 499
	p. 327
	p. 557
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.