Moral Psychology, Volume 2 The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity

by Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

• ISBN13: 9780262693578
• ISBN10: 0262693577
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2007-10-26
• Publisher: Bradford Books

Summary

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field.

Author Biography

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Philosophy Department and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He edited the previous volumes in Moral Psychology.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. xi
Introduction	p. xiii
Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics?	p. 1
Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong	p. 27
Moral Heuristics and Consequentialism	p. 31
Reply to Comments	p. 41
Framing Moral Intuitions	p. 47
Moral Intuitions Framed	p. 77
Defending Ethical Intuitionism	p. 83
How to Apply Generalities	p. 97
Reply to Tolhurst and Shafer-Landau
Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy	p. 107
Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions
Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy Inside and Out	p. 145
Resisting the Linguistic Analogy	p. 157
A Commentary on Hauser, Young, and Cushman
On Misreading the Linguistic Analogy	p. 171
Response to Jesse Prinz and Ron Mallon
Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology	p. 181
Does Social Intuitionism Flatter Morality or Challenge It?	p. 219
The Social Intuitionist Model	p. 233
Some Counter-Intuitions
Social Intuitionists Reason, in Conversation	p. 241
Sentimentalism Naturalized	p. 255
Normative Theory or Theory of Mind?	p. 275
A Response to Nichols
Sentimental Rules and Moral Disagreement	p. 279
Comment on Nichols
Sentiment, Intention, and Disagreement	p. 291
Replies to Blair and D'Arms
How to Argue about Disagreement	p. 303
Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism
Against Convergent Moral Realism	p. 333
The Respective Roles of Philosophical Argument and Empirical Evidence
Disagreement about Disagreement	p. 339
How to Find a Disagreement	p. 345
Philosophical Diversity and Moral Realism
Moral Incoherentism	p. 355
How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of a Semantic Hat
Metaethical Variability, Incoherence, and Error	p. 387
Moral Semantics and Empirical Inquiry	p. 403
Reply to Gill and Sayre-McCord	p. 413
Attributions of Causation and Moral Responsibility	p. 423
Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment	p. 441
Two Experiments
Can You Be Morally Responsible for Someone's Death If Nothing You Did Caused It?	p. 449
Kinds of Norms and Legal Causation	p. 459
Reply to Knobe and Fraser and Deigh
References	p. 463
Contributors	p. 499
Index to Volume 1	p. 501
Index to Volume 2	p. 529
Index to Volume 3	p. 559
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