Natural Justice

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  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2011-01-28
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press

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This book lays out foundations for a "science of morals." Binmore uses game theory as a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters. He reinterprets classical social contract ideas within a game-theory framework and generates new insights into the fundamental questions of socialphilosophy. In contrast to the previous writing in moral philosophy that relied on vague notion such as " societal well-being" and "moral duty," Binmore begins with individuals; rational decision-makers with the ability to emphasize with one another. Any social arrangement that prescribes them toact against their interests will become unstable and eventually will be replaced by another, until one is found that includes worthwhile actions for all individuals involved.

Author Biography

Ken Binmore is a mathematician-turned-economist who has devoted his life to the theory of games and its applications in economics, evolutionary biology, psychology, and moral philosophy. He is best known for his part in designing the telecom auction that raised $35 billion for the British taxpayer, but his major research contributions are to the theory of bargaining and its testing in the laboratory. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of 12 books and some 90 research papers. He is currently visiting the California Institute of technology as Mellon Professor of the Humanities.

Table of Contents

Prefacep. vii
Moral Sciencep. 1
Evolutionary Ethicsp. 1
Mudslingingp. 2
Social Contractsp. 3
Stabilityp. 5
Efficiencyp. 7
Fairnessp. 14
Reformp. 18
Bargainingp. 21
Realistic Bargainingp. 21
The Meeting Gamep. 22
Bargaining Problemsp. 23
The Nash Bargaining Solutionp. 25
Interpersonal Comparison of Utilityp. 27
Social Indicesp. 28
The Utilitarian Bargaining Solutionp. 29
The Egalitarian Bargaining Solutionp. 31
Utilitarianism versus Egalitarianismp. 32
Enforcementp. 33
Cultural Evolutionp. 34
Signifying Nothing?p. 36
Battle of the Ismsp. 37
Kicking up Dustp. 37
Empiricismp. 37
Naturalismp. 42
Relativismp. 47
Reductionismp. 53
Nil desperandum!p. 54
Equilibriump. 57
Inventing Right and Wrongp. 57
Toy Gamesp. 58
Cooperation and Conflictp. 58
Mixed Strategiesp. 60
The Prisoners' Dilemmap. 63
Multiple Equilibriap. 66
Nash Demand Gamep. 73
Out-of-Equilibrium Behaviorp. 75
Reciprocityp. 77
Tit-for-Tatp. 77
Folk Theoremp. 79
Punishmentp. 82
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?p. 85
Emergent Phenomenap. 86
Unpleasant Behaviorp. 89
Free for All?p. 92
Dutyp. 93
The Good, the Right and the Seemlyp. 93
Rightsp. 94
Dressing Upp. 96
Moral Responsibilityp. 97
Kinshipp. 101
Sympathyp. 101
Kin Selectionp. 102
Social Insectsp. 105
Modifying Hamilton's Rule?p. 108
Learning to Play an Equilibriump. 110
Extending the Familyp. 111
Warm Glowp. 112
Empathyp. 113
Empathetic Preferencesp. 113
Empathetic Identificationp. 114
Utilityp. 116
Interpersonal Comparison of Utilityp. 121
The Evolution of Empathetic Preferencesp. 125
The Golden Rulep. 129
Sages down the Agesp. 129
Hunters and Gatherersp. 130
Mechanism Designp. 135
An Origin for the Golden Rule?p. 139
Enforcementp. 143
Utilitarianismp. 147
John Harsanyip. 147
Skyhooks?p. 148
Summum Bonum?p. 149
Political Legitimacyp. 150
Bargaining in the Original Positionp. 152
Social Evolutionp. 157
How Utilitarian Justice Worksp. 158
A Food-Sharing Examplep. 160
Relativityp. 161
Why Not Utilitarianism?p. 163
Egalitarianismp. 165
Original Sinp. 165
Equityp. 165
Rawls' Difference Principlep. 166
The Phantom Coinp. 168
Fair Social Contractsp. 170
How Egalitarian Justice Worksp. 175
Trustless Transactionsp. 175
Social Indices and the Contextp. 179
The Marketp. 183
Planned Decentralizationp. 185
A Third Way?p. 185
Whiggeryp. 186
Why Decentralize?p. 189
Why Plan?p. 189
Designing a Social Mechanismp. 192
Reforming a Social Contract?p. 195
Unfinished Businessp. 197
A Perfect Commonwealth?p. 199
Bibliographyp. 201
Indexp. 205
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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