Moral Skepticisms

by Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

• ISBN13: 9780195187724
• ISBN10: 0195187725
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2006-01-26
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous practical importance in handling controversial moral questions in health care ethics, politics, law, and education. Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive overview of these difficult subjects, looking at a wide variety of questions, including: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? What is justified belief? The second half of the book explores various moral theories that have grappled with these issues, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that all these approaches fail to rule out moral nihilism--the view that nothing is really morally wrong or right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory,--"moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism"--which concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an extreme contrast class. While explaining this original position and criticizing alternatives, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a wide-ranging survey of the epistemology of moral beliefs.

Author Biography

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies, Dartmouth College. He is author of The Existence of God and editor of Pyrrhonian Skepticism.

Table of Contents

PART I: ISSUES
Chapter 1. What Is Moral Epistemology?	5	(11)
1.1. Moral Theory	5	(2)
1.2. Epistemology Applied to Morality	7	(2)
1.3. Varieties of Moral Skepticism	9	(4)
1.4. Presumptions Against Moral Skepticism	13	(3)
Chapter 2. Are Moral Beliefs 'Truth-Apt?	16	(16)
2.1. Does Knowledge Require True Belief?	16	(1)
2.2. Expressivism	17	(15)
Chapter 3. Are Any Moral Beliefs True?	32	(28)
3.1. Error Theories	32	(5)
3.2. Arguments Against Moral Facts	37	(16)
3.3. Is Moral Nihilism Coherent?	53	(5)
3.4. So Far	58	(2)
Chapter 4. Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?	60	(23)
4.1. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief?	60	(3)
4.2. Ways to Be Justified	63	(10)
4.3. Arguments Against Justified Moral Belief	73	(10)
Chapter 5. In Contrast with What?	83	(29)
5.1. Contrast Classes in Epistemology	84	(6)
5.2. Unqualified Epistemic Judgments	90	(7)
5.3. Problems for Relevance	97	(6)
5.4. Classy Pyrrhonism	103	(4)
5.5. Objections	107	(5)
Chapter 6. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism	112	(23)
6.1. Moral Contrast Classes	112	(5)
6.2. Unqualified Judgments in Moral Epistemology	117	(2)
6.3. Relativized Moral Skepticisms	119	(2)
6.4. Academic Moral Skepticism	121	(1)
6.5. Is Moral Nihilism Relevant?	122	(5)
6.6. More Problems for Relevance	127	(3)
6.7. Moderate Moral Pyrrhonism	130	(5)
PART II: THEORIES
Chapter 7. Naturalism	135	(18)
7.1. The Original Humean Doctrine	135	(1)
7.2. Necessary Moral Truths	136	(4)
7.3. Logical Tricks	140	(2)
7.4. Appeals to Authority	142	(9)
7.5. Other Naturalisms	151	(2)
Chapter 8. Normativism	153	(31)
8.1. Moral Explanations	153	(14)
8.2. Contractarianism and Contractualism	167	(17)
Chapter 9. Intuitionism	184	(36)
9.1. What Is Moral Intuitionism?	184	(7)
9.2. Which Contrast Class?	191	(1)
9.3. When Do Beliefs Need Confirmation?	192	(3)
9.4. Do Moral Beliefs Need Confirmation?	195	(15)
9.5. Objections	210	(8)
9.6. Qualifications and Conclusions	218	(2)
Chapter 10. Coherentism	220	(33)
10.1. What Is Coherence?	221	(5)
10.2. First-Order Coherence	226	(4)
10.3. Second-Order Coherence	230	(3)
10.4. Wider Coherence	233	(2)
10.5. Which Contrast Class?	235	(2)
10.6. Objections	237	(13)
10.7. Conclusions	250	(3)
References	253	(10)
Index	263