Natural Justice

by Binmore, Ken

• ISBN13: 9780199791484
• ISBN10: 0199791481
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2011-01-28
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

This book lays out foundations for a "science of morals." Binmore uses game theory as a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters. He reinterprets classical social contract ideas within a game-theory framework and generates new insights into the fundamental questions of socialphilosophy. In contrast to the previous writing in moral philosophy that relied on vague notion such as " societal well-being" and "moral duty," Binmore begins with individuals; rational decision-makers with the ability to emphasize with one another. Any social arrangement that prescribes them toact against their interests will become unstable and eventually will be replaced by another, until one is found that includes worthwhile actions for all individuals involved.

Author Biography

Ken Binmore is a mathematician-turned-economist who has devoted his life to the theory of games and its applications in economics, evolutionary biology, psychology, and moral philosophy. He is best known for his part in designing the telecom auction that raised $35 billion for the British taxpayer, but his major research contributions are to the theory of bargaining and its testing in the laboratory. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of 12 books and some 90 research papers. He is currently visiting the California Institute of technology as Mellon Professor of the Humanities.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. vii
Moral Science	p. 1
Evolutionary Ethics	p. 1
Mudslinging	p. 2
Social Contracts	p. 3
Stability	p. 5
Efficiency	p. 7
Fairness	p. 14
Reform	p. 18
Bargaining	p. 21
Realistic Bargaining	p. 21
The Meeting Game	p. 22
Bargaining Problems	p. 23
The Nash Bargaining Solution	p. 25
Interpersonal Comparison of Utility	p. 27
Social Indices	p. 28
The Utilitarian Bargaining Solution	p. 29
The Egalitarian Bargaining Solution	p. 31
Utilitarianism versus Egalitarianism	p. 32
Enforcement	p. 33
Cultural Evolution	p. 34
Signifying Nothing?	p. 36
Battle of the Isms	p. 37
Kicking up Dust	p. 37
Empiricism	p. 37
Naturalism	p. 42
Relativism	p. 47
Reductionism	p. 53
Nil desperandum!	p. 54
Equilibrium	p. 57
Inventing Right and Wrong	p. 57
Toy Games	p. 58
Cooperation and Conflict	p. 58
Mixed Strategies	p. 60
The Prisoners' Dilemma	p. 63
Multiple Equilibria	p. 66
Nash Demand Game	p. 73
Out-of-Equilibrium Behavior	p. 75
Reciprocity	p. 77
Tit-for-Tat	p. 77
Folk Theorem	p. 79
Punishment	p. 82
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?	p. 85
Emergent Phenomena	p. 86
Unpleasant Behavior	p. 89
Free for All?	p. 92
Duty	p. 93
The Good, the Right and the Seemly	p. 93
Rights	p. 94
Dressing Up	p. 96
Moral Responsibility	p. 97
Kinship	p. 101
Sympathy	p. 101
Kin Selection	p. 102
Social Insects	p. 105
Modifying Hamilton's Rule?	p. 108
Learning to Play an Equilibrium	p. 110
Extending the Family	p. 111
Warm Glow	p. 112
Empathy	p. 113
Empathetic Preferences	p. 113
Empathetic Identification	p. 114
Utility	p. 116
Interpersonal Comparison of Utility	p. 121
The Evolution of Empathetic Preferences	p. 125
The Golden Rule	p. 129
Sages down the Ages	p. 129
Hunters and Gatherers	p. 130
Mechanism Design	p. 135
An Origin for the Golden Rule?	p. 139
Enforcement	p. 143
Utilitarianism	p. 147
John Harsanyi	p. 147
Skyhooks?	p. 148
Summum Bonum?	p. 149
Political Legitimacy	p. 150
Bargaining in the Original Position	p. 152
Social Evolution	p. 157
How Utilitarian Justice Works	p. 158
A Food-Sharing Example	p. 160
Relativity	p. 161
Why Not Utilitarianism?	p. 163
Egalitarianism	p. 165
Original Sin	p. 165
Equity	p. 165
Rawls' Difference Principle	p. 166
The Phantom Coin	p. 168
Fair Social Contracts	p. 170
How Egalitarian Justice Works	p. 175
Trustless Transactions	p. 175
Social Indices and the Context	p. 179
The Market	p. 183
Planned Decentralization	p. 185
A Third Way?	p. 185
Whiggery	p. 186
Why Decentralize?	p. 189
Why Plan?	p. 189
Designing a Social Mechanism	p. 192
Reforming a Social Contract?	p. 195
Unfinished Business	p. 197
A Perfect Commonwealth?	p. 199
Bibliography	p. 201
Index	p. 205
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