Natural Justice

by Binmore, Ken

• ISBN13: 9780195178111
• ISBN10: 0195178114
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2005-03-17
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

This book lays out foundations for a "science of morals." Binmore uses game theory as a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters. He reinterprets classical social contract ideas within a game-theory framework and generates new insights into the fundamental questions of socialphilosophy. In contrast to the previous writing in moral philosophy that relied on vague notion such as " societal well-being" and "moral duty," Binmore begins with individuals; rational decision-makers with the ability to emphasize with one another. Any social arrangement that prescribes them toact against their interests will become unstable and eventually will be replaced by another, until one is found that includes worthwhile actions for all individuals involved.

Author Biography

Ken Binmore is a mathematician-turned-economist who has devoted his life to the theory of games and its applications in economics, evolutionary biology, psychology, and moral philosophy. He is best known for his part in designing the telecom auction that raised $35 billion for the British taxpayer, but his major research contributions are to the theory of bargaining and its testing in the laboratory. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of 12 books and some 90 research papers. He is Emeritus Professor of Economics at University College London.

Table of Contents

Preface	vii
Moral Science	1	(20)
Evolutionary Ethics	1	(1)
Mudslinging	2	(1)
Social Contracts	3	(2)
Stability	5	(2)
Efficiency	7	(7)
Fairness	14	(4)
Reform	18	(3)
Bargaining	21	(16)
Realistic Bargaining	21	(1)
The Meeting Game	22	(1)
Bargaining Problems	23	(2)
The Nash Bargaining Solution	25	(2)
Interpersonal Comparison of Utility	27	(1)
Social Indices	28	(1)
The Utilitarian Bargaining Solution	29	(2)
The Egalitarian Bargaining Solution	31	(1)
Utilitarianism versus Egalitarianism	32	(1)
Enforcement	33	(1)
Cultural Evolution	34	(2)
Signifying Nothing?	36	(1)
Battle of the Isms	37	(20)
Kicking up Dust	37	(1)
Empiricism	37	(5)
Naturalism	42	(5)
Relativism	47	(6)
Reductionism	53	(1)
Nil desperandum!	54	(3)
Equilibrium	57	(20)
Inventing Right and Wrong	57	(1)
Toy Games	58	(1)
Cooperation and Conflict	58	(2)
Mixed Strategies	60	(3)
The Prisoners' Dilemma	63	(3)
Multiple Equilibria	66	(7)
Nash Demand Game	73	(2)
Out-of-Equilibrium Behavior	75	(2)
Reciprocity	77	(16)
Tit-for-Tat	77	(2)
Folk Theorem	79	(3)
Punishment	82	(3)
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?	85	(1)
Emergent Phenomena	86	(3)
Unpleasant Behavior	89	(3)
Free for All?	92	(1)
Duty	93	(8)
The Good, the Right and the Seemly	93	(1)
Rights	94	(2)
Dressing Up	96	(1)
Moral Responsibility	97	(4)
Kinship	101	(12)
Sympathy	101	(1)
Kin Selection	102	(3)
Social Insects	105	(3)
Modifying Hamilton's Rule?	108	(2)
Learning to Play an Equilibrium	110	(1)
Extending the Family	111	(1)
Warm Glow	112	(1)
Empathy	113	(16)
Empathetic Preferences	113	(1)
Empathetic Identification	114	(2)
Utility	116	(5)
Interpersonal Comparison of Utility	121	(4)
The Evolution of Empathetic Preferences	125	(4)
The Golden Rule	129	(18)
Sages down the Ages	129	(1)
Hunters and Gatherers	130	(5)
Mechanism Design	135	(4)
An Origin for the Golden Rule?	139	(4)
Enforcement	143	(4)
Utilitarianism	147	(18)
John Harsanyi	147	(1)
Skyhooks?	148	(1)
Summum Bonum?	149	(1)
Political Legitimacy	150	(2)
Bargaining in the Original Position	152	(5)
Social Evolution	157	(1)
How Utilitarian Justice Works	158	(2)
A Food-Sharing Example	160	(1)
Relativity	161	(2)
Why Not Utilitarianism?	163	(2)
Egalitarianism	165	(20)
Original Sin	165	(1)
Equity	165	(1)
Rawls' Difference Principle	166	(2)
The Phantom Coin	168	(2)
Fair Social Contracts	170	(5)
How Egalitarian Justice Works	175	(1)
Trustless Transactions	175	(4)
Social Indices and the Context	179	(4)
The Market	183	(2)
Planned Decentralization	185	(16)
A Third Way?	185	(1)
Whiggery	186	(3)
Why Decentralize?	189	(1)
Why Plan?	189	(3)
Designing a Social Mechanism	192	(3)
Reforming a Social Contract?	195	(2)
Unfinished Business	197	(2)
A Perfect Commonwealth?	199	(2)
Bibliography	201	(4)
Index	205