National Security Law and the Power of the Purse

by Banks, William C.; Raven-Hansen, Peter

• ISBN13: 9780195085389
• ISBN10: 0195085388
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1994-07-21
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

The ideal model of national security decision-making, whereby the Legislative branch authorizes action to protect national security and the Executive branch takes it, has broken down due to the speed and unpredictability of foreign crises and the President's monopoly on foreign intelligence. In response, Congress has ceded the initiative to the President, and then utilized the power of the purse to ratify or restrict what the President has done. This power, by necessity and preference, has become the central congressional tool for participating in national security policy. Inevitably attacks on policy are transformed into attacks on the making and effects of appropriations. This study addresses the constitutional and statutory questions raised by these attacks. It thoroughly explores the history, mechanics, and scope of the power of the purse in national security, using Vietnam War appropriations and the Boland Amendments as case studies. William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen provide a unique and provocative primer on the power of the purse in national security law.

Author Biography

William C. Banks is Professor of Law at Syracuse University.

Table of Contents

Introduction	p. 3
The Early Origins of the Power of the Purse in National Security
The English Power of the Purse	p. 11
The Power of the Purse in Pre-Constitutional America	p. 18
The Framing and Ratification of the Power of the Purse in National Security Affairs	p. 27
The Early Practice: From 1789 to 1809	p. 33
The Mechanics of National Security Appropriations and Spending
The Evolution of the National Security Appropriation Process	p. 43
The Uses and Abuses of Riders and Continuing Resolutions in National Security	p. 54
Informal Controls on National Security Spending	p. 62
The Mechanics of National Security Spending	p. 69
Constitutional Limits on the Making of National Security Appropriations
The Veto Clause as a Constitutional Limit on Omnibus Appropriations	p. 89
The Statement and Account Clause as a Constitutional Limit on Black Budgets	p. 100
The Substantive Scope of the Power of the Purse in National Security
The General Force and Effect of National Security Appropriations	p. 109
Legitimating Appropriations	p. 119
Restrictive Appropriations	p. 137
National Security Spending Without Appropriation	p. 158
Summing Up the Power of the Purse in National Security	p. 171
Notes	p. 183
Index	p. 255
Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved.