Moral Realism A Defence

by Shafer-Landau, Russ

• ISBN13: 9780199280209
• ISBN10: 0199280207
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-07-14
• Publisher: Clarendon Press

Summary

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles area fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypotheticalconsensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, thefundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel. Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning thefoundations of ethics.

Author Biography

Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1	(12)
PART I: REALISM AND ITS CRITICS
The Non-cognitivist Challenge	13	(26)
What Moral Realism Is	13	(5)
The Non-cognitivist Challenge	18	(4)
A Critique of Non-cognitivism	22	(15)
Conclusion	37	(2)
The Constructivist Challenge	39	(16)
Subjectivism and Objectivism	39	(2)
Moral and Non-moral Constraints	41	(3)
Four Constructivist Critiques	44	(7)
Conclusion	51	(4)
PART II: MORAL METAPHYSICS
Ethical Non-naturalism	55	(25)
Moore's Argument	56	(2)
Naturalism and Non-naturalism	58	(7)
Against Classical Naturalism	65	(7)
Non-naturalistic Metaphysics	72	(7)
Conclusion	79	(1)
Supervenience and Causation	80	(39)
Metaphysical Worries	80	(4)
The First Supervenience Argument	84	(5)
The Second Supervenience Argument	89	(9)
The Causal Argument	98	(16)
Conclusion	114	(5)
PART III: MORAL MOTIVATION
Motivational Humeanism	119	(23)
The Non-cognitivist Argument	119	(3)
The Attractions of Anti-Humeanism	122	(5)
Five Humean Arguments	127	(13)
Conclusion	140	(2)
Motivational Judgement Internalism	142	(23)
A Taxonomy of Internalisms	142	(3)
The Amoralist	145	(2)
An Objection	147	(1)
The Examples	148	(7)
Internalist Worries	155	(6)
Conclusion	161	(4)
PART IV: MORAL REASONS
Reasons Internalism	165	(25)
The Scope of Practical Reason	165	(6)
Varieties of Reasons Internalism	171	(5)
Arguments for Reasons Internalism	176	(9)
Two Arguments against Internalism	185	(3)
Conclusion	188	(2)
Moral Rationalism	190	(25)
Realism and Rationalism	190	(2)
A Presumptive Argument for Moral Rationalism	192	(1)
Four Antirationalist Arguments	193	(16)
Partners in Crime	209	(2)
Conclusion	211	(4)
Rationality and Disagreement	215	(16)
The Argument from Disagreement	215	(3)
Explaining Actual Disagreement	218	(3)
Explaining Hypothesized Disagreement	221	(6)
Conclusion	227	(4)
PART V: MORAL KNOWLEDGE
Moral Scepticism	231	(16)
The Master Argument	231	(1)
Realism and Epistemic Inaccessibility	232	(3)
Four Sceptical Arguments	235	(6)
Believing Where We Cannot Prove	241	(4)
Conclusion	245	(2)
The Justification of Moral Principles	247	(20)
The Appeal to Self-Evidence	247	(3)
Objections to Self-Evidence	250	(15)
Conclusion	265	(2)
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs	267	(36)
Three Models of Ethical Theory	267	(5)
Moral Reliabilism	272	(3)
Objections to Moral Reliabilism	275	(18)
Identifying Reliable Processes: Some Preliminaries	293	(3)
Identifying Reliable Processes: The Role of Exemplars	296	(4)
Conclusion	300	(3)
References	303	(10)
Index	313